

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	Telcon	HAK and Mr. Kubisch (2 pp.) DECLASSIFIED per Htr. 2/3/2016	7/12/74	B
2	Telcon	HAK and Ambassador Zehedi (1 p)	7/15/74	BD
3	Telcon	HAK and Joseph Sisco (2 pp.) DECLASSIFIED per Htr. 2/3/2016	7/16/74	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

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Kissinger Transcripts- Telephone Conversations

26

FOLDER TITLE

1974 10-16 July (4)

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DECLASSIFIED

This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

NA 14021 (4-85)



TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
July 10, 1974
4:10 PM

S: Yes, sir.

K: Did Jerry Warren do what he was supposed to?

S: Jerry Warren did what he was suppose to. He had to do it after the briefing because they didn't -- the only thing on the whole briefing was Watergate.

K: But what does it mean he did it after.

S: He called people ~~a~~ in and he got the word out and it's on a ticker.

K: As a White House quote?

S: Yes. As a White House quote.

K: OK.

S: I've got it here. At the White House Deputy Press Secretary Jerold Warren said a possible Schlesinger-Grechko meeting was not discussed at President Nixon's Moscow summit and no such meeting is contemplated.

K: OK. Good.

END



TELECON

Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger

July 10, 1974

6:00 PM

D: Mr. Secretary, welcome back to Washington.

K: How are YOU?

D: How are You?

K: I'm fine.

D: I understand you had a very brief and convincing appearance today.

K: I said no three times.

D: That's right. If I remember you correctly it sometimes took you much long longer to say yes then to say no.

K: That is true.x

D: How is Nancy?

K: She's fine. Listen, I've had an ~~historical~~ hysterical call again from Rita Hauser.

D: Yes I know, she called me.

K: Now, do you agree with her?

D: I did not know what she said to you. I would have to

K: She says you and she are agreed that I'm in mortal danger.

D: No, ~~xxx~~ no.

K: And that there are a lot of people ganging up on me.

D: I had a long talk with her yesterday. We sat for about an hour and half together and I analysed some of the situations as I did with Larry. Which I'm sure Larry told you.

K: Not yet.

D: Which is a realistic assessment I think of some of factors that are operating in the scene which I'd be more than ~~glad~~ glad to share it with you. But it's by ~~know means~~ no means a panic situation.



Dinitz - page 2

K: No, that's my assessment too. I don't know what your assesment is, I think I've identified that fact.

D: It's more or less thing that we've have ~~thax~~ talked before but so many of them are coming to a head and I think they are manageable but we have to recognize that and I wanted to change some news with ~~xx~~ you.

K: Let's get together tomorrow sometime.

D: I will be in New York tomorrow because Larry told me that we would see each other on Friday. You think we could do it on Friday or shall Ihow is your schedule?

K: Maybe Friday. Friday would be alright, about 5:00.

D: 5:00 on Friday.

K: Or does that keep you away from synagogue.

D: No it doesn't keep me away from synagogue, I go only on Thursday, as you know.

K: But only when there's a bar mitzvah.

D: Right.

K: I think I've identified my problem areas.

D: I'm sure you did.

K: I'd be -- your judgment means a lot to me.

D: No, we will be able to talk and exchange views and maybe it will be helpful.

K: I know it will be helpful. You have extremely good judgment but basically my.....

D: ___my concerned, it doesn't come out of anything except very concerned, very

K: I consider you a close personal friend, you know this. So I don't talk to you as an ambassador. On the other hand~~x~~ sometimes it's best to be fatalistic.

D: Not unless it's absolutely necessary.

K: OK, well, I'll see you -- look your people in Jerusalem have lost their minds.

D: About ~~wh~~ at now?

K: In general. I just don't like the tone. Now you take that Moscow communique, in the letter of invitation to Geneva, we said in the first stage we would discuss the Palestinians. We took out in the first stage. Less than.....

D: I think the reason the press reaction -- does not reflect the government's reaction on this.

K: I spent a whole night fighting this thing. Less than that we couldn't do on the basis of the record. Then to string together things we had already said.

D: I under stand. I will point out to you where are the points which concerned us, but obviously it was not any concern that even my phoning back Sisco and telling him what I think of him.

K: The future of the Palestinians will not be decided with such nonsense.

D: That's is correct. But you must understand why there is great sensitivity in the press.

K: But I must say the Rabin ~~interview~~ interview with Newsweek is unforgivably. It's senseless, it makes no sense.

D: I don't think he said anything new there but may be the tone was not.....

K: But why say it. What do we gain.

D: If you ask me why ___being interviewed by ___ anyhow.

K: ~~x~~ We're talking as friends, but what the hell good did it do to anybody? You don't need it now, no one has asked anything.

D: I agree with you.

K: If I hear once more a piece of land for a piece of peace. You tell Alon if he says that, that's the end of our conversation. He can say anything else. He can say he wants Amman for a ~~for~~ peace settlement.

D: I ~~w~~ tell you when I was in Israel I told Rabin _____ and said what the hell ~~to~~ do you have to give him any interview. ~~H~~ Who is he an agent of ___ and later a ___ of Sadat. Why do you have to interview. He said I'm not going in and give him an interview just background. So I guess one cannot resist a picture in Time magazine.



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Peres

K: And then of course what/said with Javits.

D: That I have told Scowcroft is not correct. I have told Scowcroft but I don't know if you've had a chance to hear from him, but I told Scowcroft because he called my attention to it and I checked with Peres and Rabin. Peres did not refer at all to any letter of commitment on the President.

K: Yes, but he said there was a letter.

D: No, he did not. Peres denies it forthright in a cable and a telephone conversation and authorized me to tell it to you in his name. It is not. I think that your Ambassador is very frustrated and probably has some ____ about it or maybe Javits ____ something and immediately wanted to cable because he wanted to indicate to everyone that he did -- you know, that he's not kept informed. That was his motivation. He said to someone that he has learned five minutes in his conversation with me so when he was in Israel more than you people told him in a year. So this is his attitude for frustrated Ambassador who.....

K: This I can't believe. There are a lot of things I believe.

D: No, but in ____.

K: But that is physically impossible.

D: That is correct.

K: OK. I will see you Friday at 5:00.

D: See you Friday.

END



TELECON

Larry Eagleburger/Secretary Kissinger

July 11, 1974

6:54 PM

E: Stennis finally returned my call and I explained your thought and he said he would send me a list of names tomorrow. But then he went on to say, ~~you~~ you had done so well the other day at the leadership meeting, he'd like you to come up before the entire committee. I said that I'd pass that on to you.

K: What do you think?

E: I think it would be a great idea, you'd run into a problem with the House, you know if we're going...

K: No, that's alright. Well, tell him yes.

E: OK. The only ~~thing~~ thing I'm thinking is we've got to worry about Doc Morgan.

K: Let's put him on in the next two or three weeks.

E: Now that one other _____ he said he was really concerned about ~~how~~ these reports about you and Schlesinger and off record for your information, he had thought about asking you and Schlesinger up there at the same time.

K: No.

E: I know. I didn't say anything. I will call him back in the morning and say that's really fine, but you'd rather just keep it to a briefing on the trip and think it would be better if you appeared alone.

K: Right. And just tell him I don't consider myself in confrontation with Schlesinger.

E: I ~~xxx~~ already told him. He said, what did I think and I said, look I can tell him personally in my knowledge that no conflict between Schlesinger (inaudible). OK. I'll call him back.

K: Good.

E: And get it set up.

K: Right.

END

TELECON
Larry Eagleburger/Secretary Kissinger
July 11, 1974
7:40 PM

E: Yes sir.

K: Larry, I sent a letter out yesterday for Hal Sonnenfeldt to answer. This means I want the answer by tomorrow.

E: OK.

K: To Lord Kennet about this ~~xxx~~ Jackson episode. Can you make sure?

E: Yes.

K: Secondly, I find here a whole batch of letters to Senator Ross, to Otis Chandler. They are six weeks old, replying to letters they sent me. Now that just cannot be.

E: I'll check it with Bremer.

K: We're talking about Otis Chandler.

E: I'll check it with Bremer in the morning.

K: That's a good way to make an enemy.

E: No, I know. I agree.

K: I understand also from Nancy that David Bruce is very hurt that I never answered his cable explaining that he hadn't said what he had said.

E: I thought in fact we had answered it, but let me ~~xx~~ check.

~~Kx~~

K: But could ~~x~~ we please make sure that we do these things.

E: Yes.

K: Now finally this morning I ran into the President of the University of Rochester who said he's been ~~x~~ trying to offer ~~x~~ me an honorary degree for four weeks. He had a letter in here for six weeks, he's been trying to call you for three and he can't get through.

E: I replied to his letter on your behalf...

K: I don't want a honorary degree.



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E: I know. I replied to his letter several weeks ago saying you were out of town and we'd get an answer as soon as you got back.

K: For example, what it is that is holding up an answer to the Alfred E. Smith dinner?

E: Alfred Smith.

K: Alfred Smith dinner. That used to be considered something the Presidential ~~xxxxx~~ candidates fight for. Now why do we not answer that? Or ~~k~~ at ~~least~~ least get me a recommendation. How many hundreds of people have to analyse that?

E: I intend to check that in the morning.

K: How about that award from the ~~xxxxxxx~~ Carnegie thing that I gave you yesterday. I just want to know what the procedure is.

E: The procedure is that on those they go down to PA for a recommendation and they usually pull together in one and they apparently take too damn long. I'll have to sit down with George Springsteen and work up a system I guess.

K: I want both of these back up tomorrow and I want no letter held for more than three days.

E: OK. Alright I'll have it for you and the Sonnenfeldt thing.

K: OK.

(Remainder of conversation is personal)

END

TELECON

Mr. Ziegler/Secretary Kissinger

July 12, 1974

9:55 am

Z: Hi Henry.

K: Ron, how are you?

Z: Good. Listen, I was just reading the Wall Street Journal here. And it has Nixon and Kissinger head toward a falling out. It is not a big thing. It is more of the crap.

K: What does it say?

Z: It says Nixon and Kissinger head toward a falling out. It is not a big thing. But down below it says talks of a possible Nixon trip to Japan or more visits to Europe -- but Kissinger hasn't been filled in on either idea.

K: Well it is total bullshit. They asked me on the plane about the President's trip to Japan in August. I said I had never heard of it,

Z: Good.

K: But I do know it was in a Communique that he is going in '74.

Z: Good. I just want you to know that what I have said when they say Ziegler talks about a possible Nixon trip -- when that story broke, I don't know who broke it about August. I took exactly the same line you're taking. I said there is no problem. I know that Kissinger and the President have not talked about a specific date but as we said in the Communique, the President would like to visit Japan in '74. And has agreed in principle. And in terms of another trip to Europe, I say that there is nothing on the calander. So if you see that, I want you to know that we're not over here, and I'm not spreading around some Japanese trip. We were responding to that leak story. Ok?

K: Ok. Well, you know, whatever you can do to avoid any impression of a split between the President and say I think -- would be highly desirable from the President's viewpoint.

Z: Absolutely, that's why I am calling. Of course it would and that's what I am going to do. But I just wanted you to know first hand that if you read that or it is called to your attention that I am taking exactly the line you're taking.



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K: Well, why don't you call them and tell them.

Z: I am going to. I am going to. I am going to hit the guy over here today.

K: Ok, good.

Z: Ok, Henry.

K: Thank you.

END



TELECON

Mr. Sidey/Secretary Kissinger

July 12, 1974

9:57

S: Hello, well, you got through the Court alright.

K: I tell you,

S: Didn't lose any parts at all.

K: Two more questions and I would have confessed.

S: Listen, Henry. I have kind of reversed field and I want to see whether I can get your permission. I wanted to do a piece when all is said and done, when I considered all the implications that says Henry Kissinger has really had more fun than anybody I know over these last years. And I go on to say...

K: You want to kill me?

S: No, No. I am just so delighted that you keep your humor. Here is what I've done. I said hard work, sure; moments of anger and frustration, certainly, but as you have gone along this remarkable journey you have injected peace and good sense and yet have cast a wry eye over all the singular doings of mankind. And then I just wondered with discretion and that, with some of these little anecdotes that you have told us along the way -- and might be used. I talk about how -- the World Soccer match and then there was a call from Elizabeth Taylor and you said she wanted to give a briefing on European security Conference.

K: She wanted to get a briefing.

S: Get a briefing, yes. Ok. Just as a joke again.

K: Yes, you can use that.

S: And then that he stood fascinated on the grounds of Leonard Brezhnev's dachau and watched him demonstrate the collapsable glass wall around the swimming pool and once he took a ride with Brezhnev at the wheel of a Mark IV Lincoln, the results of which are still a state secret.

K: That's all fine.



S: Is that alright. Then, I said the other night, you devoured delicious roast goose in a Bavarian restaurant and laughing as Gert Ferber, whatever his name is, told stories and pantomined, you know. And then I said the discreet Secretary surveyed the bosomy waitresses on the same night and after some hasty calculation, observed that if those particular girls had not served the dinner, the host would have had to increase the guest list by 30 percent to fill the room. Is that alright.

K: (Laughter) That is all fine.

S: And then, Kissinger listened to Brezhnev order him to Siberia, failing to yield enough in negotiations, but he has come back suggesting I should be a member of the Politboro since I meet with you guys so much. I would like to be in charge of ideaoölogy. Is that alright.

K: That's fine.

S: Ok. He was thoroughly thrilled when he got to Moscow this time, when Smirnov, head of Soviet weaponry, said he was downright insulted that Americans like Senator Henry Jackson would believe that the Soviet s would put brand new missiles on old diesel submarines. That is what Kissinger has been saying to his critics about the so-called treaty "loophole", so when the Soviet -US heart agreement was signed in the Kremlin, Kissinger warned Smirnov, I don't want you putting your, putting any artificioal hearts on those old submarines.

K: Yes, I said they can't put heart machines on those submarines either.

S: Ok, can't put any..

K: artificial heart machines on these submarines either.

S: Ok, good. There we go. And it is part of the legend now, that Kissinger came away from the negotiation session ~~xxxx~~ with the Soviets once and said I would do anything for caviar, and I may have. Is that right.

K: That is also essentially true.

did not start

S: Back in '72 when the Russian____ carry Nixon to Kiev, the mortified Alexi Kosygin asked if the Minister of Aviation ought to be shot, Kissinger tried to soothe things, explaining the inherent evil in objects: dropped coins roll away from a person, not toward him; Buttered bread falls butter down in direct proportion to the cost of the carpet. Kosygin eyes Kissinger and said he didn't agree. Kosygin had dropped coins that rolled toward himself. Kissinger changed the subject.



K: Laughter.

S: There is something in the world now called Henry's groupies. They are his former Harvard students. You can find one or two in almost every Government that we encounter. The Secretary flies in, there is a little meeting with the old seminars, that sort of thing. Oh, yes, here's one. Kissinger has been offered the choicest girls by at least one of his powerful hosts. He graciously declined. Even though it was in bachelor days. Once the offer was so insistent that he felt like accepting and then telling this host to hurry and take the pictures they wanted, so Henry could get back to work. Is that too delicate.

K: That, if you can avoid that, that might be a little bad.

S: Ok. We can take that out. Let me see, what else. Oh, he called for a massage once in Israel recently, and then you can say anything you want about Jewish intellectual attainments, he reported, but that guy almost killed me. And then, Kissinger's fascination with soccer is such a relatively new discovery. Reporters wormed it out of him that he had broken his hand when he played goalie as a boy in Germany; shifted to forward. Was he pretty ~~asked~~ fast, someone asked. Kissinger thought a moment. I wasn't so fast, he said laughing, but I was tricky. And then, Kissinger like Nixon has found that sports and politics have much in common. So a while back when East Germany was still in the world soccer contention, he sidled up to a Soviet official, "I bet I know one team you don't want to win" said Kissinger. East Germany, because if they win they will be more trouble than ever. The Russian roared and slapped Kissinger on the back for displaying such wisdom in the ways of this strange world. That's it essentially.

K: I think that's very friendly.

S: No, no. It is just good nature. I must say we are so burdened with heavy stuff, it seemed to me that essential in your success is your enjoyment of the job.

K: Well, I appreciate this and it was fun to have you on the plane.

S: Oh, goodness, Henry. I wouldn't have missed it. You know, I kept saying I was going to roll off but.. how is the rest of it going?

K: It is going along ok.

S: Is it easing out on this whole business?

K: On which.



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S: Oh, just the whole trial thing.

K: I think, you know, now that I look over the evidence and so forth. I think I'll be fine.

S: I was worried that in court there would be cross-examination and all of that sort of thing, but it seems to me that this whole thing is breaking down. This business of involving you and that, but we'll see.

K: Well, I hope so. Anyway, I have that impression.

S: Strange days. Listen, I will guard you on this. No state secrets. Just good warm fun.

K: No, this is very friendly and I appreciate it.

S: Ok, good luck.

K: Many thanks, bye.

END



TELCON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
July 12, 1974
10:09 am

D: Hello.

K: Anatoyl.

D: Hello, Henry. I am really glad to hear your voice.

K: I am so busy doing your work in the European Security Conference and elsewhere that we're not in contact anymore.

D: Well, for a change I think it is useful. Really. To do something.. well, Henry have to thank you for the opportunity to meet on Monday because I go for a rather long vacation on Tuesday.

K: Ok, can we have lunch on Monday.

D: Yes, that is very good. Yes, and if you don't mind to look through on those agreements which have an understanding on what we are going to do from an organizational point of view. When we will begin it and..

K: Absolutely. And also I want to tell you what we have done on the European Security Conference, because I think we have got it in a very positive direction now, if you cooperate a little bit on Basket III.

D: Well, do you have any concrete suggestions.? This is important.

K: I think we have broken the back on the Summit idea.

D: Already.

K: I think we are well on the way. But don't go around saying this.

D: No. no, no.

K: No, you won't, but sometimes your people in the lower regions are not as subtle as you are.

D: On this only Gromyko and myself are looking, otherwise he will keep this close to his heart. It is a project he likes very much. So, Henry, then...

K: And I also want to talk to you about SALT. Not that there is a wild urgency, but I really think before everybody goes crazy....



-2-

D: Henry, Brezhnev asked me if you could just a little bit more liberate these ideas of yours. Because he himself is going for a vacation. He will want to go for three days in Poland, in a few days. But then he will spend all his time ...

K: What did you do to my Egyptian friends ?

D: What did we do. We just give a chance to explore all depths of their talks til October, so we hope they will explore it fully.

K: Well, now they are all upset and worried.

D: On the contrary, we give them a full chance to make a soul searching...

K: I will stop advising you when you people start getting clever, we'll be in deep trouble.

D: They decided really to give them a chance.

K: I need you clumsy.

D: You are going to stay here, not go on any vacation.

K: No, I think I need to show some of my opponents in this town that I did not survive for five and a half years by being a pushover.

D: I notice this, but I think what they are going is a crazy idea and a stupid one. Because no chance of...

K: Anatoyl, I am bound to win.

D: No, no. I am sure about it. That's why I am rather surprised by the stupidity of them to try it because it is a clear-tight case and..

K: No, no. Actually I want to stay in town. I just want to stay here for about four weeks to restore a little discipline.

D: This is important.

K: How long are you going to be gone.

D: I guess until the middle of September.

K: Well. Somebody told me you are going to become Foreign Minister. Is that true?



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D: Well, you know, not always are your sources of information the best ones.

K: Well, we'll have to take that wiretap off the Kremlin then.

D: Well, this is another story, or you have to fire those who are making them, there not good enough and get a better one.

be

K: Well, Anatoyl I would/very torn. On the one hand, I would like to see you in a higher position, on the other...

D: No, I ~~xxxxxxreallyeagerxx~~ am not really eager. It is troublesome work. In a way, I may say, it is more difficult than yours.

K: Much more, much more.

D: In one way. A rather important one. In a sense, when you have to get a message...

K : You have fifteen, and you have a Polltboro member who thinks he is an expert.

D: So this makes it much more difficult. In your case, it is easy, you have only one man.

K: No question, and I would also hate to lose a personal friend here. I don't know how it squares with Marxist ideology to have personal friendships at the diplomatic level.

D: I think it is quite alright. I hope until next meeting here, until next summit I'll be here.

K: Oh, good.

D: These are my intentions. Ok, Henry.

K: Good.

D: And I'll see you on Monday at 1:00.

K: Are you going away for the weekend.

D: Probably yes. Probably will go to the big bay, this is my intention.



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K: Today?

D: No, tomorrow. Today, I will stay here.

K: And you'll be back on Sunday.

D: Yes.

K: Ok, well if I want to get a hold of you I can call you there.

D: Well, ok. It is alright with me, but I am sure you can wait until Monday.

K: It will wait Monday. See you for lunch on Monday.

D: Yes, thank you very much.

K: Good, bye.

END



TELECON

Mr. Schechter/Secretary Kissinger

July 12, 1974

10:40 am

S: Hugh must have known you were trying to get me, he wouldn't let me get off the phone.

K: What does he want, to prove that the President is getting ready to fire me.

S: No, he said that diplomatic relations between the White House and the State Department were superb.

K: That's true.

K: I return his calls the same day now.

S: (Laughter) Well, you sound in pretty good shape. The reason I called is we are trying to do a piece about -- a sort of positioning things for your appearance.

K: My appearance won't be until the 23rd now.

S: I see. Are you pretty sanguine about how things..

K: Oh yes. Now that I have seen all the documents which I never had before. I think they more than support my case.

S: When you say all the documents, you mean the FBI stuff.

K: Yes, you see all I had seen is a 29 page summary. Now I have seen the documents on which the -- on what basis are we talking?

S: The usual.

K: No, I just don't think I ought to characterize my testimony before I give it, but I really...

S: Let me -- well, I can say on my own that you are confident.

K: Very very confident. And, in fact I don't think there is a problem.

S: What about this so-called difference about the fact that Hoover says in the memos, which I gather were drafted by Sullivan but signed by Hoover, saying that you were the initiator.



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K: I think that will all come out very clearly. The initiator of what, individual taps?

S: Yes.

K: It is a pure question of terminology. And I think I am going not to get into it. What I am going to do is to describe it. I really think it is a pure question of terminology. That the substance is as I described it.

S: Right, right. What about the thing on terminating the taps.

K: McCloskey now says, that he having reviewed the records -- if anything I overstated my role.

S: (Laughter) Well, it won't be the first time.

K: Listen, you bastard, you'll never get in here again. Look, everyone agrees that after May 1970, I didn't see any of these reports anymore. So what possible basis did I have for terminating it.

S: Yes,

K: Secondly, the records will show that a number of people that were tapped, I never got any reports on so I just couldn't have been the guy terminating them.

S: Right, well, who was responsible for that in the White House at that point.

K: You know I'll have to wait with my statement. But I don't know the answers to all of the questions.

S: Ok, it's just sort of speaking personally, I think that is one of the questions that should be answered in this whole thing because that is one of the questions that has been raised on this. The memo says, the FBI memo says, that on three separate occasions they asked for the taps to be terminated .

K: I frankly don't believe that.

S: Well, ...there may have been a little bureaucratic ass covering there, but you know, you're aware of what the problem is. The problem is that you then take a quantum jump from not terminating the taps to the idea that the information wasn't, didn't generate National Security information but was used for domestic political purposes, namely the fact that



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S: Halperin and Lake were working for Muskie.

K: Look at the time Halperin and Lake were working for Muskie, I wasn't getting any reports any more.

S: Ok.

K: So even if that were true, I wouldn't have known about it.

S: Now, what about the plumbers business and Wellender. Do you see that as a problem.

K: It is a harder problem to prove because I didn't do anything, so I have no records whatsoever to fall back on.

S: Yes.

K: I do not see it as a problem, no. I did not know about the Plumbers. I don't know how often I have to say that.

S: Now, for example, in your testimony, you have mentioned on two or three occasions people came to you for historical documents which you refused, but you also said that you didn't understand that that was an organized group.

K: No, no no. Nobody of the Plumbers ever came to me.

S: I see. I see.

K: That didn't come from the Plumbers.

S: Where did that come from, Colson?

K: I think once it came from Colson and once it came from Erlichman. But that never came from anybody from the Plumbers.

S: I see. Ok. Well, I get the feeling that resignation is fading into the background here, would that be correct.

K: It depends what decision the Committee makes.

S: Yes, but I sense that frankly, the worst that Erlichman and Colson have to offer seems to have just kind of floated away with the tide.

K: They don't have anything to offer.

S: That's right.



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K: I mean they have innuendo. And with Colson, his own sick imagination. When Colson says I was at a meeting that he didn't himself attend, then what the hell do you have.

S: Yes, Yes.

K: No, I'm glad that we can have a comprehensive view of the thing. Ok, Jerry. You've been very decent through all of this.

S: That's because you deserve it.

K: Well, I don't know, but you have and I appreciate it.

S: Thanks, we'll be in touch.

K: Ok, bye.

END

Schecter called back: 10:42

S: Henry, Life magazine is going to start up again and they have a special report which is going to be one day in the life of America which the day is going to be September fifth and they are going to do a day in the life of the country and of course, they want me to do a piece on you and your day. And, I was hoping we could get you to cooperate on that.

K: Of course,

S: Ok, wonderful.

K: It means you have to spend that day with me.

S: That's right.

K: I wish you were prettier.

S: (Laughter) Maybe your wife will like me.

K: Ok.

S: Thanks.

END



TELECON

Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger

July 12, 1974

12:15 PM

K: Tell the Germans that Genscher could come on the 23rd. That I could then meet with them the morning of the 24th and if the President is still on the West Coast we could then go out to the West Coast the afternoon of the 24th and meet the President the morning of the 25th, then he can go on home the evening -- you know, ~~after of the~~ the afternoon of the

M: Was he supposed to bring his wife?

K: Look, preferably not. The fewer I have to deal with, the better.

M: I mean, you didn't suggest that to him.

K: Well, if you give him that schedule he's going to ~~begin~~ bring his wife.

M: OK.

K: Good. Can you do that?

M: Yes.

K: Thank you.

END



TELECON
Bernard Kalb/Secretary Kissinger
July 12, 1974
12:20 PM

HAK: How are you?

K: Fine. Thank you very much, sir. I just wanted a moment if I could, I was going to try actually to stop by for a second before leaving for San Clemente to drop off a bound copy of the book, which we just have received.

HAK: Oh, terrific.

K: But Dr. Kissinger, my office called to ask me to look into the story in the Wall Street Journal which I assume you may have seen this morning.

HAK: No.

K: It's on the front page on the top, Nixon and Kissinger head toward a falling out.

HAK: Oh, baloney.

K: And he says the President fails to aid the Secretary of State on the wire tapping controversy; Kissinger would like a White House statement that he's telling the truth.

HAK: That's also nonsense.

K: All of that?

HAK: Yes. I'm certain the President will say what needs to be said before that is over and it's just not true.

K: Can I use some of this of what you're saying, nonsense of this whole report? I mean would it be alright if I were to quote you on this? Or just take it on background and so forth.

HAK: Take it on background. But you can make it very strong.

K: The whole story?

HAK: Yes. I mean, for example, somebody read me a part of it this morning. For example, he fails to inform me of a Japanese trip. He failed to inform me of a trip he isn't taking.

K: I see.

HAK: That was with respect to the story that he was going to Japan in



Kalb - page 2

August. The fact that a trip was being planned for 1974, I of course knew, because I had it in the communique when Tanaka was here.

K: Absolutely. Well, one of the things that when we were listening to the Salzburg news conferences, there was some speculation that maybe some of that might have been that the President might step forth and in effect reiterate the May 22 that he personally authorized the entire wiretap program.

HAK: I've expected that will be done before it's over. There is no dispute between the President and me and I'm sure the White House will confirm this.

K: They have. They told me that this morning.

HAK: There's not the slightest problem and I don't know how these stories get started.

K: So in effect, you're really guiding me away from that whole story and knock it down as best I can.

HAK: That is really -- and I'm not doing it to be cute. There just isn't anything to it.

K: Alright, I'll get down and I'll try to stop by Dr. Kissinger and drop of a copy of the book on the floor before we take off.

HAK: Good.

K: I'm most grateful for your ~~help~~ help on this thing and to welcome back after a very very difficult job on this last round.

HAK: Thank you.

K: I hope you loved the soccer match.

HAK: I liked it very much.

K: OK, many thanks.

HAK: Bye.

END



TELECON

Senator James Allen/Secretary Kissinger

July 12, 1974

4:55 PM

K: Senator, I've been out of town so much since you introduced your resolution in my support a few weeks ago, that I never had a chance to thank you.

A: You didn't have to do that.

K: Well, I wanted you to know that it was very much appreciated and it meant a great deal.

A: I was glad to do it. I felt that since so many of our agreements stood to fail on their trust and ~~were~~ confidence in you that the United States Senate should not have less confidence, so that was the theory on which I did it. I feel like it came at a pretty good time.

K: It came at a very good time and it was -- it ~~were~~ meant a great deal to me and I wanted you to know that.

A: Well, I was just delighted to do it and I feel like I have performed a service that you certainly were entitled to and you've done an outstanding job and I was certainly glad to lend my support to this statement.

K: Again, I want you to know how much I appreciated it.

A: Well, you're certainly welcome.

K: Hope to meet you.

A: I was delighted to do it.

K: Bye.

END

*

TELECON
Secretary Weinberger/Secretary Kissinger
July 12, 1974
5:08 PM

W: ____classmate of mine and somebody you probably know - Francis Keppel, who used to be over here. I guess may still be at Harvard.

K: What's his name?

W: Keppel.

K: Oh, yes. I know.

W: Francis Keppel, he used to be commission of education.

K: Yes, I know him very well.

W: He's finishing a job really running a thing called General Learning which was a joint ~~venture~~ venture of Time and General ~~Electric~~ Electric and has done a fine job of that.

K: No, he's a very able guy.

W: He is and he has some interest in public service again and to be perfectly frank, I tried out the President with him to see if I could get him to agree to have me put him on as Commission of Education again, which Frank was willing to do and the President indicated no enthusiasm for that idea but I do think he is extraordinarily able and his primary interest is in the ~~foreign~~ foreign international field, international monetary fund and international banking__ and the State Department with perhaps international economic overtones or something of that kind.

K: What makes you think the President will want me to hire him?

W: I thought that perhaps that if ^{he}~~you~~ were in an area in which the President is ____more interested and secondly which he would regard as less sensitive with your aspects of things like buffing, grants to ivy league institutions and things like that, that he might not regard that as so much more difficult. I don't know, I just think this is an extraordinarily able fellow and I have known him since ~~a~~ I was a first year freshman in college.

K: No, I know Keppel. He's very able. Let me see what I can do about it.



~~XXXXXX~~

Weinberger - page 2

W: It could be with one of the funds or with something else but I just wanted to put his name before you and I ~~z~~ was sure you knew him so I thought rather than write the formal.

K: No, this is much better.

W: letter I would just do it ~~w~~ this way. But I wanted to be frank and let you know the past ~~history~~ history of the thing. The President didn't say no you can't have him but he just said, gee I don't know if he'd really be very consistent with what we want to do and I think that would be mis-read in the community and stuff like that and after a while I got tired of pushing him. He is awfully good and in a different field he might not encounter that.

K: Good. Well let me -- I will definitely consider him.

W: Excellent. I cannot refrain from telling of my admiration for how you do all these things, Henry. It's really great. It's the one thing that we all got to crow about and hope to God you keep on doing it for a long time.

K: Cap you're a good friend.

W: Thank you sir.

K: Thank you, bye.

W: OK.

END

TELECON

Mr. Kubisch/Secretary Kissinger

July 12, 1974

5:18 PM

HAK: _____ find that the Brazilian press is attacking me for rooting against them in soccer.

K: I saw that in this morning's New York Times. I'm absolutely mistyified about it.

HAK: And also that they were offering me a sweat shirt. They must have some psychotics down there.

K: Well, there are plenty of those in Rio but...

HAK: I don't remember that any one offered me any sweat shirt. Why don't you issue a statement say ing I would have been glad to root for them if they had ever left their half of the field. Why don't you have our Embassy put out a statement saying I rooted for them the two times they crossed ~~x~~ mid-field.

K: OK.

HAK: No, I'm kidding.

K: No. But also in that same little piece in the N. Y. Times, they attribute some remark to Crimmins that you were going there in October. I can't imagine Crimmins saying anything like that. ~~x~~

HAK: Well, can you get this straightened out first in so far as it's possible get Crimmins to get across to them that I wasn't rooting for anybody. That secondly no one offered me a Brazilian sweat shirt and that I would be honored to wear one into my office. Tell them if the ~~sex~~ sweat shirt is under \$50 I'll keep it.

K: Whether it's laundered or not.

HAK: No seriously, can you get him if it's possible in that nut house down there to get that word out to the newspapers?

K: Yes. You weren't really rooting for anyone and no one offered you a Brazilian sweat shirt.

HAK: That's right.

K: OK.

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HAK: Because had they done so it would have left such an indelible impression. In fact I even posed with Pelli (phonetic). ~~Indecent~~ Indecent embrace.

K: Well, it's nice that you're indiscriminate in

HAK: OK. Well, will you get these guys in Brazilia to see what they can do in a low-key way?

K: Yes.

HAK: OK, good.

END



TELECON
Larry Eagleburger/Secretary Kissinger
July 12, 1974
7:06 PM

K: Did you ever call Congressman Mahon?

E: No, I did not because I wanted to talk to you tomorrow morning.

K: There's nothing to talk about. I wish to do it.

E: Alright.

K: I am not appearing ~~before~~ the Senate ~~xxxx~~ -- for the State Department, I'm appearing for other reasons.

E: No, I understand that.

K: I know there are a lot of things you guys got scheduled for me that don't do anybody any good.

E: I wanted to get some feel from you on those other two appearances.

K: I want the House on Thursday morning.

E: Good.

K: Then we can ~~move~~ move the verification panel.

E: OK. That's all I need and I'll call him.

K: And then I want a Senate Armed Services Committee next week.

E: Week after next.

K: Yes.

E: OK.

K: I also want Mahon in one of those social hours.

E: OK. Wasn't he supposed to give you some other names too?

K: He was going to arrange a meeting and he was going to be in touch with you.

E: OK. I'll call him in the morning.

K: Good.

END

TELECON

William Clements/Secretary Kissinger

July 15, 1974

1:07 PM

K: How are you? I wanted to talk to you about one other things in connection with our conversation this morning. These statements that we're falling behind strategically will have a major effect on our foreign policy.

pointed out to me that it made his position very tough. He wants to keep Defense's budget up. The Chinese Ambassador was in here and asked me what there was to Zumwalt's statements. He seemed to think Moorer made such statements.

C: I don't think he did. I know the statements. It's really not quoted properly and Tom did what he

K: When foreign governments make full inquiries then you have to worry.

C: I don't know what to think about it. You know, before, he was difficult to control.

K: Defense ought to take him on. If we take them on, the next time someone ought to say it's untrue.

C: I don't mind doing that. I will talk to Jim about that. Bud and I have had some arguments. I actually had in my hands his resignation and wouldn't accept it.

K: That guy is really totally irresponsible.

C: That's right. He's trying to (charge some sufficient interest). I don't know what it's

K: That you can be sure. When he came to the Pentagon ~ He wanted to have an aircraft carriers going to Santiago. I refused to let him do that.

C: I will do this and I will also mention this to George Brown. We are having a sandwich together now. We're continuing to talk about some of the same things we talked about this morning.

K: If you want to call Haig, it wouldn't be a bad idea.

C: I think I will do that but I didn't want to do it without your permission.

K: If you do it, do it in the same sense of what we talked about this morning.

Clements - page 2

C: I will say it's a result of a discussion you and I and George Brown were having.

K: OK. Thank you.

END

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TELECON

Mr. Ziegler/Secretary Kissinger

July 15, 1974

5:00 pm

K: Hi Ron, how are you?

Z: Good, how are you? I wanted you to know that I took a jab at Jackson on three things. I was asked about the secret letter and I followed your guidance about leaking executive material and you had covered it in your press conference of June ___ and what it was about and then I went on to say I had been asked to comment on other things. First the knowledge of the US Government on the Indian nuclear test before May 18 and I shot that down.

K: What? Oh, exactly.

Z: The fact that we had knowledge before the May 18 text. We didn't did we?

K: No idea whatsoever.

Z: And thirdly, I said the Senator said we are selling police equipment to the KGB.

K: That's crazy.

Z: I said there is a world trade fair going on and some private industry might have done something, but any relations to munitions falls under COCOM and existing regulations... These are 3 instances where the Senator has violated... without stating the facts. I also said you would be out on Thursday and then again for the signing of the Spanish Declaration.

K: Good.

Z: Fulbright has released the letter and I think we will release it out here.

K: OK. Many thanks

Z: Anything there?

K: No, I think every time Jackson puts his head up we ought to slap him back. That SOB is totally irresponsible.

Z: I agree. Ok, Henry. END

TELCON
Ted Koppel/ Sec. Kissinger
July 15, 1974, 5:15 p.m.

TK: I wanted to check with you personally and quickly and see if we could work out a convenient time for you to see your program.

HK: I would love to see it.

TK: Do you think you would be in town some time next week?

HK: Yes.

TK: We would like you and Nancy to come out and bring a few people. Walter wanted to come down. We will have a few people at the house and show it out there.

HK: How about Howard K. Smith.

TK: Absolutely. He would be one of the people. You think about it.

HK: Nancy was going to NY next week on Tuesday. Maybe I can get her to put it off until Wednesday and in which case I would suggest Tuesday night.

TK: I will call back tomorrow and check.

END



TELECON
David Frost/Secretary Kissinger
July 15, 1974
6:05 PM

(Missed first part)

F: I'm going to be in New York on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday of next week and was wondering if you would be free~~x~~ for lunch.

K: Let me see. I couldn't be so lucky if they would tell mewhat I'm doing next week. There is a chance on Tuesday, but I won't know -- when are you coming?

F: On Sunday. I ~~xxx~~ could call Sunday or Monday. I will give you a call Monday morning.

K: Terrific.

F: It would be delicious to see you.

K: Good to see you.

F: I will give you a buzz. Everything seems to be turning out alright for you.

K: We're going through hysteria but it seems to be alright now.

F: That's marvelous.

K: OK, David.

F: I hope to see you this week, Henry.

K: That would be very good.

F: Greetings from London - God bless.

K: Goodby.

END



TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
July 15, 1974
6:30 pm

D: Hello Henry. The Ambassador of Cyprus has just informed me that Makarios is alive and in UN troops, he is in another place.

K: I have seen that as an unofficial report.

D: This is what he mentioned to me. I don't know if it is official.

K: I'm glad you called. I was just getting ready to call you. I just had an unofficial report that he is in a town called Phados.

D: I heard.....

K: Well, we got the first letter the same. If that is true it puts a new complexion on the situation.

D: And it says he has asked the Secretary General to have Security Council tomorrow to discuss and according to this information the Ambassador has..in this area, where Makarios is, it is quiet, where the Archbishop is, but in Nicosia there is strong fighting. This is what he mentioned to me.

K: Let us see if we can keep our actions coordinated. The United States has no unilateral interests there. And we support the existing Constitution. Can we stay in touch with each other before we take any drastic moves.

D: I will send a telegram saying let's coordinate our actions.

K: We are in favor of the existing Constitutional arrangement. Let's check before doing anything. I will let you know if we plan anything. We don't plan to do anything until we get a report but we have made those demarches I told you about.

D: Ok, Henry.

END

TELCON

Arthur Burns/ Sec. Kissinger

9:30 a.m., July 16, 1974

K: Hello.

B: Morning, Henry.

K: Arthur, how are you?

B: All right. How are you?

K: Sorry we missed each other yesterday.

B: I got home too late to call you.

K: I called you yesterday about the possible assistance to Italy if that becomes necessary and I understand that one idea is to use the swap line and that you are a little reluctant to do it. I don't want to get into fiscal details which I don't fully understand. I just want to point out from a foreign policy point of view we cannot let Italy go down the drain. Whether that is the way to do it or some other way, I don't know.

B: I agree and I have been actively trying to get other countries to contribute to a package but what we can do through the swaplines is very limited. The amount could be large but it is a three month loan and that is not what they need.

K: Yes. My people tell me you would not approve more than \$300 million.

B: As a start.

K: Yes. Look, on financial things I am not somebody--I cannot get into a debate on numbers. All I wanted to stress to you is to really give this -- if it arises -- very high priority.

B: I agree and I was active in getting the credit line extended. Also in a meeting with the finance ministers I went around and pushed the Germans and Japanese to contribute to a package for Italy. It is a loan of medium term duration and the swap line does not serve that purpose. That is the essential point.

K: If you can give any other thought to that problem I would appreciate it.

B: You bet I will.

K: O.k. Now let's see if we could get together sometime. Are you here next week.



-2-

B: I expect to be .

K: How about 11:00 next Monday.

B: Fine Henry. I will check my calendar. I think it is all right.
I will call you if there is.

K: I would like to talk to you about the European financial situation and you
know how we can gear it to foreign policy considerations.

B: Right. I'm eager to get together with you.

K: And certainly I would like to talk to you about the state of
Washington. Look forward to seeing you.

END



TELCON

Rowland Evans/ Sec. Kissinger

9:35 a.m., July 16, 1974

E: I just got back last night and I have been reading this nonsense. I have to see you.

K: What nonsense?

E: I need to see you before you go to San Clemente. Can you give me 25 minutes.

K: I will only be there 48 hours.

E: I am going on vacation for a week.

K: What nonsense have you been reading.

E: A column by Braden.

K: He is a darling man but...

E: Nothing in that at all.

K: His perceptions are not as sharp as his wife's.

E: You are not kidding me.

K: I am not. I never heard of a quarrel with Simon. No quarrel. The Energy Conference was a success -- not a failure.

E: How about Nixon?

K: We achieved what we wanted and now the French are trying to join. Nixon is always a complex thing but nothing there. You and I chatted about that.

E: About the way it has always been. You are not going to quit or getting fired.

K: Getting fired is an absurdity.

E: Yes, sir.

K: Seriously.

E: I have many messages from Mr. Rabin. Many messages. Private. Not for telephone discussion.



2.

K: One wrong move...

E: When are you going to see me?

K: I will get Eagleburger to call you.

E: Sometime Wednesday afternoon.

K: We will do our best.

E: I am counting on it. It is very gib stuff. Everyone is talking about it. I have to get it from the horses mouth.

K: Don't be absurdmy getting fired.

E: I am serious.

K: Look at it realistically. How could I get fired.

E: How is Nancy.

K: Fine.

E: We should get together for dinner. Will se go out?

K: Of course. As long as she does not have to pay for it.

E: Of course not. I am the rich boy. I would do the paying.

K: I am kidding. You want to have dinner tomorrow.

E: We are going to dinner with the British. When are you going out?

K: Thursday and Friday. Get back Saturday.

E: Tonight.

K: Probably cannot do it. I will call Nancy.

E: Get me half an hour before you leave.

END



TELECON

Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger

July 16, 1974

9:50 am

K: Anatoyl, how are you?

D: Fine, Henry.

K: Anaytol, we still don't have absolute confirmation that Makarios has survived but we suspect that he has.

D: Our information is that he has.

K: Fighting is still going on. We are having a meeting in 45 minutes and I'll call you again when it is over.

D: Good. There are reports that the British and Turks are planning to do something.

K: Turkey we know for sure isn't. And Britain isn't a strong enough government. What are they doing?

D: I don't know. I hear this on the radio. I have no information from Moscow.

K: If we hear anything we will let you know.

D: Good. So after the meeting you will call.

K: Yes, after the meeting. Will you send me that message.

D: Yes, to Scowcroft or..

K: No, Scowcroft is in San Clemente. Send it to Eagleburger.

D: I will tell Vorontsov to get in touch with him.

K: Good.

END



TELECON

Ambassador Dobrynin/Sec. Kissinger

July 15, 1974

5:30 pm

K: Anatoyl. We just got a message from Cyprus that your Counselor asked the British High Commissioner how the British would feel about the introduction of Soviet troops to restore order.

D: Troops?

K: I can't believe this.

D: I have no information. I have no telegram telling me this.. I doubt that very much.

K: I can't believe he would do this.

D: I doubt this and you don't have anything from your mission? your mission in Moscow?

K: In Moscow?

D: I mean in Moscow. They might have been in touch with them.

K: We have nothing from Moscow and nothing from Cyprus. Only that there is still fighting going on.

D: Who was it....

K: Your second man in the Embassy.

D: The second man come to the British...to me it sound unbelievable.

K: Me too. If you planned something like this you would talk to us.

D: Yes.

K: You know, we would not look on it with favor.

D: I know....

K: Let's see if it calms down. There are plenty of troops there.



x2-

D: What is the latest report?

K: The latest report is they are still fighting.

D: What about Makarios?

K: I have a report from Israel. They say they heard him on the radio.

D: I know, but nothing from your Embassy. I will check with Moscow. I don't have anything at all.

K: I don't want to start a crisis to keep you here. I don't want anything to interfere with your vacation.

D: I know. I want to get away. I know this could come about only if Makarios asked for it and then it would have to be discussed. But if Makarios is not there we would not do it on our own. This I am sure. This is not done at all. I doubt very much they do this on their own.

K: That is my view.

D: Ok Be in touch.

END

TELECON

Foreign Secretary Callaghan/Secretary Kissinger

July 16, 1974

10:15 am

K: Jim?

C: Henry.

K: Can you hear me now?

C: Yes, very well.

K: Good. I have your message and I wanted to tell you I am dictating an assessment of the situation as we see it and I will send it to you. We are going along with about two-thirds of what you have done in Athens. We have had approaches from the Soviets.

C: So have we.

K: We don't want to legitimize a situation where they... We will continue recognizing the existing government.

C: Well, Henry, hold on. There is a late development. Makarios has asked for permission to evacuate to our base area. We have done this and we are now thinking of flying him to our carrier. So we'll have to go slow on legitimizing.

K: ~~OK~~ If that is the case, we don't want to have him leading an outside movement and ask for Soviet help.

C: Right. What should we do with him? He may want to come here. Actually, he'll probably want to go to New York to talk... I am going into make a statement to the House of Commons. I am going to say he asked to be evacuated. And I will say my view is that Greece should the intervention and I will go on to say the Ambassador is informing the Greek Government that if the ~~Greek~~ government officials of the Cyprus National Guard will be replaced at the earliest moment.

K: Wait, I think we should stop short on that.

C: It would reduce tension in the area.

K: Once we know there is a clear ~~involvement~~ outcome, fine. But if there is a civil war we would be getting involved.



-2-

C: How do you see it?

K: IF Makarios is leaving the Island I have to make a different assessment than if he is leading a civil war. My main concern is to keep outside powers out of this.

C: Yes.

K: We can go along with asking the Greek Government to state their intentions -- on the remaining Greek officials, we would come to it but not today.

C: Good. I think this would help keep things..

K: Once there is an outcome , then we can do something. We are not supporting Enosis and we have had a good reaction from the Turks to our actions here.

C: Good. We are in a different position, of course, because we are one of the guaranteeing powers.

K: I just want you to know our thinking is only different on that officer point and that on timing. We will make an assessment of this.

C: Good. Henry , will you give me your assessment of what to do with this guy?

K: Yes. I will. I'll be in touch with Peter on it.

C: Good.

END

TELECON

Secretary General Waldheim/Secretary Kissinger

July 16, 1974

11:50 am

W: This is Waldheim speaking .

K: Yes, Mr. Secretary General.

W: Mr. Secretary, I am grateful for you returning my call. The reason is , you have probably heard from Buffum, that we have a serious development and I wanted to inform you of a cable that we have received. This would give a clear picture of the situation. I received from my special representative and Commander in Chief in Cyprus -- I don't know if you have been informed by Buffum.

K: I think Sisco has told me about it.

W: Makarios may request a meeting of the Security Council to discuss, what he terms, Greek military intervention in Cyprus. We know four members of the Greek Government are being treated for wounds received during the coup d etat in the last two days, so there was some involvement. I want you to know that we have these indications that the Greek military contingent is involved. And he also asked me to convey to you and others to help keep Cyprus independent and sovereign. I sent a message to the government of Athens and ~~Ankara~~ Ankara stressing the importance of maintaining...

K: I notice the Greek Government has affirmed this.

W: Yes, the important thing is, well it is not so important, but that the Archbishop asked that the British send a helicopter to evacuate him to a British base on the island and the British High Commissioner accepted this on the condition that the Archbishop would accept evacuation to the United Kingdom and in the meantime, our commander in chief there has asked for protection, so Makarios refused to evacuate the ~~isak~~ island and I have now authorized our commander in chief to grant protection. Of ~~course~~ course, that will cause problems in the future. This will be a problem.

K: Yes.

W: This is most important information which I got ~~his~~ this morning. I asked Rossides whether he will ask for a meeting of the Council. He did not...I consulted with the President of the Council and we decided there should be a meeting at 3:00 this afternoon. The situation is very confused and all kinds of rumors around the world and I think it is important that the Council be informed.

K: I appreciate this very much and your information is later than ours.



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K: I talked with Callaghan who reports they were evacuating Makarios and that didn't sound right to me.

W: I agree. But for us it will be a problem if the new military government is in control and no President is sworn-in, then we have a problem of what to do with Makarios.

K: How about you and I talking tomorrow and exchanging information then.

W: Yes. I think it is important to avoid intervention by the Turks . Our information is that the Turks...will report that they will not provoke or do anything which could create deterioration of the situation, but this is the real danger.

K: We are dealing with the Turks today and I will keep you informed and I understand we are going to get together next week or soon.

W: Yes. I want to talk to you.

K: Very nice to talk to you and I appreciate your keeping me informed.

W: If I hear anything else I will let you know immediately.

END



TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
July 16, 1974
Noon

K: Anaytol.

D: Henry, I received another telegram from Moscow and I read it to you. Well, it begins by asking me to tell you that the...reference is scurrilous. And to please be more careful in your approaches to such allegations. This is said by Mr. Gromyko.

K: No, no. We were just asking you.

D: I know, I know. This is nothing really. Just Brezhnev would like to get clear, but nothing really. Brezhnev believes that only the people themselves should decide...Dobrynin reads cable...they have staged a military coup against the local government. Justice demands for the Soviet Union and the United States and all countries to do more than.. to put an end to military intervention in the affairs of Cyprus. We believe the President along with the Secretary of State ...should take the line corresponding to the interests of the Cyprus people...and the most urgent task now is the adoption ~~of the resolution~~ by the Security Council of a decision as to the immediate withdrawal of military personnel and a stop to the intervention by Greece in the internal affairs of Cyprus. We are giving instructions to our Representative of the Security Council and would like to hope the United States representative will be given instructions to adhere to the same line.

K: Can you send that message to me?

D: Of course. To whom?

K: To Eagleburger.

D: Do you have anything?

K: All we know is Makarios has asked to be put in a UN base.

D: What about the Security Council?

K: We are taking the position that we want more information.

D: This line and nothing else?

K: No.



D: What about withdrawal?

K: I think today we are not going to support a resolution on anything.

D: On anything? You like to pass a summary of your position.

K: You can pass it now. We will oppose Enosis between Cyprus and Greece.

D: Yes, but as for immediate withdrawal, you are not prepared to do it today.

K: No.

D: Or any kind of resolution?

K: That is correct.

D: And if a resolution is introduced, what will you do?

K: I do know we will try to avoid taking a vote.

D: Oh. Well, what is your personal opinion, Henry?

K: I want to see what the situation is on the Island.

D: Well, the situation can be helped if you and we would take a stand.

K: It depends if there is a government left there.

D: Well, Makarios is still there on a UN base.

K: Well, we are not prepared to do it today.

D: Not today.

K: No.

D: Well, that was a very helpful message but I will pass what you say.

END



TELECON

Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger

July 16, 1974

6:30 pm

K: How are you?

D: Fine, how are you? I called you back because I wanted to tell you that I talked to Shimon.

K: Yes, and he said he never said anything about promissory notes.

D: No, he did. I asked him about the ~~xxx~~ promissory note. He said a promissory note in Hebrew is (word). It is an idiomatic expression. It means if somebody promises you something, then you expect them to fulfill that promise. It refers to the fulfillment of a promise. It has nothing at all to do with written notes. So, there was no allusion to the letter whatsoever. I asked him not to do this during Simon's meeting and I will send a cable to the Prime Minister and ask him not to allude to the letter in anyway whatsoever. Alright?

K: ok, good.

D: I will be in touch.

END

TELECON

Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger

July 16, 1974

6:40 PM

K: What happened in New York today?

S: I have a memo here for you, but I'll give it to you orally. They argued with no substantial action having been taken. Speeches were given by the ___ themselves Russia, UK and France. We spoke briefly along the lines of our ~~wk~~ statement which I was going to send up.

K: Yes, send it up.

S: The rumors are that Makarios is coming to New York and is probably going to ask to be heard. Buffum is here now. I've asked him to put down how we have handled the situation. We've had a cable report.

K: I've seen that.

S: The man is very unstable.

K: I don't see how he got___.

S: One on Cyprus and one on Greece. We've done the cables. We don't recommend.

K: I agree. I think we should talk to the ___. We should send the Greeks a cable accepting the statement that they recognize the ___ and ~~wk~~ we're proceeding on that basis. That pins them down.

S: I'll put that in. We got a short cable. ___if it's acting in our judgment that will ___the Turks. The Greeks should try to bring in (forces). I'm asking ___to see the Foreign Minister and make your point. When the Turks came in this afternoon ____.

K: That's fine, but I don't ___pin them to their noses and then tell the Turks that we have been given this assurance and intend to hold them to it. You have to do that.

S: ___to go and make the point. It's a waste of time___Foreign Minister.

K: He should do and see the other guy.

S: Regardless of the action.

K: We have to go on (regardless) with that other statement. Tell it to the Foreign Minister. That we have met it with approval.

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Sisco - page 2

S: I haven't put it in very well.

K: Explain it in a more elegant way.

S: Yes, for a cable.

K: I would like to find out from the Turks what would be the course of intervention.

S: The point of the message was _____. That's entirely understandable.

K: We don't want to do that.

S: They find this _____ unnecessary. We've always known _____. If we take that at face value this _____. It could be Makarios has flown off the island.

K: Macomber has to have a talk with Ecevit and do it at my personal request. Can you call Ramsbotham and find out if they have any later information?

S: Why don't I call Colby and see if CIA knows how the Turks feel.

K: Why don't you and Buffum and maybe Ingersol come to my office at 9:15 tomorrow before the WSAG meeting.

S: And I'd like to bring Wells Stabler if I could. Can I send these ~~xxxx~~ cables out?

K: Can I see them?

S: Sure. If you need to reach me, I'll be at the Pakistani Embassy.

K: One of these early departures? OK.

END



TELECON
Elliot Richardson/Secretary Kissinger
July 16, 1974
7:40 PM

K: There was something I wanted to ask you. You mentioned somebody who was in ISA. Who was he - Rod somebody?

H: Roderick Hills.

K: He's being ___ to me as Under Secretary for Economic Affairs.

R: He might be very good. He's a very good lawyer. He ~~was~~ was the Chairman of the Republic Corporation. I did a lot of checking on him at that time. He checked out very well. For the ISA job, I had to subordinate the international experience I would have like to have found in him. He's a very able guy.

K: You think he could handle that?

R: Yes, I think so. It's not entirely clear to me exactly how the job works. It didn't exist while I was there.

K: He's the counterpart of the ~~Under~~ Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

R: I think he would do very well.

K: I met him today and liked him.

R: One thing that appealed to me and that is ISA is largely depended on his ability to work with others. I think he had the abilities that would make him effective in that. He had a certain amount of aggressiveness and poise and skill to build the job.

K: OK. Well, have a good trip.

R: One more thing. I meant to mention the name Clyde Ferguson.

K: Who's he? On that Negro. I think highly of him.

R: He's a good man.

K: I think ~~very~~ very highly of him.

R: Good.

K: Call me when you get back.



Richardson - page 2

R: I enjoyed the luncheon with you very much.

K: The Soviets didn't introduce the resolution.

R: Good. Well, I enjoyed that conversation.

K: OK, bye.

END