

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	Telcon	HAK and Robert McCloskey, Robert Ingersoll, Wells Stabler (4 pp.) DECLASSIFIED per Htr. 2/3/2016	7/19/74	B
2	Telcon	HAK and Robert McCloskey, Robert Ingersoll, Wells Stabler (3 pp.) SANITIZED per Htr. 2/3/2016	7/19/74	B
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4	Telcon	HAK and Robert Ingersoll (2 pp.) SANITIZED (see DOS upgrades) 12:05	7/19/74	B
5	Telcon	HAK and Michael Mansfield (3 pp.) DECLASSIFIED per Htr. 2/3/2016	7/19/74	B
6	Telcon	HAK and Peter Ramsbotham (5 pp.) DECLASSIFIED per Htr. 2/3/2016	7/19/74	B
7	Telcon	HAK and Robert Ingersoll, Robert McCloskey, Wells Stabler, Richard Kennedy (4 pp.) SANITIZED per Htr. 2/3/2016 3.3(b)(1)	7/19/74	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

BOX NUMBER

Kissinger Transcripts - Telephone Conversations

26

FOLDER TITLE

1574 19 July 1 of 2 (6)

RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
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 G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
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TELCON

CONFERENCE CALL

Secretary Kissinger/Robert McCloskey

Robert Ingersoll/Wells Stabler/William Buffum

7/19/74 9:30 a.m.

K: Hello, who is this?

M: This is McCloskey

K: Are the others on the line?

M: The others are on--our signal is not quite as clear because Buffum and Ingersoll are in their own offices.

K: Why is that.

M That is the way the call came in I guess.

S: We can go to the other office, if you like

M: Yes, do that we had a better connection this morning.

K: But I would like to get some action and -- do you think you could all assemble in the next two minutes.

All: Sure. Be right up.

K: Hello? Well, this isn't any better, let's just keep going. Is everybody together now?

M: Mr. Secretary: I'd like to take up the subject of the press briefing, if I may, first

K: Why

M: Because we're right against the deadline. Only two minutes.

K: Right.

M: We will announce the Makarios call on you and there will be a question as to whether he is being received as the President and Anderson would say, as we previously indicated, no question of recognition with respect to Cyprus has yet arisen.

K Well, in his case you've seenof recognition

M: No, change of recognition. It is an important distinction from what we have



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have been saying all week.

K: Until we change our recognition, the existing arrangement obviously continue.

M: But I'm afraid we have changed it by what we said throughout the week implying that we are undecided as to which is the legal government and which one would we recognize, and I think and I'd like to recommend that we use the same formulation we have all week.

K: But I always thought we said this in relation to the Sampson government.

M: No, the questions were not always that specific.

K: I can't held responsible, you know for example, it wasn't I who instructed Anderson to say there was no outside influence.

M: That was a different matter, Mr. Secretary, and the context of the question on that point, was since Monday

K: If you say it this way, it means we no longer recognize Makarios.

M: No, it doesn't. It just leaves ambivalent.

K: Why can't we say, we don't have to make a formal decision on recognizing Makarios.

M: I'm afraid if we say that, we have made an important new diplomatic statement. I frankly think it is safer to leave it the way it has been--the fact that you are going to see Makarios.....

K: Now just a second, Bob. It makes a hell of a lot of difference whether when you are asked about Sampson who is in de facto control, whether you say the question of recognition hasn't arisen, or whether you say about it Makarios who happens to be the legal head of the government

S: But because no question has yet arisen, it means obviously that we continue because nothing is before it--

K: That is fine with Sampson but if somebody says are you receiving him as President--can we just say ~~the question~~ the request was made by his Ambassador and he is being seen on that basis?

S: We do sayagreed to receive him at therequest--do we want to say conveyed to his embassy in Washington--that might do it.

K: Yes, just say the request was made through the Cyprian Embassy



plus waffle it.

M: That is what we thought--

K: Bob if you say the question of recognition hasn't arisen, that is a clear step away from Makarios, because that in effect says you may not recognize it.

M: Mr. Secretary, I'm sorry, I think I must disagree. I think that the answer implies more that we continue to recognize Makarios by saying that--by announcing that you received him--than it does the other way.

K: What is the question--is he being received as President?

M: Yeh. --that would be the natural question.

K: And we say what?

M: As we previously said, no question of recognition with respect Cyprus has yet arisen. Now that was our formula for maintaining flexibility

K: Bob, I understand--I'm not as intelligent as the country directors, but after this week I learned something. My point is when you say in answer to, will you recognize the Sampson regime, if you say the question of recognition has not yet arisen, then you are distancing yourself from the Sampson regime. Are you receiving him as president and you answer, "The question of recognition hasn't arisen", you are saying something entirely different. Then you are distancing yourself from Makarios.

M: But the questions throughout the brief have not been specifically, do you recognize the Sampson government, the question is who do you recognize, that is why we have the answer, the "question of recognition has not arisen." It did not tie us specifically to one way ~~or~~ or the other. Now when you put together the answer today, that the announcement that you are going to receive Makarios, it means the situation in favor of Makarios. Without jeopardizing what you may want to do later on, if Makarios is completely and forever out of the picture.

K: I would prefer to say the question of recognition has not arisen when I am asked about Makarios. I would prefer to say almost anything else.

M: All right, then supposing we do this. Announce that you have seen Makario and any question of recognition, say we have nothing to add to what we said earlier this week.

K: We can say we've nothing to add to what we said earlier this week. That we can say. They say, then do you recognize Makarios, say his appointment was made through the Cypriot Embassy. Say anything other than



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say yes.

M: All right. Second subject. There has been much made of the announcement by Greek Ambassador in NATO yesterday that the Greek government is going to rotate the 650 offices in the National Guard

K: Yeh

M: The only thing we can think to say sensibly in response to a question for reaction would be the following: We have noticed this announcement and we hope that it may contribute to an easing of tensions in the area

K: Say we have been urging all parties to exercise restraint and we hope that this may contribute to an easing of tension.
But I don't frankly think it will.

M: Neither do ~~it~~ I.

K: I don't think it has any significance.

M: Okay. Third subject, how now if Anderson is asked to describe the objective of the Sisco mission ~~in~~ which you want to have down.

K: The objectives of the Sisco mission are--first to state the three objectives we have been stating since Monday--territorial integrity, independence and constitutional arrangements. To prevent a Greek/Turkish war, and and to find a solution acceptable to all of the parties concerned.

M: Good. Rather than our finding a solution...

K: And to encourage the parties to come up with a solution acceptable to all of them.

M: Right.

K: Now, may I get around to getting instructions to Sisco or would this be against State Department rules.

M: Mr. Secretary, just one more moment please--

K: Now just a second, one more moment for me please. Sisco is not to talk to anybody until he gets instructions. Is that clear?

M: We have sent a flash--

K: Is it clear that he has--is not to talk until he gets instructions?

M: We sent a flash message out right after I talked to you--the instructions were coming.



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- K: That doesn't mean he will not come back to us and say in the absence of instructions, I had no choice. You fellows better understand one thing-I am going to do this thing--as long as I am in charge the way I want it. And Bob Ingersoll, you will see to it that this department is going to do what is needed in this crisis and I do not give a good God-damn about the independence of emissaries and I want to make God-damn sure that Sisco knows he is not to talk until he gets instructions and if Ecevit climbs down a grease pole, that is going to happen.
- M: Sisco has been told definitely and has acknowledged that he will see
S: nobody in Ankara until he receives instructions.
- K: Okay, I just don't to get a cable being that since it is now 9:00 in Ankara and he has no instructions, he went ahead.
- M: And he won't Mr. Secretary, we can say that confidently.
And we have a telegram we would like to run over with you--
- K: Now before you run anything over with me, I'm going to tell you/want .
But now ~~let~~ let's go thru the press briefing. what I
- M: There is a lot of reporting this morning that Turkish naval units are moving out of Southeastern Turkey for Cyprus
- K: Yeh, I have the impression they are ... going into tomorrow morning.
- M: I think the only thing we should say so we don't raise any alarm--is we have seen the report, we have not seen any announcement...
- K: No we are going to say --but we want to make clear we are opposed to any military intervention at this point--we are opposed to any military intervention and we hope very much all parties will exercise restraint --can do nothing to confirm this, but the US wants to make absolutely clear that diplomatic processes have not yet been exhausted. And we better say that at the briefing. Now where is Scowcroft. What has he has he got to do that is more important than this.
- M: One other thing--Clements has told--called Bob Ingersoll and Bob do you want to describe it.
- I He explained that the amphibious force that we talked about yesterday is about 100 miles or 10 hours or 20 hours steaming (?) time from Cyprus.
- K: Yeh, I think they are going into tomorrow morning.
- I He recommends we move that force half-way or 10 hours away or 50 miles away.



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K: That is correct, I agree with it.

M: Do you want to run over the telegram now?

K: The first thing that--no, no I want to tell you what I want. Then you may run over a telegram with me. And not ~~w~~ one second before that. I want a telegram to Sisco that as soon as he arrives he is to tell Eevit that we are extremely concerned about unconfirmed reports we have about Turkish military ~~inter~~ moves. He is instructed to point out to the Turkish government that the US would take the gravest view of turkish military move before all diplomatic processes are exhausted. That is point one. That he must do immediately, because I think we have been waffling and weeping around the place and we have not made clear that we are opposed to military intervention. Secondly, he is to say we are doing this in the Turkish interests, that Turkish intervention will not be the last move, it will be the first of a whole sequence of moves, that in our judgment something he never said, the government that will emerge out of this cannot be that a Greek Cypriot government will become a Turkish stooge. I mean you can put this in more elegant language. That therefore, if you look for support from --to the Soviet Union and to its own commnnist strength on the island--left wing strength on the island and therefore he can make this a message from me that part of it, as a freind as somebody who admires Eevit, I want to warn him that what he is starting is a process in which he in which all can easily lose control. Now can we get that telegram out immediately. Then we will send him a longer ~~xx~~ one on the solution.

M: Okay.

K: Now what is it you fellows--could somebody go off and draft this now?

M: Yep.
Right away.

K: Now what is your telegram, what do you want to say.

M: What you have just given us would overtake what we have pursuant to your instructions this morning. Do you want to go over it--

K: No, why don't you send this telegram and then in 15 minutes call me again.

M: Thank you.



TELCON

Max Fisher/Secretary Kissinger

11:25 a.m. 7/19/74

F: Henry, how are you?

K: I've got a little crisis on here, so

F: Just take me a couple of minutes. First of all, we have been working on this Jackson thing--and you made great progress on this--Javits call me yesterday and I think if you are ready, but I don't think it ought to be until you are ready....it might be advisable for us to meet with the just the two people--remember--the head of the conference and --that is Stanley Lowell and Is Miller and myself

K: Yeh but on general grounds would like to meet with the whole group too.

F: You would, fine.

K: The reason for my meeting isn't just the soviet situation, I just haven't met with the Jewish leaders for a while, I don't mind in addition meeting them

F: I am thinking about this because on the Russian situation, we put all the backers of Jackson on top of his neck, some of his particularly most influential financial backers and I think he has come around a long ways 0-if you think it is ready, there are two things that can be done. We arrange a meeting with the group, but as a matter of strategy it would be very important at the same time to go thru the procedure of a 30-minute meeting with Miller and Lowell and then have them come into the other meeting. I think I recommend this henry/

K: Then let's aim for that.
But I hope they understand that I also have time problems.

F: I realize that--I know you have plenty of other problems. Secondly, I think that something that could be very, very significant in this whole thing would be this. When I was in Israel, I met with all wives and children --the prisoners of conscience--the 17 prisoners who are in prison in Russia and the wives and children are in Israel. They are the ones who were involved in the highjacking 7 or 8 years ago....I met with them and it was a very teary scene because I had to give them an audience. But I think if something could be done to ease that problem, it could be a tremendous psychological boost for the Russians.

K: Yeh, but the problem is this....Max, and even I am getting impatient with it. Every three months I am told there is one other thing the Russians have to do..They do it after which ~~wx~~ they say, fine, now do the next thing.



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F: (laughs) I can't argue with you--just think about this prisoner of conscience. I'm telling you what happend while you were over there and I met with them--now I just mentioned it to you, but I tell you this psycholically now if you feel you have made enough progress with Jackson, I think it would be important to have this meeting and you could cut the meeting short to meet with the three and go into this meeting and

K You work~~s~~ with Jerry Bremer

F: Is he your man on that.
Jerry Bremer. And what we will do is allocate a half hour for one and half hour for the other.

K: Good.

F: We 'll find a time and ~~date~~ convenient to you.

K: Excellent.

F: I met with --do you think we made some progress with this

K: I think we have.

F: I met with his two big financial backers--in New York--Jackson you know is running for president and I just told him the facts on this thing--do you want me to apply any more pressure on that or do we have enough.

K: No, I'd keep up thepressure

F: All right. And we will try to do this in the next week.

K Exactly.

F: I'll be in touch.



TELCON
Conference Call
Secretary Kissinger
Robert McCloskey
Robert Ingersoll
Mr. Stabler

11:35 a.m. 7/19/74 7/19/74

K: What are we doing--why are you all at the White House?

ALL: Because! You asked for a WSAG meeting

K: Yeh, yeh, okay. What are we doing about that UN speech. I haven't seen a copy of it.

M Buffum is going to get it back out to you. Stabler and I read it, it looks okay. I thought it ought to convey a little more of the concerns that is reflected in the telegram you wanted sent Anakara.

K: That is right. That--but it is now 2:30

M: Last I talked to him Mr. Secretary 20 minutes ago it was still possible Scali would not have to speak this afternoon--that the council may agree to hear only Makarios and then carry over until tomorrow. is to let me know just as soon as he has any change in that.

K: Right. Let me say a general thing. The management of a crisis like this depends on everybody being informed of our thinking that we want to take action. Now I have a cable here from Sauvagnargnes.....which shows for example in para 4., is stabler on?

S: Yes, sir.

K: It says Sauvagnargnes proposes that Sisco go on to Ankara, now what does Irvine say to that profound remark, why doesn't he say that is exactly what he is doing?
Does he need instructions to be told this

S: He certainly shouldn't--he

K: Why didn't he say it/

S: It doesn't suggest he didn't, but he didn't--certainly doesn't ~~pur~~ purport that he said so, no.

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K: There are only two possibilities--if he is reporting of it==he must either want to inform us of their thinking and think this will influence the decision--at any rate, I want Irwin to go back to Sauvagnargnes and tell him two things--I greatly appreciate his analysis, I agree with it and there were a number of things which weren't made clear in our original cable--one that we have made clear to Turkey that we would strongly ~~xxx~~ oppose ~~anosis~~, direct or creeping and that the Turks to us have expressed great appreciation for this. Secondly, that we are going in the UN debate to indicate our objection to outside intervention and third as he knows Sisco has been sent to Ankara. Just want to do this to keep them happy.

Now is somebody keeping the British informed of what we are doing.

I I just talked to the minister--Ramsbothom was not available--but I got Sykes. They have a long message from Callahan ~~xxxxx~~ to you in which they are delivering to me and we were just getting it over the phone when your call came in--

K: Is he rambunctious?

I No, pretty much the same position they had before saying they were going to ^{support} ~~xxxxx~~ Makarios at least at this time not knowing whether he could eventually be the head of the government, but until they found another solution, this was their position.

I:

K: Well that is all right. / Have to do something to make sure the Turks didn't move in and that would be the removal of Sampson.

I: They said the only way this will happen is by putting pressure on the Greeks.

K: Tell them we are willing to bring pressure on the Greeks as soon as we know what the alternative is that emerges and you can tell Ramsbothom on my behalf to Callahan that we are not in disagreement with them on this.

I: Okay.

K: I don't want the British to leak that they are fighting us on Greek--tell them it is a tactical difference that we don't want to move against Sampson until we know the alternative and use him as a bargaining chip and we can assure them we don't want to have sampson emerge out of this. And you might call the Turkish ambassador and make this clear to him. Hopefully on the line that the Russians monitor by microwave. And have we heard from the Germans?



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I: Nothing I have seen so far--

S: No, absolutely nothing at all

K: But could you gentlemen form a little group that keeps on top of this and not just reacts.

I: That is right. We talked to Fulbrigh and Morgan

K: How are they reacting?

M I spoke to Mansfield and Morgan. Mansfield was in fully support-- Morgan who I had to reach --

K: Of your position or my position?

M: Of your position and efforts

K: (laughs)

M: that we are making.

K: Good. I

~~K:~~ I: I talked to Fulbright and he was concerned with the way things were going and he commented very adversely on the colonels (?) in Greece.

K: You tell him we have no love for them.

I: I know. I told him we'd keep him informed.

K: The major theme is we can't have a war there right now and can only do one thing at a time.

I: We don't have anything from Joe from Athens, so we don't know what happened there.

K: Has he left?

I: Yes, He must be to Ankara now.

K: He must be taking over the government. Can we call Ankara and make sure the guy reports. And does he understand he is not to surface the Clerities thing until he gets instructions.

M We told him we'll send instructions on that from his two telegrams this morning--



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- K: You better pray that these were clear enough. I tell you there will be blood if he surfaced--the last thing I want is an American draft proposal--the last thing we need is an American proposal. We first have to get into the Turkish heads there must be an alternative solution. Once he has done that--then tell them we will support a alternative solution such as for example Clerities or something else they might think of. But until he has convinced them that there has to be an alternative, our introducing Clerities just makes us a.
- S: I have prepared as a result of an earlier conversation this morning the subsequent instructions
- K: Listen Stabler, just because you have won me over with that cable last night, don't press your luck. Okay, what are your instructions. I've even been saying nice things about you to Eagleburger. Which is the highest--almost like a declaration.
- S: I'll have to return it. But may I--
- K: What did you say--you are going to say nice things about me to Eagleburger
- All: Laughter
- K: That is the foreign service mentality.
- S: Could we get on with your ~~xx~~ instructions? What I said, "the Secretary has considered the report of your conversations with Ecevit in London as well as your proposal to suggest a strategy contained in the message which you.... The Secretary does not want you to float the Clerities proposal until you have been absolutely sure that Ecevit understands that in our view the direction taken is presently pointed...would lead to ultimate disaster for Turkey.
- K: Excuse me, I've got a call from Sauvagnargnes. Hold still and I'll call back. I placed the call to him to make sure he is happy.
- S: Will you tell him these things?
- K: I'll tell him those things, but send them anyway. And will you all stay where you can be reached
- M: Should we start the WSAG
- K: Yeh, and I'll call you out again.
- M: Last thing, Mr. Secretary, there is a message coming in from Sisco
- K: Good and the State Department at the WSAG will act firmly, right
- Not handwringingly?
- I Yes, that is right.

TELCON
FonMin Sauvagnargues
Secretary Kissinger
7/19/74 11:45 a.m.

V

K: Hello: I thought I'd call you and tell you I have read the report of your conversation with our Ambassador

S: Yes.

K: And I just wanted you to know that I basically agree with you

S: I thank you, yes.

K: We have sent Sisco to Ankara, as you know and I basically--can you hear m

S: Yes, I hear you

K: AND we basically agree with the strategy which you outlined, one reason--we have told the Greeks all week long that we would oppose enosis either direct or hidden. So I want you to know I am sending you a message what we have told the Greeks but I just wanted you to know tonight that the basic strategy you have described is one in which we are not in disagreement.

S: Thank you very much. I appreciate very much your message--you know, we have just seen Mr. Wilson and Callahan and I have seen reports of the Turkish ships Cyprus.

K: I noticed that--I think the major thing now is to prevent precipitant action

S: As a matter of fact Callahan did not seem too worried because he says they same thing as happened in '64 and '67 that the Turks ships that closed (?) before the island, but without taking action--

K: I wouldn't stake my position on that

S: Did you have the same information?
The Turks have already set their in motion?

K: We have that information and we are telling the Turks we think it would be unfortunate.....

S: Yes, do you think they are contemplating landing? in the next few days?

K: I hope not. I think it would be useful if you stated your views to the Turks, tonight on that matter.

S: Yeh, good, we'll do it.



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K: Thank you. I think it would be helpful. And we'll send you--and you can be sure we will keep you closely informed of whatever we do.

S: Thank you very much.

K: Nice to talk to you.

S: Thank you for calling. Goodbye.

K: Good bye.



TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Amb. McCloskey
7/19/74 *am*

M: This would go flash immediately. Subject your instructions for meeting Ecevit

K: Now if Sisco isn't there to deliver it, Macomber should deliver it.

M: Okay. That's what it says, if Sisco not yet arrived, Macomber should see Ecevit immediately and deliver the following

1. We are extremely concerned over insistent reports of turning Turkish military moves towards Cyprus.

K: Reports can't be insistent.
Repeated reports.

~~M~~ You should add that US would take the most serious view of any military move with respect to Cyprus before the diplomatic process has had an opportunity for the fullest play. 2. You should make Ecevit understand that T_urkish intervention will be only the first in the sequence of moves

K: That in our judgment

M: Right ... sequence of moves which would be difficult if not impossible to control. Any government in Cyprus which would emerge at the end of this process would not better serve the Turkish interests because in order to attempt a counter-balance of Turkish dominance , . . . government would inevitably ~~xx~~ look for support both internally and externally ~~to~~ communism. You should give Ecevit an assurance that we are totally opposed to enosis ~~w~~ whether direct or creeping.

K: You should reaffirm our... right

M: Finally, you should tell Ecevit that as his friend and admirer~~x~~, I must make clear my convictions that if he follows the course of military intervention, he will have started a process which will not only have serious adverse affects for Turkey in the long run, but will be extremely dangerous for the West as a whole.

K: Yeh. Ah--you took out great consequences at the beginning.

M: We will insert that back in.

K: And what I would like to get across in that last paragraph is not get the impression that this is a threat from us, but to say that he is going to start a series of events which out of the control of either the US and Turkey which will have long-range disadvantageous consequences for Turkey, See



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So he doesn't read it as a US threat.

M: Right. Otherwise okay?

K: Yep.
Good cable.

M: Mr. Secretary, we think here that the group in the department that prepares evacuation plans ought to get into motion.

K: Exactly.
And also we ought to get some contingency planning for what happens when the war breaks out

M: All right
How would you suggest we organize ourselves. With Defense?

K: Yeh.
Let Ingersoll call a meeting of Defense and NSC CIA--a WSAG meeting

M: This afternoon?

K: Yeh. And our briefer is saying we would take a grave view of military intervention from any quarter.

K: Until diplomatic processes are exhausted.

M: Right.

K: Good. T

M: That's the language I gave them.

K: Thank you, I'll be back to talk over the Clerities thing.

M: All right.

K: Hello--I mean don't give Fulbright any sense that we are against Makarios. Tell him the strategy I outlined to him is in full force, he need have no worry that we are going to back junta on the island and this is what we are doing, but ~~w~~right now we have to prevent a war.

M: I'll call him right away.

SANITIZED COPY

SA 147

1*

TELCON

Secretary Kissinger

Robert McCloskey

Robert Ingersoll

Mr. Stabler

7/19/74 11:50 am.

SANITIZED

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

- K: I talked to Sauvagnrargnes--I just gave him the gist of it--but send a telegram and send Erwin to give him something to babble about. Sauvagnrargnes was flattered out of his wits. And he --they are going to make a representation to the Turks tonight against intervention. The British have told them not to worry because the Turks always do this in a crisis--have ships cruising around off Cyprus and there is not a danger of a move. Do you agree with that?
- S: We were just beginning to get a Colby briefing downstairs and it seems I guess they believe that no decision has yet been made. but I must say all things are in place-- [redacted] while they made no decision, they expect to wait and see what Sisco has to say and we were moved into these militarily in the morning of 21 July or possibly 22 July. In other words, get by that time what they call necessary guarantees of independence and non-interference of Cyprus. Th
- I: The total of their mobilization so far appears to be two divisions.
- K: Then the point is the we have got to get instructions to Sisco on the Clerities matter. Now I want two things--Now I want two things for Sisco--one is I want him to explain to the Turks that a pro-Makarios intervention is not in their interests. But secondly, you have the Turks understand that we are not in favor of enosis hidden or direct so that we are not unsympathetic to their point of view. Thirdly, that we are willing to work with them energetically to bring about a constitutional solution that protects the Turkish minority and their strategic interests on the island. Because I don't want them to think we are going in there as pro-Greek. Four, we are willing to listen to any ideas they have. Five, one idea which has occurred to us is possibly having Clerities succeed and that is as far as we should go on Clerities. If they are interested in that we can see whether we can flush it out. You see what I mean? Then it is not the US, pushing its own idea.
- of this
- M Now you know there is a good deal that is already in the message that Sisco should receive very shortly if he hasn't. Already. How a
- K: How about humoring me and summing it up again, the way I gave it.

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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5

U.S. 50/12574 per sec. 3.3(b)(1) 2/3/2013
 By RS NARA, Date 11/14/2016

12574



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K: Now I don't know what is in the message that you are talking about.

S: The message that was sent out this morning which I have here
--should I read it again?

K: No, no that is the one you did this morning.

S: But in that one at your instructions we said you should reaffirm to Ecevit that we are totally opposed to enosis whether direct or creeping. That was in that one and that was the one about intervention--

K: But we didn't give the Clerities solution.

S: No we did not because that was in this other one

K: How about humoring me and and summing up our position again. That keeps Sisco from getting off on something else. And winding up with Clerities. I want some compassion shown to the Turks. I --we are going to wind up bulldozing both parties into a solution they don't want. The trick is to get at least one of them to want it.

I We will do a new telegram on this instruction--we've already made the point on enosis in the previous one but all the rest of it them is

S: But I think sums up in this message--

K: Could you express to Sisco that the strategy to follow is to show compassion to the concerns of both sides so that --at least of the Turks so that we are not in a position where at the end of it the Turks will say we raped them--they said it in '67.

And that is why I want him to present our views of this in the most compassionate light and convince them that military intervention has the wrong impact now because it strengthens the wrong forces. My personal view is that in '67 I wouldn't have been as opposed to their intervention as I am today. But that is a different matter.

I Okay sir, we'll do it.

K: Will you read it to me and get it off, because it is already 7:00 in Ankara --no it is 10:00



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M: You understand he already has the ~~one~~ message.

K: Bob, I understand he has the message--I want him nevertheless in every message to understand the strategy. I want then from the base of that strategy--my nightmare is that his proclivity is to peddle a solution in the face of an unagreed view in which we will then become one of the parties to the dispute and we will have a Clerities faction, a Makarios faction and a Sampson faction and Clerities at that point has no support at all.

M: Understood. Get the point.

K: If we could convince the Turks that they should work with us for a new solution.

~~MX~~ I: You mean some other solution?

K: Here we go.

M: No, I understand.

K: Here we go. July 19. Turkish news broadcasts reports by news agents that US Sisco has brought to Greece and Turkey and American plan for solving Cyprus crisis. According to their plan in which it is replacing current head of Cyprus regime with more moderate and influential person who could be Clerities.reads rest. Well gentlemen we have a disciplined outfit of which we can be proud.

I: Mr. Secretary, I was afraid you would see that.

K: The worse thing we can have is an American plan at this moment. It isn't after all that I have failed for five years. It is that I have occasionally been right. Now can't this department carry out my instructions? That is where I want to come to. All it takes now is for Clerities to say he doesn't want it.

I: We have a good cable from Roger Davies where talking with Clerities where he comes up with the same answer we do.

K: Who Clerities or Davies?

I: Clerities.

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Friday, July 19, 1974
Secretary Kissinger - Ambassador Ingersoll
12:05 p.m.
San Clemente

K: Bob?

I: Yes, Henry.

K: Now, Bob, let's get something straight. You're now acting Secretary. You're going to shape up this rabble while I'm out of town.

I: All right.

K: And first of all, any press comments on this Claridies thing, we do not comment on on-going negotiations. Now you get Stabler and McCloskey under tight control, Bob, or I'm going to clean the whole bunch of them out.

I: OK.

K: This is a god-damn rabble house. Why do I not want to surface Claridies? We are going to be in the UN with an American-----Makarios when nobody supports it.

I: Well this bunch here did not do that. We don't know what has been done in Athens. But I can assure you that we have been following your instructions explicitly.

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But now what I want to understand is, I want these guys, my nightmare is that we are going to wind up totally isolated. And we will be committed. I wanted us to be in a position where others were committed and we could go either way depending

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on the balance of forces. You know, it isn't that I've failed so often in these things.

I: Right.

K: I mean, that's where I want to come out. If I had surfaced an American plan on the second day on the Syrian-Israeli negotiation, I would have been home on the fifth day.

I: Right, I understand what you're saying.

K: Yeah, but are you going to take over now?
And will you be willing to give orders now? I don't care about their morale.

I: I'll give orders. Don't worry.

K: OK. Now, press comment. There is no American plan. We are discussing various ideas with these people designed to prevent a Greek-Turkish war, the ----- and restoration of constitutional rule.

I: OK.

K: These are our objectives.

I: All right, sir.

K: And I'm counting on you to keep this thing under control.
I may have to have a meeting on Sunday morning with you all if that is possible.

I: You're coming back tomorrow.

K: OK. Bye.

I: Bye.

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Friday, July 19, 1974
San Clemente
Secretary Kissinger - Amb. McCloskey
12:45 p.m.

K: Hello?

M: We've got Welles Stables on and he will read to you the telegram--one to Sisco and the other to the French Foreign Minister

S: For Undersecretary Sisco: The has sent us a report ----- as well as your proposal ---strategy..... The Secretary wants you in your approach to Ecevit to demonstrate compassion and understanding for Turkish concerns. But at the same time make it clear that we---- not in Turkish interests because it would set in train ----precisely those events which in the end would be damaging to Turkey's long-term interest. Ecevit was also concerned that by the same token we are totally opposed to ----- and have so informed the Greeks.

K: And that we will cooperate with the Turks to this end.

S: We are willing to work energetically with Turkey for a solution which will preserve consitutional arrangements while protecting the rights of the Turkish-Cypriot community. You should go through carefully with Ecevit our analysis of this, hopefully to lead him to understand we are not attempting to ----- the situation for to put forth a US plan but rather in our judgment the Turkish, while it might seem to have advantages to Turkey in the short term, clearly has the most dangerous potentialities in the long term.

K: Good.

S: The Secretary recognizes it may be difficult to present such a case but our analysis is correct----- he considers it imperative that Ecevit be carefully led through this analysis. Basically the ~~text here is your~~ package here is our hope that if Ecevit can be convinced that our analysis is correct, it is therefore a Makarios solution would be no better for Turkey than-Sampson he will be ----- what an alternative solution might be. You should tell Ecevit that we are open to any ideas he may have and then indicate that as an idea of yours there might be a -----.



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Do not suggest in any way that this is a American chief proposal but rather an idea on which he might want to reflect. Summarize briefly..

K: And say if he finds it useful he will report immediately to Washington and see whether we can... and what our reaction is. Well, maybe we can put it a little stronger. Say that I asked him to feel him out on the.... just say it is something that I have not discussed with anybody but that I would like personally to get his reactions to and as soon as we have it we should report it. That makes it a little less free-wheeling.

S: ~~OK~~, to summarize briefly, we must not get ourselves in a situation where we are backing one solution and the UK and Turkey backing another and the Greeks another solution and the Soviets having the role of opting for Turkey if they so desire for Turkey. We must remain as flexible as possible and not get ahead of the ~~previous proposal~~ Carides proposal until we can bring the parties themselves to recognize that a compromise solution must be sought and that it is in their best interest. The Secretary does not wish you to commit yourself in any way to returning to Wash. at this time.

K: No, infact, I think he should go to London for the Monday meeting.

S: Well, you should be prepared to go to ----- London if desirable.

K: No, that's a damn good cable. Can you add one other thought to it, please. That one of our principle objectives is not to have the Turks feel we let them down in this and therefore he should really make Ecevit understand that we are really talking to him as friends as allies.

S: Yes, we said we wanted him to approach it with compassion...

K: Yeah, I know, but say it again at the end.

S: Right.

K: And you better tell Joe that he should not surface his document.

S: ~~S~~ Yes, right.

K: I mean, that is totally premature. Now, gentlemen, before I get another spade of stories, does anyone disagree with this? If anyone does, please let me know. There is no crime in disagreeing. There is a crime in taking it to the press.

~~Mx~~ I: We don't know where those stories came from--but certainly none of the people have been in on this.



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K: I don't mind the disagreement if there is one.

I: No, I don't think there is one.

S: Mr. Secretary, I don't know how to convince you but---I wouldn't have any hesitations.

K: And, Bob, you agree?

M: Oh yes, Mr. Secretary.

K: OK, fine. I'm not asking this for PR reasons, I'm asking it to make sure that we are all aboard. You might as well go ahead even if you disagree but I'd like at least to know.

I: Do you want to hear about the Souvaraguanes cable?

K: Yes. I have talked to Souvaraguanes incidently.

S: ... and therefore a compromise is the only way out. We are willing to press for such a compromise once it is clear what sort of compromise is desirable. ~~We~~ You should also make the following two points-----
Therefore a compromise is the only way out -----

K: And also you should tell them that we have told the Turks we will work with them on any solution on Cyprus that gives them guarantees in that respect. You know just a sentence about our cable.

S: Yes. And then finally during the Security Council ----- consideration you should make clear that we are opposed to all outside intervention from whatever quarter.

K: Including -----.

S: Yeah.

K: Now we better tell Erwin that we had a telephone call with Sauvargues, otherwise he'll look like a fool. Tell him the Secretary has made these points in capsule form to Sauvagnargues on the telephone but this is an extension of his remarks--or something like that.

I: Henry, we've set up a WSAG meeting for tomorrow morning at 10:00 a.m. To set up a working group to prepare a possible contingency plan and we thought we should not do anything on alert or anything like that. No evacuation plan.



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K: I agree, but we should look them over.

I: We are, that is what we are preparing for tomorrow morning.

K: Good.

I: The other thing, I think I told you we got a message in from Callaghan which we are going to send to you as soon as it is delivered from the British.

K: You might talk Ramsbotham through what we are telling the Turks.

M: Anyone else that you want us to do this with?

K: No, Ramsbotham, and has somebody talked to the Secretary General--

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M: No, not other than what you instructed Buffum this morning.

K: That's good enough. Has that been done?₁

M: I'll have to check. Anything else?

K: No.

M: Thank you.

K: Thank you, Bob.



Friday, July 19, 1974
San Clemente
Secretary Kissinger - Amb. McCloskey
12:45 p.m.

K: Bob? I just want to talk to you alone but if you've got the others on there it is OK with me.

M: Which Bob do you want?

K: McCloskey.

M: He's on here. I'll get off.

K: No, you can stay on (Ingersoll). Just the two of you?

M: We can have it just the two of us. You want the two of us?

K: Well, what I wanted to mention briefly is that Dana Schmidt article now in the Christian Science Monitor about the disagreement in the State Dept. with our policy.

M: God damn it. Does he have a piece like that?

K: Yup.

M: I should have seen him the other day. He came and waited for me and I got too busy and never got to see him.

K: Well, it is a little odd that we've got a Department that can get things about itself that are against it--regardless of whether I am right or not. And the press doesn't seem to get any briefing about what we are doing. And I'm wondering if Hartman or somebody who can bring himself to do it can explain that the senior officials in the State Dept. are in agreement with each other---not that it makes a god-damn bit of difference.

I: I told to call John Oaks of the New York Times at noon to explain that to him after their editorial but I wasn't able to ~~xxx~~ reach him.

K: But the fact is that no press man has yet heard one word of support out of the State Dept. for US government policy. That is a little odd. Could somebody call Schmidt. I mean for example---it says, "US officials were critical of the



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decision to seek a postponement of the Security Council meeting for Monday until Friday, ostensibly to wait until all the facts were in. Well, the delay according to officials gave the insurgents time they needed to consolidate their position. Now then, on Monday we didn't even know Makarios was alive. Secondly, supposing there had been a meeting. How would we have unconsolidated their position? Thirdly, from Wednesday until today the delay was not at our request but at Makario's request. We just a delay only until Tuesday when Makarios could get there. Now I'm just wondering, can we do a little briefing of at least my point of view.

M: All right, sir. I'll do it.

K: I don't care so much for a defense for myself but I can't believe it is in the interest of the Department to appear as a rabble.

M: I quite agree with you.

K: And, furthermore, not one of these policies was ever raised with me. Do you recall that this was ever raised?

M: No.

K: Was there one person who ever said to me, "let's have a meeting this afternoon?" And what would have been out position at that meeting? Can we do something to keep this thing from developing into a rolling campaign? Can we get some background, or should I do it from out here?

M: We'll do it here, sir.

K: Will you let me know what has been done on the Turkish intervention.
per your instructions

M: We have a telegram that we are typing up now/and that we will have back to you very shortly to read it to you.

K: I don't want instructions. I want a contingency plan. I'm worried that if we don't get that-----soon Joe won't have anything to talk about.

M: Have you seen his telegram from Athens? Can I read it to you? He saw your-----

K: Oh, here it is. It was just brought in. Well, of course, Joe's conception of his role is not my conception of his role. He is going empty handed---you



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know, well, fine. But it is at least progress.

M: I think it is encouraging.

K: Oh yeah.

M: And then, I think armed with what has already has been bent and what will be sent--he ought to be on pretty sound ground for his conversations with the Turks.

K: Yeah, if we get it there in time.

I: We'll call you in a few minutes.

K: Yeah, but---Hartman is a sensible fellow. Can somebody talk to the key reporters like Murray Marder, or should we get a backgrounder group together, what do you think?

M: Well, we could, given the time now, I think what I would do is to get after the Times and the Post and I'll get a hold of Schmidt and go over our thinking with them. Now I had to pull Marder back last night from a story in which he was saying that we were introducing ----- now he claims to have gotten the basis for this from the British and the Cypriots.

K: Well, just keep it confused. I thought for some reason that the Marder article wasn't bad.

M: Well, I pulled it back from it. He had already written it and he changed it after I talked to him. I'm sorry about Schmidt. He came and tried to see me yesterday morning but I got busy and couldn't see him and he couldn't wait any longer.

K: Yeah, but the fact of the matter is that it isn't your fault. The fact is in the Department no one seems interested in defending our policy and everybody that has a gripe that he doesn't have the guts to tell me personally is going to the press with it. The impression that makes of the Department is a disaster.

M: Right. I regret to say that that's true and that is the kind of thing that led to that terribly misleading editorial in the New York Times this morning. That's why I tried to call Oaks to correct the impression.

K: The fact is that it never seems to work. No one has yet---there is not one newsman who has heard one senior official in the Dept. who is supporting policy. I don't even want personal support.



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Well, that's not entirely--

K: Well, who's heard it--from whom?

M: Well, Marder has heard it from me. Valeriani has heard it from me. I talked also to ~~V~~ Pete Lisagor yesterday.

K: I had no sense that any of these meetings show any fundamental disagreement.

I: I think you are right. I gathered all the regional assistants together this morning to tell them that and to pass the word down in their departments.

M: I fell particularly bad about this because I'm the one who---

K: Well you have many other things to do.

M: But I'm talking about the people in the Department now who are airing their own opinions.

K: Well, if they had only told me their opinions.

M: It is a gutless thing for someone to have done.

K: But what we face now---this is going to turn into the god-damnest brawl ever. It will be like the India-Pakistan thing. And it won't stop unless someone get a hold of it. So if just a few of these key people could get it---

M: I'll ~~take~~ take care of that.

K: Or, I'll hold a backgrounder out here. Though it is a little humiliating for a Cabinet member to say my subordinates agree with me and never disagreed with me when I was there.

I: We'll take care of it.

K: OK and get me that cable within the next 15 minutes or else Joe won't have anything to talk about.

I & M: OK, Bye.

TELCON

Senator Mansfield
Secretary Kissinger
7/19/74 1:15 p.m.

M: Yes , Henry.

K: Senator, I know they have already called you from the department.

M: Yeh, McCloskey did.

K: But I just wanted to tell you briefly where we stand now. We have gotten the Greeks to agree to send somebody to London on Monday.

M: Which Greek?

K: The Greek government. We are not dealing with the greeks on Cyprus at all.

M: Hm huh.

K: And our strategy is we will definitely get that government on Cyprus removed.
The sampson government.

M: Yeh.

K: But before we start moving on that, we want to prevetn at Turkish intervention and a Greek/Turkish war and frankly what we would like to to work out--we ~~wxx~~ see no way of getting Makarios back on the island short of military action. Which we would prefer not to take so what we are trying to do, this is just for your information. His constitutional successor is a man called Clerities who is head of the national assembly and we are trying to see whether we can get him established with the agreement of Greece and Turkey--once that is done he can call for elections in which Makarios can run in 6 most and that way we avoid both a Greek/Turkish war, poossible Soviet intervention and civil war on the islandx And the major thing we want to do now is prevent a blow-up and possi ble call for American military forces

M: You wouldn't get military forces, Henry.

K: That's what I mean. That being the situation. I wanted you to unde - stand why we are maneuvering as we are--it is easy to make a proclama- tion and one danger is if we can't get US forces since we also cannot get UK forces, if we go too far on the Makarios ... and he then calls for Soviet ~~forces~~, we haven't got a leg to stand on.

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TELCON

Senator Mansfield
(continued Page 2)

M: But if it comes to that and you've no leg to stand on, then you are in great trouble--worse than Vietnam, I would think

K: If we try to get in.

M: Yes.

K: We will not get in. But knowing that we can't get in, we are trying to maneuver in such a way that a consittutional solution emerges.

M: That won't meet with Makarios' approval yet.

K: We don't know yet.

M: You are seeing him Monday, McCloskey said?

K: On monday, if he figures he can't get back any other way--it might meet with his approval.

M: That would be fine, but it is a delicate situation as you know more than me.

K: What is your view.

M: Hmmm. I'd stick to Makarios as long as possi ble and if you can get a way out with his approval, fine. Otherwise there is a lot of ~~Greek~~ anti-Greek sentiment whidh is already evident in the Senate anyway, and you will be in difficulties.

K: The trouble is if we take a pro-Makarios position, since we can't use US forces it won't get us anywhere either. It might keep the present crowd in.

M: Yeh but there is a lot of anti-Greek feeling in the Senate and you better keep it in mind at all times, Henry because it could go in over our necks and if it did, you know there'd be hell to pay.

K: Right. We are not supporting the Greeks under any circumstances. In fact we will oppose the Greeks, but we want to get them to pull back from their position step-by-step without a war.

M: Oh yes, that is quite impor tant. But you have to play Makarios like a violin.

K: That is why I am seeing him.



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K: What I said to you isn't our public position.

M: No, no, I haven't heard a thing.

K: Our public position is that I am seeing Makarios and if I can work out something with his approval, that would be the best solution.

M: But he is a pretty mercurial character

K: Yeh, he is tricky.

They all seem to wind up in my baliwick sooner or later

M: But you can't avoid it either.
Do your best Henry, we will watch.

K: Right, and I just wanted you to know (1) we won't intervene militarily
second we will not support the Greek government --in fact we will
oppose the greek government--but in such a way that they can pull back
from their position without going to war

M: Good, it sounds good.

K And third we won't make any other decisions until I've seen Makarios

M: And fourth you will walk the tight rope.

K: Do the very best of our abilities.

M: Good luck, Henry. Take care.

K: Thank you.



TELCON

Amb. Ramsbotham

Secretary Kissinger

2:05 p.m. 7/19/74

R: Hello, Henry.

K: Peter, how are you?

R: Sound as though you are in Washington.

K: No, I'm in San Clemente. I'll be back tomorrow night.

R: Yes.

K I just wanted to check, our press reports are based on what my loyal subordinates are leaking out that there are disagreements between the UK and the US.

R: I had to take that up today with the State Department because it is troubling me a bit.

K: Well, it troubles me. And I just want you to know that as far as I am concerned there are some differences in emphasis, but I am not aware of any major differences.

R: Right. Well, that is very good to say that, I'm not either. And I've been saying Henry that there is a difference in position which arises inevitably from the fact that we are a guarantor and you are not.

K: That is right.

R: That is not a necessary difference in policy--a position which we can't avoid.

K: I don't mind you having your position and our having a slightly more nuance position because we can eventually go to yours if that is the way things develop or you can go to ours.

R: That is right. Henry, I don't know if you have had a longest message from Callahan.

K: It is allegedly on the way to me, but

R: Because it has come to me now and I think it ~~is~~ very much bears out what you are saying--this is how we see it too.

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K: Would you let Jim know that that is how I see it?

R: I will indeed.

K: And if you have an occasion to say this to the Press, we would welcome it.

R: Let's get a phrase while we are together on this--

K: Think I could mention that we are a ~~guarantor~~ guarantor.

K: You can say first of all that I have been in telephonic and other contact with the foreign secretary every day.

R: Yes.

K: That there is a consistency in our ~~approach~~ appraisal of the situation and that Britain as a guarantor power has a different --is differently situated from us, but that there is no difference of policy.

R: Yes, I think it would be very helpful, Henry

K: And we will say the same thing.

R: I've have already had to fight off the Financial Times today because they had a story as they expressed it--that you had blown your top as far as the Financial Times.

K: What the hell are they talking about.

R: And I took the line which we are taking now and I hope I have stopped them sending any reports.

K: But there hasn't been a cross word.

R: Q That is right.
I think you will find it is a very constructive--gone into all the details--

K: Do you want one of my people to call the Financial Times?

R: No, no. I think I'd leave it--you could do that.

K: Whom would we call?

R: A fellow called Lewis. Paul Lewis.

K: Yeh, he is a menace.



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R: I hope I did it alright this morning. There will be something on it. And as you know Mandre and other people are indicating that there had been differences in the approach.

K: Who is?

R: Any how Henry, I'm glad what you've said.

K: But absolutely no differences.

R: And I'll pass it on to Jim too and we will use it here.

K: And we on are side.

R: Thank you very much.

K: And we will keep each other informed. I've told Ingersoll to keep you posted.

R: We will--were in touch with Ingersoll today.

K: So you know what we are saying to the Turks.

RL Right.

K: And I'm assuming you are in general agreement with it.

R: On their way to see him now

K: On their way to see whom?

R: To see Stabler

K: I see.

R: My fellow Graham--to see Stabler
You have been in touch with the Russians according to the press.

K: Not in the last few days.

R: Anyhow we are sharing all pretty fully, I presume.

K: And you can be sure we will share every thing with you.

R: The only thing I see of the differences we have talked about--could be when the time comes when we agree entirely with you at keeping the UN away from Resolutions while we try to work things out--when the time comes for resolution, I can see that we may want to discuss the question of withdrawal.



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- K: When the time comes for a solution we are prepared to discuss it.
- R: That is right. But one never knows when that time does dome. Because other people sometimes keep the ball. We have no intention at the moment of doing more than--
- K: We would like to do it in the context of a solution.
- R: Right we have your point. And one way possibly of finding some language when it comes to it--in a wider context of improving the system of security inside Cyprus.
- K: That is no problem.
- R: Than using that bold ph~~rase~~ase about withdrawal, we might be able to do that.
- K: In that context, we can go along with it. At least as a concept I don't reject it.
- R: You made that clear. I don't think, Henry, there is misunderstanding at all and our position and yours, is very well aligned, I reckon.
- K: Good and if you want to get it across to your newspapers we will do the same with ours.
- R: I see. As I'm talking a telegram has come in ~~with~~ from Athens of a talk with Joe Sisco.
- K: You know that the Greeks have agreed to come to London on Monday.
- R: Good. That is good. I think Joe is going back to London.
- K: I am certain.
- R: He should drop in on NATO too. And bring them along and that will put more pressure on the Greek goverment. We can all stick together there too.
- K: There major problem is to keep him from going to Oslo to collect the Nobel Prize before he has settled it.
- R: ~~9x~~ (laughs)
- K: We will send him some anti-thyroids and that is the onlyproblem I have.
- R: I am having some communication from Makarios personally in NE W york because of my previous contact with him.



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- K: Yeh. And there is one little thing which I was asked today--to pass a message to Clerities which I am not sure that he will do--not to get too much involved with the new regime in the ... talks because there may be a change again and at the moment, of course, the regime is not recognized by the Turks and therefore is not really in a to give Clerities instructions, you see.
- K: Yeh.
- R: Whether we passed that on or not, I am leaving it to our people there.
- K: Right. I will --after I have seen Makarios I'll keep you posted.
- R: Would you do that?
- K: Yep.
- R: Thank yo very much.
- K: Good. Bye.



TELCON

Secretary Kissinger

Amb. McCloskey

2:15 p.m. 7/19/74

M: Yes sir

K: Bob I have just talked to the British ambassador--just in general to tell him there were no disagreements of any major substance between us and he concurred and he says the British press has been fed stories from my darlings that I was furious with Calhoun and I blew my top at him

M: I had heard this this morning that he was attributing to someone of the Financial Times

K: That is right, but ~~we~~ did we do anything ~~about~~ Bob?

M: No, Mr. Secretary, since I talked to you I went in and spent 10 minute with the Task Force explaining to them that if any of those people in there had any differences they owe it to you to tell one of your advisors to tell you directly --but we can't have editorials of the major--

K:N No, did we tell--did somebody straighten the financial times? When we get a story in the morning and if I hadn't heard it from Ramsbotham, why didn't we call them and say it is totally total balderdash

M: First I was trying to find out the name of the guy at the ~~convent~~ Financial Times who I had never heard of before.

K His name is Lewis.

M: I now know it and I haven't talked to him yet. I will . I have been talking to David Binder of the NY Times. Bob Ingersoll who is here now has talked to Johnny Oakes of the editorial page that had not been considered and when they had been--

K: First of all if the department wants to be the Polish Parliament they can do it. I don't even remember we received any recommendations.

M: That's what I told them.

and

K: But even if we ~~don't~~ reject them, that is what we ~~are~~ there for
for God sake.



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M: I said we wouldn't necessarily agree with the, but we haven't even received them. And he is willing to print any kind of message we want to send him.

K: In a letter box.

M: I don't think it is worth doing.

K: That is not worth doing.

M: I was talking to Binder who gave me the sense that he was embarrassed to see that editorial this morning because he said he became convinced yesterday and wished he had talked to me the day before--convinced that this is not the case.

K: But Bob we have two problems, one is a report filtered into the department that I was supposed to have blown my top to Callahan. If the Financial Times prints this it will become gospel truth and I'll never catch up with it. Now if by the sheerest accident I haven't talked to Ramsbotham I wouldn't even know about it. The opposite is true. We had the most amicable relationship. There isn't the slightest cross word, their position--the position Ramsbotham will take as signatories, they are in a different position from us but they are ⁱⁿ ~~are~~ close and intimate coordination

M : I understand.

K: You get a story of allied disagreements floating around and we will be in deep trouble. I talked to Mansfield and he said don't use force, we will not support it, don't support the Greeks and don't use any pressure. Now you tell me what policy that is.

M: A nonpolicy. I will talk to Lewis of the FTimes--

K I don't know if it is worth it at this late stage, because by now, whatever he has done he has filed.

M: I will find out.

K: Now whose resolution is this--(to someone in HAK's office)

M: Mr. Secretary--can I come back to the press--after--we have just received now your forSisco for the Secretary--that you sent to San Clemente--

K: Yeh, that really isn't necessary--after what you did
Has that already gone?



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M: No, it just got here.

K I would hold it because your other cable takes care of it.

M: Okay.

K: What do you think?

M: I agree. I think the other one takes care of it.

K: The only thing is, if you redo it and say, you know, this is on top of the other one--and I just wanted to make sure that he heard also personally from me.

M: Well, we will send it but I honestly think--

K: No, I don't frankly think it is necessary.
Where is the Callahan message?

M: It is pretty long--do you want me to read it to you?

K: No, but has it been sent to me.

M: Yes, to the WH

K Well has it been sent to me?

M: To you from the WH. It was delivered over there because we were waiting for it at the WSAG meeting and Kennedy was to send it to you from there.

K: Now, I just wonder whether there is any sense talking to Lewis.
It is now past his filing deadline.

M: I'll get off the phone and get on it right now.

K: No, no, isn't it past his filing deadline--it is now--10:00 in London.

M: It would be yes. It is possible that someone else here has already talked to him also. In the Eur Bureau.

K: Could somebody take control of this. When we get a story going in the department like this, by the time it gets established, if we want an artificial crisis, that once more we are troubled with our allies, if we had a functioning thing, someone would be putting out that we are in the closest contact with all our allies everyday. Which happens to be the truth. In NATO with the nine, with France, with Britain.
That is what we should be putting out. We have been in touch, but we



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have not been putting it out.

M: I think we will do it right now.

K: I don't think Bob can do it all but some of the leakers could put their energies on that.

M: Right.

K: Above all, if a paper as prestigious as the Financial Times puts out that I yelled at Callahan in which there isn't the slightest bit of truth, then other british papers will pick it up--then you are going to get the left wing of the labor party screaming.

M: In this case, at least this is not the kind of thing that would come out of the State Department--it had to come from the British source.

K Impossible, because he checked with the British.

M: Ramsbotham.

K: Lewis checked with Ramsbotham.

M: Saying he got it from the State Department.

K: He got it from an American source. Why would the British put it out--it isn't true. There isn't the slightest bit of truth in it.

M: Mr. Secretary, the question I am sorry to be just catching up-- apparently came up in the press briefing today and was denied. I have this man Lewis calling in now if you --

M: Why don't you talk to him and tell him it isn't not only not true it is the opposite of the true.

M: Right. Bob Ingersoll is still on.

K: Now what about the UN resolution--

M: Bill Buffum is here--here is Buffum.
Has Larry given you this resolution yet, Mr. Secretary, I dictated to him a few minutes ago?

K: It isn't as bad as I thought.



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~~MX~~ B: It really is the best we have seen so far. It also will coincide with our policy except for that reference to withdraw of excess troops, but I think there will be unanimous support for in the Council Mr. Secretary

K: Can it no longer be changed?

~~MX~~ B: I don't believe so at this late stage. I would urge however that

K: If you say at this late stage--how did it get to this late stage without my getting a crack at it.

~~MX~~ B: Because they are nonaligned--they have been negotiating this text among themselves during the day--this is just emerged this afternoon from their own efforts--they gave us their earlier version night before last--the one I showed you yesterday.

K: And we never knew about anything they were doing. And we didn't know what they were doing?

~~MX~~ B: They have been huddling on this throughout the day and this is the text they have finally produced--now we will urge that they not vote on this text this afternoon but if they should force a vote on this this evening, I wanted very much to have your ~~government's~~ judgment on it.

K: ~~Kkkkkkk~~
Except for the withdrawal of foreign military personnel we could live with it.

~~MX~~ B: Indeed. That is the one sticking point and the question is I think, what --whether that is a serious enough consideration for you in view of the very good appeal to all states to exercise restraint. But we should stand aside on the text if everyone is supporting it.

K: No, but we should try to change it.

B: All right. We could make an effort, but I think this is probably the minimum requirement on withdrawal ~~ix~~ that most of the other members have settled for. Particularly since the British had been sponsoring this kind of language from the beginning.

K: But see if we can get it watered down--talk to the British first.

B: Will do. And ~~has~~ the revised text of the speech reached you yet, Mr. Secretary?

K: No. I also would prefer not to mention Makarios--but we don't seem to be able to avoid that.



TELCON -- CONFERENCE CALL
Secretary Kissinger [San Clemente]
Dep. Sec. Ingersoll, Amb. McCloskey,
Wells Stabler & Colonel Kennedy [Washington]

2:30 p.m., July 19, 1974

HAK: Hello, what are we doing -- why are you all at the White House may I ask?

McC: . . for a WSAG meeting.

HAK: Yeah.

McC: Just about to begin.

HAK: About that UN speech, I haven't seen a copy of it.

McC: Buffum is to get it back out to you. Stabler and I read it, it looks okay. I thought it ought to convey a little bit more of the concern that is reflected in the telegram that you wanted sent and we sent to Ankara.

HAK: That is right. But it is now 2:30.

McC: Well, the last I talked to him, Mr. Secretary, -- 15 or 20 minutes ago -- it was still possible Scali would not have to speak this afternoon. But the Council may agree to hear only Makarios and then carry over until tomorrow. Buffum is to let me know just as soon as he has any change in that.

HAK: Right. Now, let me say one general thing, the management of a crisis depends on everybody being informed of our thinking that we want to take action. Now I have a cable here from Sauvagnargues which shows for example in paragraph 4 -- Is Stabler on?

S: Yes, sir.

HK: I mean, it says -- Sauvagnargues proposes that Sisco go on to Ankara. Now what does Irwin say to that profound remark? Why doesn't he say that's exactly what he's doing? Does he need instructions to be told this?

S: No, he certainly shouldn't. Because he's certainly aware that he would. It was announced in the public domain in any event.

HAK: Well, then why didn't he say it?

S: Well, I'll have to just check that and see. I mean, it doesn't suggest that he didn't. But it certainly doesn't report that he said so, no.

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HAK: Well, there are only two possibilities. If he's reporting it, he must either want to inform us of their thinking.

S: Yeah.

HAK: And think ^{that} this will influence a decision. Well, at any rate, I want him -- I want Irwin to go back to Sauvagnargues and tell Sauvagnargues two things: One, I greatly appreciate his analysis; I agree with it and there were a number of things which weren't made clear in our original cable. One is that we have made clear to Turkey that we would strongly oppose enosis direct or trekking (?) and that the Turks to us have expressed great appreciation for this.

S: Um-humm.

K: Secondly, that we are going in the UN debate to indicate our objection to outside intervention. And third, that, as he knows, Sisco has been sent to Ankara. Now I just want to do this to keep them happy.

I: Okay.

HAK: Now, is somebody keeping the British informed of what we're doing?

I: Bob has just talked to --

McC: I have just talked to the Minister -- Peter Ramsbotham was not available but I got Sykes. And they have a long message from Callaghan to you which they are delivering to me and we were just getting that over the phone when your call came in. We didn't quite complete it.

HAK: Is he rambunctious?

I: No, pretty much the same position they were in before, saying that they were going to support Makarios, at least at this time, not knowing whether he could eventually be the head of the government. But until they find another solution, this is their position.

HAK: Well, that's all right.

I: Sampson out of course. And they have to do something to make sure that the Turks didn't move in and that would be the removal of Sampson. They said the only way this is going to happen is to put pressure on the Greeks.



HAK: Well, then we are willing to bring pressure on the Greeks as soon as we know what the alternative is that emerges.

I: Right.

HAK: And you can tell Ramsbotham on my behalf to Callaghan that we are not in disagreement with them on this.

I: Okay.

HAK: I don't want the British to start leaking that they are fighting us on Greece. Tell them it is a tactical difference. That we don't want to move against Sampson until we know the alternatives and use him as a bargaining chip but we can assure them we don't want to have Sampson emerge out of it.

I: Right.

HAK: And you might call the Turkish Ambassador and make this clear to him.

I: Right.

HAK: Hopefully on a line that the Russians monitor make microwaves.

I: [Laughter]

HAK: And have we heard from the Germans?

McC: Nothing I've seen so far. Wells?

S: No, there's been absolutely nothing at all from the Germans.

HAK: But you gentlemen form a little group that keeps on top of this and not just react?

S: That's right. We talked to Fulbright and to Morgan and to --

McC: I spoke to Mansfield and Morgan. Mansfield was fully in support. Morgan who I had to reach at home in Pennsy --

HAK: my position.



McC: Of your position and the efforts that we're making.

HAK: Good.

I: I talked to Fulbright and he was just concerned over the way things were going. He commented very adversely against the Colonels in Greece.

HK: Well, you tell him we have no love for them.

I: [Laughter] I told him we would keep him informed.

HAK: The major thing theme is that we cannot have a war there right now.

I: Right.

HAK: And we can only do one thing at a time.

I: Right. We haven't heard anything from Joe from Athens so we don't know what happened there.

HAK: Has he left?

I: He's supposed to have to have left.

S: He must be in Ankara by now.

HAK: He's probably taking over the government.

[Laughter]

HAK: Well, can we call Ankara and make sure the guy reports?

I: Yep.

McC: Sure.

HAK: And does he understand he's not to surface the Clevides thing until we ~~gxxx~~ give instructions?

McC: We told him that we will send him instructions on that from his two telegrams this morning --

HAK: You better pray that people are clear enough.

[Laughter]



HAK: I tell you there will be blood. If he surfaces this. The last thing I want is an American draft proposal. The last thing we need is an American draft proposal. The first thing he's got to do is to get into the Turkish heads that there must be an alternative solution.

I: Right.

HAK: Once he's done that, tell them we will support an alternative solution such as, for example, Clevides or something else they might think of. But until he's convinced them that there's got to be an alternative, our introducing Clevides just makes us a party.

S: Well, I have report as a result of any conversations this morning the subsequent instructions. There were done of course --

HAK: Well, just ~~But that's~~ because you won me over with that cable last night, don't press your luck.

S: I'm not pressing my luck. But I think you've got to --

HAK: What are your instructions?

S: Well, they are your instructions.

HAK: . . . nice things about you to Eagleburger.

S: Huh?

HAK: I've even said nice things about you to Eagleburger.

S: That's _____.

HAK: Which is the highest -- it's almost like a declaration.

S: [Laughs] I'll have to return it. Well, --

HAK: What did you say -- you're going to say nice things about me to Eagleburger?

[Laughter]

That's the mentality. Go ahead.

S: Can we get on with your instructions?

HAK: Yeah.



S: So what I said is: The Secretary has considered the reports of your conversations with Ecevit in London as well as your proposals to suggest as _____ contained in the message which you saw. And the Secretary does not want you to float the Clevides proposal until you have made absolutely sure that Ecevit understands that in our view the direction in which Turkey is presently pointed would lead to ultimate disaster for Turkey. You should, therefore, in speaking with him in Ankara go through it in carefully analysis set forth in the message of yesterday. He must be made to understand --

HAK: I got a call from Sauvagnargues. Hold still and I'll call you back. I placed the call to Sauvagnargues just to make sure he's happy.

S: Will you tell him these things?

HAK: I'll tell him those things but send them anyway.

S: All right.

HAK: Will you all stay where you can be reached?

S: If you want us to. Shall we start the WSAG?

HAK: Yeah. Start the WSAG and I'll call you out again.

I: Okay.

McC: Last thing, Mr. Secretary, there is a message coming in now from Sisco.

K: Good.

McC: Okay.

HAK: And the State Department at the WSAG will act firmly right? Not hand wringingly?

I: That's right.

HAK: Thank you.

I: Okay.

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TELCON - CONFERENCE CALL
Secy Kissinger [San Clemente]
Dep. Secy. Ingersoll, Amb. McCloskey,
Wells Stabler, Colonel Kennedy [Washington]

2:50 p.m., July 19, 1974

K: I talked to Sauvagnargues and just gave him the gist of it but send the telegram and send Irwin in to give him something to babble about. Sauvagnargues was flattered out of his wits. And they are going to make a representation to the Turks tonight against intervention. The British have told them not to worry because the Turks always do this in a crisis, have ships cruising around off Cyprus and there is no danger of them. Do you agree with that?

McC: Well, we were just beginning to get the Colby briefing downstairs and it seems I guess they believe that no decision has yet been made. But I must say all things are in place.

S: which says that while they made no decision, they expect to wait and see what Sisco has to say and will move to intervene militarily the morning of 21 July or possibly 22 July. In other words, if they don't get by that time what they call necessary guarantees of independence and non-interference in Cyprus.

McC: The total of their mobilization so far appears to be two divisions.

HAK: Well, then the point is we've got to get instructions to Sisco on the Clevides matter. Now I want two things for Sisco: One is I want him to explain to the Turks that a pro-Makarios intervention is not in their interest. But secondly, to have the Turks understand that we are not in favor of enosis or direct so that we are not unsympathetic to their point of view. Thirdly, that we are willing to work with them energetically to bring about a constitutional solution that protects the Turkish minority and their strategic interests on the Island. Because I don't want them to think we are going in there as pro-Greek. Four, we are willing to listen to any ideas they have. Five, one idea which has occurred to us is possibly having Clevides and that is as far as we should go on Clevides. If they are interested in that, we can see whether we can flesh it out. Do you see what I mean?

All: Yes.

HAK: Then it is not the United States pushing its own idea.

McC: Now you know there's a good deal of this that's already in the message that Sisco should receive very shortly if he hasn't already.

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Conference Call - Continued

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HAK: How about humoring me and summing it up again, the way I gave it.

McC: Well, to extend to the Turks that a pro-Makarios intervention --

HAK: Now I don't know what is in the message you're talking about.

S: The message that was sent out --

McC: The one that we sent this morning.

I: That I have here, which was read -- Do you want me to read it again?

HAK: No, no. That's the one you did this morning.

I: Yeah. But in that one at your instructions we said: You should reaffirm to Ecevit that we are totally opposed to _____ for the direct _____.

HAK: Yeah.

I: That was in that one. And then that was the one about intervention and the consequences --

HAK: Clevides solution.

S: No, we did not because that's in this other one that we were just --

HAK: Well, how about humoring me and summing up our position again. That keeps Sisco from getting off on something else. Winding up with Clevides. I want some compassion shown to the Turks. I don't want us to go -- we're going to wind up bulldosing both parties into a solution they don't want. The trick is to get at least one of them to want it.

McC: Well, we'll do a new telegram then on this instruction. We've already made the point on enosis in the previous one but all the rest of it then is --

S: But I think it's summed up perhaps still in this message. I don't know whether you --

HAK: Do you think you could express to Sisco that the strategy to follow is to show compassion to the concerns of both sides or at least of the Turks so that we're not in the position where at the end of it the Turks will say we raped them. I said that in '67. And that's



Conference Call - Continued

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why I want him to present our views of this in the most compassionate light and convince them that military intervention has the wrong [feedback] now because it strengthens the wrong horses. My own personal view is that in '67 I wouldn't have been as opposed to their intervention as I am today but that's a different matter.

I: Okay, sir, we'll do it.

HAK: Will you read it to me and will you get it off because it's already 7 o'clock at night in Ankara, isn't it?

S: 7 hours -- it's 10 o'clock.

McC: You understand he already has the one message.

HAK: Bob, I understand he's got the message. I want him nevertheless in every message to understand the strategy.

McC: Um-humm.

HAK: I want then from the face of that strategy -- my nightmare is that his productivity is to peddle a solution in the face of a non-agreed _____ in which he will then become one of the parties to the dispute and we will have a Clevides faction, a Makarios faction and a Sampson faction and Clevides at that point has no support at all.

I: ... Understood. Any point -- no.

HAK: If we could convince the Turks that they could work with us for a new solution -- [Long Pause] --

I: You mean some other solution?

HAK: Here we go!!!

McC: No, I understand.

HAK: [Reads a press item:] July 19th, Turkish news broadcasts cites report by [news agent] is that Under Secretary Sisco has brought . . . Turkey an American plan for solving Cyprus crises. According to their plan in replace current head of Cyprus regime with more moderate and influential person Clevides -- changing Greek officers on Cyprus involved in the coup.

Well, gentlemen, we have a disciplined outfit of which we can be proud.



Conference Call - Continued

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I: Mr. Secretary, I was afraid you'd see that.

HAK: The worse thing we can have is an American plan at this moment. You know, it isn't after all that I have failed for five years. It's that I've occasionally been right. Now can't this Department carry out my instructions? That's where I want to come to. All it takes now is for Clevides to say he doesn't want it.

I: Well, we have a good cable from Roger Davies where talking with Clevides where he comes up with Clevides where he comes up with the same answer we do.

HAK: Who, Clevides or Davies?

I: Clevides.

HAK: You put Sisco on a lease or I'm going to go out there.

I: We'll do that.

HAK: What is the explanation for that?

McC: Mr. Secretary, I think the --

HAK: I'll tell you what the explanation is, he already surfaced his plan. Okay, well, you get out that instruction. Read it to me within an hour.

I: Okay.



TELCON
Dep Sec Ingersoll
Secretary Kissinger
3:40 p.m. 7/19/74

K: I just got the speech of Scali's but I suppose it is too late since I also had a call from Ramsbotham congratulating me on the masterful way in which Scali sometimes referred to Makarios as President and sometimes as Archbishop

I don't consider that masterful, I consider it another example of total indiscipline.

I: I just heard it and I talked to Ramsbotham afterwards who called it to my attention.

K: Do you suppose our calling President Makarios is without significance?

I: No, I don't--it is rather significant--the first part of the--

K: Did we all agree on that--I mean is everyone happy with this, I am not.

I: He started out with Archbishop--that is what we had in the text I don't know where he got the President Makarios.

K: Well, we'll somebody call it to his attention? That he is to stick to Archbishop Makarios

I: Right.

K: If we can interrupt his great flights of policymaking. Did he give essentially this speech?

I: Yes. I didn't have the text in front of me, but one of the fellows there was looking at it and said it was essentially that.

K: With what changes?

I: Well, he adlibbed at one point and talked about a reference that the Soviet representative made that--I didn't hear the Soviet man, so I don't really know what he was saying, and it implied that there had been American appealing to the Soviets that we should have a policy similar to theirs. And he said we always permit our citizens to take opposite policies or anything they want. Henry you heard the story in the Fin. Times was not filed because the reporter found out it wasn't true.

K: No, I have not heard that because it would have been interesting information



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I: We called Lewis and I--

K: That's all right. The next thing, Bob is the Callahan letter. I think it is basically a friendly letter and that basically we don't disagree with it, we are just differing about pace and how we get to this objective. Could Stabler do one of his masterpieces

I: To Callahan

K: A personal letter and reply, giving him our analysis of the situation again in a capsule and saying we agree--I've already called Ramsbotham just so that you know--is Stabler on?

I: I think I'm the only one on--I didn't know you wanted him

K: No, no that's all right. Tell him an A I don't disagree except I would do it with lower key, B I agree, C I believe that that is going on, D --that is premature--E we are willing to do once, we know what is acceptable to the parties or at least to the Turks and F is becoming moot because of the eloquence of our great ambassador. Don't put it this way--F is now being debated. Does Scali understand that we would like to delay everything as long as possible.

I: I haven't been in touch, but I will find out and we could make sure he does--I'm sure he does.

K: Have you ever dealt with Scali? Will you tell Buffum that I'm holding' him personally responsible for slowing Scali down

I: All right

K: Okay.

I: Essentially this is all right that Stabler can say except for this--'

K: I want him to give our view and then say what this means to us is with respect to your letter the following--do it a little fuller than what I have just given you.

I: Right. We will draft it let you know in a bit.

K: Good. Today.

I: Right.

TELCON

Amb. McCloskey

Sec. Kissinger

7/19/74 3:40 p.m.

M: I've talked to Lewis of the Financial Times. He explained to me that he first heard this from an American--I explained the realities of the situation and said nothing like that ever occurred. He then told me that by the time he talked to a second source, he realized it was exactly the right version. It happened that I had in front of me Callahan's letter to you today and I said you can't read a letter that the Secretary just received from Calahan and believe anything like this happened at any time let alone in the present situation --it turns out he did not write a story that Kissinger blew up at Callahan by the British insistence on supporting Makarios. K: We don't disagree with the British so much.

M: I don't think we do.

K: There is a slight tactical nuance? the Callahan letter I 'm not in much disagreement.

M: I've also talked to Marder, Binder, Dana Adam Schmidt --Baltimore Sun this p.m., I think I got the message thru of our serious disappointment at this line getting around that you working against the advice of your people and I went into this at some length with all of them--I think I got them persuaded. In the case of Binder, you'd be interested, that he said he began to understand this as far back as yesterday. I said it was too bad then that that didn't get conveyed to the editorial page. He told me that on his original story where on Wednesday he had the quotes from unnamed sources that that opinion was easy to come by, but now looking back on it realized that that is not an opinion that ~~doesn't~~ really counts and it doesn't involved the people who are mostly working closely with you.

It happens that Les Gelb is doing today's Cyprus story and I had Anderson speak to him ; after Anderson listened to me talk to Marder. And my impression is that Gelb is on course and understands. The same thing with Marder and I just spent 15 minutes ~~for~~ with Dana Adma Schmidt.

K: I wonder whether we should have Schlesinger get some of his people to call.

M: We have--My confidence in them is not as strong as my confidence in some of our own people.

K: It can't be that desperate. Okay. Then we won't do it.

M: I wanted to tell you also I went in on my own and spoke to the members of the Task Force and told them if any of this represented any views



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the people in the Task Force, I'd like to have them say it to me. That I thought it was putting the Sec State in an intolerable position when he is accused of ignoring the advice of his people and he hasn't gotten any advice contrary to what he is doing. I went on at some greater length --and someone with me said he thought the message was put across. I also talked to Hartman to keep his eye on that Task Force and see that it has some good strong leadership.

K: I think we will all learn from this crisis how to run a tighter ship.

M: For one who found myself arguing with you at times on behalf of the Foreign Service, I'm deeply disappointed with...

K: No, I understand this Bob and my concern is to make the FS a great institution. I'm not fighting the FS. Because in the two years I've got left, I'd like to see that when I leave it will be proud of itself.

M: We had an inquiry in the press office this afternoon from John Finney who picked up some word the Soviet forces in So. Russia are on alert. He went to the Pentagon and was given no comment and certainly got the same thing out of John King and our press office. I've asked Dick Kennedy to circulate from NSC that any inquiries should be ~~met~~ met with no comment unless authorized guidance from the WH.

K: Exactly right.

M: I guess that's all.

K: On the press that needs to be done is --two points that I--I just got the editorial from the Times--one did I do it against the advice of the State Dept. Two, we are not having any trouble with the British--we are in close touch with allies and more or less they agree with us--which ally is really unhappy with us.

M: None that I know of-- except the Greeks

K: The Greeks are unhappy.

M: Although after all

K: On the whole we are doing fine--what we are trying to do is working. If we can keep the Turks from invading another 48 hours.

M: I hope you might find occasion in the next day or so to send a one line note to Joe how much you--how well you think he has done--

K: Okay--I'll send it now. But have we heard from him again?



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HK: Do we know what he is doing.

M: He had--the last someone talked to him on the phone--he was awaiting the instructions--he must have them now. He did tell someone on the phone that he had heard in Ankara that Ecevit was going on the air sometime within the next couple of hours.

He didn't seem to --and we don't know--what to take from that--

K But did we deliver the original message--

M: Yes.

K: Did Joe do it or Macomber.

M: Macomber delivered the original message because Sisco had not yet arrived in Ankara--that was the instruction. I'm sorry.

K: Okay, so that have that--so he must be having the next instructions.

M: Oh sure, I would think they are there by now.

K We sent them two hours ago didn't we?

M We sent them not quite that far back.

K: Okay. Thank you--are you going away.

M: No, I'll leave a number where I can be reached--

K: Good, we may all have to get together sunday morning--it depends what the situation is--

M: When are you coming in tomorrow?

K: About 8 or 9.

M: Do you want any of us to meet you?

K: I don't see any need for it.

M I'll talk to Eagleburger tomorrow.

K: There is no need for it really--Bob. I'm a pain in the neck, but I'm not petty.
Do what you planned to do in the evening.

M: Okay.



TELCON
Secretary Ingersoll
Secretary Kissinger
4:00 p.m. 7/19/74

K: Bob, you'll regret the day you were sworn in.

I: Ahhh ha.

K: At any rate, it is proof for you--the people I don't trust, I don't work with.

I: Right. '

K: Your predecessor had not complaints about/called too often.
being

I: I don't mind a bit.

K: Look do you have that Clerities cable in front of you --

I: No, I don't--I'll get a copy though.

K: Let me tell you I would like it to be given on a confidential basis to Ramsbotham for Callahan
And to say this is pretty much an analysis of ours.

I: Do you want to incorporate in this reply that Stabler is making?

K: Yeh, why don't you say for your own personal use, I am sending you a cable.
Secondly, I would like an instruction sent to Davies that he should see Clerities if at all possible and tell him we are quite sympathetic to the considerations he advanced--or more tactfully at any rate under no circumstances should he resign his position.

I: All right.

K: Now the only thing that Stabler has to learn to become a really good friend is to draft faster.

I: He drafts fast, it is a matter of getting it through the typewriter I think is our biggest trouble.

K: Can we get those two things off in the next hour--or fairly soon

I: You want them out there first, don't you?

K: Or read to me on the phone. Fine. Thank you.



TELCON

Irving Lazar/HAK

7/19/74 ~ 4:40 p.m.

L: Hello. Hi Henry.

K: Ok. How are you.

L: Very well thank you. When are you going back?

K: Tomorrow afternoon.

L: Would it do any good at all if I came out tomorrow around 11:00 or 12:00 and just sit and talk to you for a few minutes?

K: I'd better to you about that in the morning. Can I call you around 8:30?

L: Well, I'm usually not up. I'd rather call you.

K: OK.

L: I'll call you at 8:30 in the morning.

K: You'd have to get^{up}/around 8:30 if you wanted to come down by 11.

L: That's no big problem. I'd have a car and chauffeur drive me down. 2 hours.

K: Less than that. Well, we might talk for half an hour. That might be useful.

L: Yes. I'd be glad to do it - happy to do it and if you said to me now yes and even if you couldn't give me more than 15 or 20 minutes I'd understand obviously. Perfectly.

K: On that basis I could probable do it.

L: Let's make a date for me to be there at 11:00 and I'll make arrangements.

K: Let's make it at 11:30.

L: Perfect. I'll have my car fetch me and take me right down to the -- San Clemente. And should you leave word at the gate that I'm coming.

K: And you know how to get here?

L: Yes. I'll get back your Secretary and she'll give me the exact turn off.



TELCON - McCloskey, Ingersoll/HAK - 4:45 p.m. - 7/19/74

K: I thought you were going off Bob McCloskey.

I: But he is in my office.

M: Knowing you're still working I can't leave.

K: Yes, but I'm three hours behind you.

M: Anytime we're three hours ahead of you I'll figure we've gone pretty far.

K: In that message to Callaghan - one point that ought to be made is that it is of you two that to bring pressure to restore Makarois from the outside may well be a way of solidifying rather than weakening the Greek regime. Which I believe to be true. And that's [redacted] report I've just seen from athens. It rationalizes that it will look to them as an outside pressure of somebody that is unacceptable to all of them of that Greek junta. Excuse me. Fulbright is calling me. I'll call you right back.

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12579 per sec. 3.3(b)(1) Hr. 2/3/2016
By RS W/H NARA, Date 11/15/2016

12579



TELCON

Fulbright/HAK

4:47 p.m. - 7/19/74

F: Mr. Secretary. How are you?

K: OK. I just wanted to bring you up date at where/stand. It isn't much different from what you were told this morning. But the Greeks have now agreed to send somebody to London on Monday.

F: To send somebody where?

K: To London. Which is what we had proposed and the British had supported. To talk about new constitutional arrangements which is a big step forward. And we're trying to keep the Turks from invading.

F: Well, I hope you do.

K: So that's where we are right now. You know I'm seeing Makarois on Monday?

F: What time?

K: Before your Committee. About 2:30

F: You're supposed to come to my Committee about 4:00.

K: I think that gives me an hour and 15 minutes with him.

F: What do you think he is going to say?

K: To me? I don't have a clear idea. We're not opposed to Makarois. We're opposed to getting ourselves into a position where we have to restore him by force.

F: I'm opposed to using force too but I don't want to support the Greeks.

K: There is no chance Mr. Chairman about supporting the Greeks and I can give you that flat assurance there is no chance whatever of our supporting that present regime on Cyprus. And I assure you we are maneuvering to get rid of them. What we would like to do is to maneuver the Greeks into removing them. Because if we get into a public confrontation -- it isn't so much our NATO base that worries us -- what worries us if we get into a public confrontation with Greece on the issue of the restoration of Makarois. We may be uniting that junta while if their own incompetence leads them to pull back from the regime they themselves installed. I think this will weaken them more than yielding to direct pressure. And again for your information we haven't done it officially but we are slowing all military deliveries.

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By RS/MH NARA, Date 11/15/2016

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- F: That's good too.
- K: That's again for your very private information.
- F: That's what my Committee has been telling you for two or three years.
- K: So we're bringing pressure on the Greeks but we're doing it so it isn't too publicly visible.
- F: OK.
- K: And what we're now trying to do is to see whether we can work out with the Turks some acceptable formula other than Sampson and then see what the Greeks will do about it. Once we have a formula that London and Ankara support we will put all sorts of pressures on Greece. What we don't want to do so that you understand our strategy is to get ourselves way ahead with an American plan that nobody supports and that we have to enforce.
- F: Well, I agree with that.
- K: But as soon as we have -- well have a substantial -- don't believe the newspaper stories. There isn't any real difference between us and London. Sometimes a shade of tactics but in terms Callaghan has written me a long letter today of their views and I've just replied to him and told him that. You know, here and there there may be a shade in tactics but we're on substantially the same wicket.
- F: That goods.
- K: We'll keep a little more daylight between ourselves and Makarois than they do but we're in total agreement that the present group in Cyprus has to go.
- F: Good. Well, that's just amazing. It's the main thing.
- K: But we don't want to say that publicly until we've got the Turks signed up for an alternative. Because what the Turks are after is a Turkish proposal is to turn Makarois into a Turkish stooge. Now, you know he'll never agree to that so then he comes back under those conditions and he'll have to lean on the Soviets to balance off the Turks. So we want to get the Turks to agree to a more constitutional and more balanced solution first. And under all circumstances we will oppose Sampson.
- F: Sampson? Yes.



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F: I think that's the main thing.

K: That you can be absolutely sure of. And on that we are in total agreement with the British.

F: Good. Well thank you very much for calling.

K: I'll call you tomorrow and bring you up to date again.

F: Fine.

K: Ok. Mr. Chairman. Bye.

*

TELCON
McCloskey/Stabler/Ingersoll - HAK
7/19/74 - 5:05 p.m.

K: Hello.

M Yes.

K: I tell you what you can do on this idea I gave you. Why don't you send them the CIA report. I and R can give it to you. It's in an I&R summary. Which I've just read.

M You want that to go to Callaghan.

K: Yes. That plus the Klaritus(?) thing.

M By the Klaritus thing you mean the one that Davies sent in.

K: Yes. And I want Davis to go back and as I told you I don't want him to resign.

M I report this first to the CIA?

K: I've just read it. It's page two of a special summary number 1 that I & R did for me this morning.

M Alright. We'll look for it. And.....

K: The second item is Greek military solidly united behind the United.

M I've seen that before. OK. One other thing Henry. We're holding up some more equipment than the ones we talked about yesterday.

K: I talked to Schlesinger about some A7. heavy tanks and
You hold it up for technical reasons. and they'll be no leak on this.

I: No.

K: OK.

I: You want this passed through Ramsbothom of course.

K: Yes. But tell him only for Callaghan.

I: Right.

K: Stabler are you going to do some of these masterful cables of your s.

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S: I understand I'm drafting too fast for you.

K: You're not drafting fast enough. That's the one criticism I now have of you. Just so that you don't get too confident.

S: I trust that hasn't made your day though. I've already dictated something to Callaghan which we should get on the wire shortly for you.

K: OK. How about Davis?

S: The Davis thing has already been done and I -- it's gone.

K: What about asking him not to resign?

~~XX~~
~~XX~~

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

M: Yes.

K: OK. The word was not that Davis shouldn't resign.

I: He got the message.

K: Is it true that there is a petition of foreign service officers asking me to resign.

S: No. They're asking for more work.

K: More work. Don't be ridiculous.

S: You want this Callaghan put on the wires. I mean I have it here in front me now. It's a little long.

K: Put it on the wire but will you tell Kennedy to clear the G. D. wires. They've got more watergate stuff on there. Tell them to clear the wires for it. Doesn't anyone think the Turks are going to invade tonight.

M: I don't think we've had any further indication. The last thing we had earlier this afternoon was if some of these forces were sort of slowed down in the water and were drifting about.



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- S: And that indicates that they were not _____.
- K: Bob. Ask Bill Clemens to get work to the Turks through their military channels. Our general unhappiness. That they should hold off. Not in the middle of the night though. I mean to do it during business hours. And make sure Bob, that Schlesinger sees the key cables.
- I: All of them.
- K: Well the key ones.
- I: I think they've been going to him.
- K: Good.
- I: Alright sir. Bye.

San Clemente
Friday, July 19, 1974
5:05 p.m.
Secretary Kissinger - Senator Pell

P: Hello, Henry.

K: Claiborne.

P: Greetings.

K: I just received your letter. I'm out on the west coast for a few days and I just wanted you to know that there is no intention of recognizing the Sampson regime and that it will not stay there. But we have to maneuver in such a way that we don't trigger a Soviet intervention and that we don't get a Turkish-Greek war started. But, just for your information there is no intention or any prospect of recognizing the Sampson regime.

P: I'm delighted to hear that and I appreciate more than I can say your letting me know that. I think that will make the Committee feel more relaxed. As you probably know, Bill Fulbright is inviting Makarios.

K: That's all right. I knew that and had no objection. See what we are trying to avoid, just for your information again, we are trying to avoid the situation where we are nailing our flag to something which we then have to impose by military force. We would like to get the situation in which the Greek government accepts the removal of Sampson. We think if that happens that will also have a major effort of weakening the Greek government and doesn't put us in the position of an ineffectual grandstand play.

P: Right, but if you find that the --that you have to ~~take~~ take a public position on this--

K: We will take a public position on this. And against----we are moving steadily. And, again just for your information and not to be repeated, we are already beginning to cut off military supplies.

P: Right. Well I'm delight and I thank you very much.



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K: But don't get that into the newspapers. You can g tell the other signers of your letter that if you want to that I have talked to you, you know, McGovern, Humphrey and McGee and you can give them a little feel. At any rate, put their mind at ease that we are heading for the recognition of the Sampson regime.

P: That I will but I will wait to contact them until Monday when they will be back in town.

K: THat's fine with me.

P: I appreciate very much your calling.

K: Don't let some of these articles in the N Y Times affect you. The top echelon of the State Dept. is all the people and they are totally behind what is being done.

P: Then basically your position is parallel to that of the British.

K: That's right. There are minute tactical differences but--produced by the fact that they are a guarantor, but I talked to Callaghan at least once a day-- I've just had an 8 page letter from him. I'm writing him one that is going off tonight and we are working in the greatest harmony.

P: That is good news indeed. What will you do though if you find that you just can't get rid --- that he stays and stays---

K: Then we will have to do other things.

P: All right. I thank you very, very much.

K: But what we don't want to do is have the Soviets go in there in the name of the Security Council to enforce a Security Council decision.

P: Yeah.

K: But, we will not accept Sampson.

P: Then I hope in the course of ----- that will give us an opportunity to let the Greek people be aware of the fact that the ----- government, while we have no wish to interfere---that it is not our first choice in government.

K: Well I think that if it comes out the way I think there is a good chance of at coming out, the junta will be substantially discredited anyway.

P: Would you thinking go toward-----.

K: Well, you know, we are not at that point yet. I personally, I would lean toward



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Caramonles?.

P: He seems to have a broader base. And some respectability at home still.

K: That would be my view but you know one cannot be sure what will emerge there.

P: I had a long talk with the King on my way through London. He has matured a great deal. A few years ago he was a little cocky. Now he is a much more solid person. And I would say probably in the end that ~~we~~ he would be used as a symbol----to keep his fingers clean in all these very different machinations that have been going on. He is in Eng. finishing up his degree, he moved into a smaller house and I think he would be-- we would be pleased with him if he went back.

K: Yeah, ~~hw~~ we would have no objection to that if that is how it developed.

P: Good, well I thank you very much.

K: You're welcome, Claiborne.

P: Very nice of you to call and good luck to you---

K: You can reassure your colleagues on Monday. I've already explained it to Fulbright and he is fully with us.

P: All right and I will do that myself.

K: Find, bye.

P: Bye.