

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	Telcon	HAK and Robert Ingersoll, Robert MacBostrey, Wells Stabler (7 pp.) SANITIZED	7/19/74	B
2	Telcon	HAK and the President (3 pp.) SANITIZED	7/19/74	B
3	Telcon	HAK and Wells Stabler, Robert Ingersoll (3 pp.) SANITIZED	7/19/74	B
4	Telcon	HAK and Hubert Humphrey (2 pp.) SANITIZED - (See DOS upgrades)	7/19/74	B
5	Telcon	HAK and William Colby (2 pp.) DECLASSIFIED per RAC review 4/14/11	7/19/74	B
6	Telcon	HAK and James Schlesinger (3 pp.) SANITIZED	7/19/74	B
7	Telcon	HAK and the President (4 pp.) SANITIZED	7/19/74	B
8	Telcon	HAK and William Colby (4 pp.) SANITIZED DECLASSIFIED per RAC review 4/14/11	7/19/74	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

BOX NUMBER

Kissinger Transcripts - Telephone Conversations

26

FOLDER TITLE

1974 19 July (2 of 2) (7)

RESTRICTION CODES

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TELCON

Ingersoll/McCloskey/Stabler - HAK

July 19, 1974 - 7:30 p.m.

I: Another message that Sisco and McComber were called back to The Prime Ministers.

K: But that is just to tell them we refused.

I: There was a separate message Mr. Secretary which said that the ships had turned.

K: Oh really.

I: Yes.

S: They'd been in a 7 1/2 mile limit. Both forces had turned off and they've gone outside ____.

K: Really.

S: That occurred just before the message to Sisco.

K: Could it be that we do something right sometimes.

M: We'll have to wait and see.

I: Let me get that other message.

K: I've just shaken that over self-confidence of this Department. If Sisco gets a 48 hour dealy he'll be insufferable.

I: I'll say. We'll be willing to insufferable.

K: Maybe we should try Stabler as an alternative.

M: He's been doing alright on the messages today.

K: He's terrific on messages. Where are those two messages that he sent out.

S: Did you get the one to Callaghan.

K: A message to Callaghan. Has that actually been sent.

S: It was sent out to LDX several hours ago at the White House.

K: It went two hours ago to the W.H. Now will you find you out where these idiots have it. Did you tell them to clear the ~~mes~~.

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I: An hour and a half ago.

K: Did you tell them it has high priority.

I: Yes. They were told to clear the lines.

K: Ok. Well, let's have a word.

M: This message I referred to reads both groups of Turkish ships have changed course according to reports London British sources Cyprus. Task force north of ~~Ireland~~ ^{island/} has just entered 12 mile limit when it turned. Forces now steaming north and is approximately 22 miles off course.

K: They may be heading for Salonisa.

I: That's a long way away.

K: Or ~~Rhodes~~ ^{Rhodes}. Listen gentlemen. I'm not that crazy yet.

I: You haven't looked at your map.

K: I know they are not heading for Salonika Bob. Now. Lets discuss what we do if they turn around again. Supposing they land. What do we do.

I: I think we should get our people heading for the Turkish base.

K: Get what people heading for what Turkish base.

M: We're talking about the Americans on Cyprus and moving them to one of the British sovereign bases on the Island.

K: Yes, but that is a minor problem. I mean that is important but that's easy. But what do we do in policy. Wells what do we do.

S: The only option that we have left open at that point is the most undesirable one we probably have to sort of join maybe in some sort of a _____ to call for the ceasation of hostilities and stand aby I think because it doesn't give a position but that is the only position one can take. You really can't accept a Turkish invasion because that's what

K: You're talking to fast. What would happen.

S: One thing we wanted to prevent was a Turkish invasion

25x(6)

K:

S:

K:

25x(6)

S:

K:

S:

K: Well, what has happened to the Callaghan message. You know these messages have taken hours to get here. The Situation Room says they haven't received it yet.

S: I'm just having a check made this very moment now to find out if it was delivered up here an hour and a half ago.

K: Where did you send it to.

S: The White House to be sent to you. The people over there were told it was coming.

K: He said they LDX'd it to the White House to send to us. Well, its partly overtaken by events anyway.

S: Yes, I know. Almost entirely. Unless he gets 48 hours delay.

K: But if we get the 48 hour delay we have then move with much greater speed.

M: Right. I think we have to get joined up by the British here Mr. Secretary

K: We have what?

M: To get joined up with the British.

K: That's clear. That's why I'm looking for the Callaghan message.

M: And I think now the pace of events overtake that message to Callaghan if it gets to you.

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K: But I'd let it go anyway and then follow it with something else.

M: Unfortunately it doesn't go anywhere until it gets to you.

K: So far it doesn't seem to have even reached the White House yet. It's probably some desk officer who hasn't put his initials on it. Whom did you give it to State Operation.

S: It was given to the SS director here directly with instructions to LDX immediately over to the White House for transmission to San Clemente on a high priority basis.

K: OK. Well, let's not worry about that now. When will we know... We haven't heard from Sisco yet.

M: You have his one message.

K: No we haven't heard about his being called -- his result of the....

S: He was called in just a little while ago.

M: The time was 10:00.

S: The message from Ankara was dated 10:06 our time. 7:06 your time.

K: What time is that in Ankara

I: Plus 7. 5:00 a.m.

K: Assuming they gave him -- there are two possibilities either they are telling him they are going in anyway or they gave him 48 hours. Now if they're going in anyway we've got to get the fighting stopped -- we've got to tell the Greeks to stop fighting. Not to go to war. Then the question is how to do we accomplish that.

M: I think you have to start with Presidential messages for one thing.

K: Ok. Will you draft those. And we've got to do something about this G.D. communications here. Brent will you do something about this communication and tell them to get the Watergate traffic off the bloody lines.

K: I guess they're sending those six books out here by ... Well, we need a message to Turkey and to Greece. We need immediately -- a contingency message to the British. I guess we have a little time on that. When do you think we'll know from Joe?

S: I suspect we would know by another 45 minutes.

K:

25x(6)

M: Do you have the Callaghan message now.

K: I have no idea where it is but what I'm now trying to decide is have we found out where the Callaghan message is. It is here. But that is not the key issue here. The key issue is when we have 48 hours we ought to try to get the Greeks and the Turks. There are two possibilities. Either the Greeks and Turks meet in London or Joe goes on a quick shuttle.

S: Either the Greeks and do Turks do what?

K: Go to London. Or Joe goes back there now. If the -- if he has 48 hours we have to see what it is that the Turks want. If the Turks insist on bringing Makarios back I don't think that can be done in 48 hours.

S: I was thinking if he does get 48 hours we then ought to stay where he is and continue to find out exactly the perimeter.

K:

I:

K:

I: 25x(6)

K:

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S: I don't ever see how you could get the Greeks to stand on that.

K: On Makarois. We agree on that. I'm just trying to go astep at at time. So the next thing is will the Greeks accept in principal a constitutional solution other than Makarois. That's what would have to be done -- that is how this would have to be phrased within the next 48 hours.

M:

K:

25x(6)

I:

K:

I:

K: Well, if that is true then if we got 48 hours we're not in bad shape. Let's see what it is. Get me a copy too. We've got a great organization here. Cables are distributed in this order - Eagleburger, Scowcroft and then me. Well, this is just what you've been telling us. This is about that change of direction. Well look, what we need is first of all to get my other cable off ~~XXXXXXXX~~ to the British as if nothing had happened.

E: Are you ready to go on that.

K: They haven't found it yet because its probably being read by Zeigler at a briefing. In reply to Doar. And we may have sent him a St. Clair statement.

M: They're still trying to find phase three. We passed to the British those other two papers you wanted.

K: You have.

M: Yes.

K: Just for Callaghan

S: Yes.

K: I thought we were going to attach them to the letter but this is actually very helpful.

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M: We refer to it in the letter.

K: No, no its fine. You did the right thing. OK. If we have 48 hours we will draft a note put here for the Soviets which we will send to you to deliver to Voronstov which we'll send through Kennedy maybe to Voronstov and Bob you can see a copy of it. Just tell him what we're planning to do. Because they may go for a Clerides solution. We want above all and Wells I want you to draft a note now to the British explaining why if its 48 hours the Makarois solution can no longer work.

S: I think there is some flexibility in Callaghan.

K: I thought that point A of the Callaghan letter gave us flexibility.

25x(6)

I mean in a more elegant way. Or they will have to try the Makarois solution without us. And give them our judgment why we think in 48 hours it cannot be done. Are you still on the line?

M: Yes.

K: I think we should also get in touch with Soumanyar and give him some of that thinking. As far as NATO is concerned we should wait until we get a tentative reaction.

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TELCON

McCloskey/Stabler/Ingersoll-HAK

7/19/74 - 7:30 p.m.

- K: If they've gone to war on the other hand, we should have a presidential message to both Greece and Turkey asking them to stop in the name of greater interests. We'll do a message out here again to the Soviets. Maybe we can get Sonnenfeldt. We'll handle it. And then we appeal to the British to get the 2 parties to London as quickly as possible.
- M: The flash in is that they have made the decision to attack.
- K: So they're coming back in.
- M: McClosely reads calbe.
- K: Isn't that the old one. What's the time.
- M: 10:38 EDT.
- K: Somebody has to teach me to read. What time is this G.D. message. We have 114 Zebra is where they turned around. What do you have.
- M: A message from Sisco. Ecevit just informed me final Got decision to land on Cyprus taken. Precise timing of landing of landing up to military leaders but we have impression is within the hour if it has not already taking place. Ecevit said so long as Greeks don't fire we won't. If Greeks are cooperative we can stabilize our forces and a certain number of places in Cyprus and then Turkey is ready to negotiate as to who will be present at the Cyprus under such circumstances Ecevit said Got does not ~~XXXXXX~~ care. He assured us in response to my request that every effort would be made to avoid injury to American citizens and all civilians on the island. Ecevit asked that they phone the Greeks to inform them of the above and to stress that there will be no Turk firing if Greeks refrain from same. Ecevit said he is ~~XX~~ going to Army Headquarters to urge his commanders to "take chances" to avoid any gunfire if at all possible.
- K: We don't need the 48 hour contingency plan. 1
- M: The other wire says the Turkish force north of Ireland has turned south again and ships are spread out in lines ten miles long and are now approximately 10 miles from coast.
- K: Where could Scowcroft have gone at this particular moment in history. You think I could keep both of you sitting here while I discuss this.

- K: We didn't get the Callaghan message but it is now totally overtaken by events. Well, we better get -- where is Sisco now?
- M: He is apparently still there but I would suppose he is leaving soon.
- K: I think Sisco ought to go to Athens. That's where he ;can do most good.
- M: What instructions should he have?
- K: His instructions are to urge them not to fire and to start an -- we will support immediate negotiations looking for a consitutional solution and let him surface the ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ solution.
Clerides
- K: I think we should give Taska the outline of the Clerides solution. First of all get a flash to Taska what Wheaton has to transmit to them. Secondly tell them we recommend that they not go war. That the consequences for everybody including themselves would be disastrous. And three, we continue to save the return to the consitutional arrangements including the level of military forces on the island as it was prior to the coup. I mean now the Turks have something to bargain with. Four, we think under these conditions, a comprehmise solution is necessary and we recommend -- and our idea is that perhaps Clerides can take over and if they agree we will put this to the Turks. And Sisco is coming to discuss it with them.
- S: You think it would be useful for me to telephone Callaghan.
- K: Yes.
- S: And just tell him wha t we're doing and get him to weigh in right away.
- K: Its night....never mind.
- S: It's five hours.
- K: It's alright. I'll call him if I can get my people to put in a call to Callaghan immediately and tell them to wake him up. And tell them to wake him up.
- M: Mr. Secretary. How about our convening an immediate meeting of the Security Council and asking for.....

- K: No, no. God no.
- M: Telling them all to exercise restraint.
- K: No. I don't want to get the Russians in yet. Let's first get somebody to Greece. We can call a meeting of the Security Council in another couple of hours if necessary.
- M: It's scheduled at 11 tomorrow morning as it now stands.
- K: Look to me the Security Council is far down on the agenda. It will make no contribution, it will get the Russians involved and the best hope is Sisco now. But also tell Ervin what we are doing. Let him see Souvana. OK can you draft that message to Callaghan immediately.
- M: Mr. Secretary. May I suggest that you ~~XXX~~ call Callaghan directly.
- K: I'm calling Callaghan but I want a message drafted anyway.
- M: Alright. I think we should get cracking on what is necessary in Athens right away.
- K: That's right. The first message that has to be done is the one to Taska.
- S: The question is whether we telephone Taska and.....
- K: Then the whole world will know.
- S: The whole world is going to know shortly - the first landing you know.
- K: But we don't want our solution known by the whole ;world.
- S: That's true but I mean in terms
- K: That ;you can do and you can say we are sending a -- it finally got here the letter to Callaghan. We got a great system here. Fischer got through with it. So I think the operative part - the message from the Turks you should call Taska about right away.
- S: Do you want Presidential messages too.
- K: That too. But the first thing now is to get instructions to Taska about how we think this thing can go. I think the Greeks have to understand it is now too late. Either stonewall it. They should not go to war and that we think this is the way it could go and if they're willing to do it Sisco is on the way and -- so call Taska -- somebody other than Stabler



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K: Stabler draft the message to Taska and then read it to me immediately. Then we do the Presidential messages.

S: Alright.

K: Maybe Bob, you can call Taska. OK Thank you.

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TELCON
HAK/PRESIDENT
7/19/74 - 8:00 p.m.

K: Hello Mr. President

N: Hi Henry.

K: I was just checking ;the line had gone dead. Mr. President it looks as if the Turks are going to land in Cyprus within the hour if they haven't already landed there. At any rate they've told us they're going to land there. And that they have given instructions to their troops to avoid fire if the Greeks avoid firing. And so my recommendation, if you agree Mr. President, is the following. That we send -- we first of all are going to get in touch with Taska immediately and give him that message from the Turks about the firing. Secondly we're going to urge the Greeks to see whether they will accept the solution of the head of the national assembly Clerides. They'll never accept Makarios without going to war.

N: Yes.

K: And the Turks have already told us they will accept anybody and if they accept Clerides then actually we'll have come out very well. If they don't accept Clerides we're going to have a war between the Greeks and the Turks. We're also drafting letters from you to the Greek and Turkish leaders urging restraint on them but the first thing we've got to do is get the message to the Greeks. We'll get the message off -- your message off immediately. Immediately after that. And then maybe in a few hours we can ~~XXXXXX~~ consider the question of a Security Council meeting.

N: Good. Fine.

K: I'll keep you informed as soon as we know more. I've got a call into Callaghan to see that we can stay lined up with the British.

N: He ought to. We'll see. He'll support us. Why are the Turks going to such lengths.

K: They have a very tough domestic situation at this point. That is just the message that the Minister of Turkey has just told Sisco that they have a tough domestic situation and Ecevit is trying to appeal to them -- the nationalists. And....

N: Well, if it gets down to the Greeks and the Turks having at each other I mean if it does get to that we then have to go to the Security Council

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K: To the Security Council and NATO and we'll have to stop military supplies to both while they are fighting. There is no sense having an open pipeline to two NATO allies who are fighting each other.

N: That's alright. That's the way to play it.

K: Let's see first whether we can get -- if actually we get the Clerides solution this will be the best way to do it.

N:

K:

N:

K:

25x(6)

N: Yes.

K: Call Ingersoll. OK Mr. President. I'm sorry to.....

N: No, that's what I'm here for.

K: I'll call you as soon as I have some more news.

N: I guess there is no way we could have kept the Turks from doing this.

K: Mr. President, we had Sisco out there. We had Sisco talk to them in London. He talked to them again. The only way I suppose we could have done it was by being more threatening which we weren't. We were maybe too pleading but frankly we didn't think they'd move this fast.

N: Well, threatening them now I suppose...

K: Now its too late. We did send them a very strong note about 8 hours ago telling them it would have very grave consequences.

N: Right. Well don't be concerned about the reaction. The libs and all that sort of thing.

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K: The libs now have nothing to react to.

N: They're on the side of the Turks aren't they?

K: Well, they're against the Greeks.

N: That's my point. Where do you end up then. Who is their horse.

K: Well, we'll be on the side of the Turks by pushing for Clerides.
The Greeks won't like that.

N: OK. Let's push for it all the way.

K: Right Mr. President.

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TELCON
Schlesinger/HAK
7/19/74 - 8:15 p.m.

K: Hello. Jim.

S: Yes Henry.

K: I just wanted to bring you up to date. You know the situation and I want you to know what my thinking is and see whether we're in step on it. My view is that -- you know the methods that the Turks have asked us to pass to the Greeks about not firing.

S: Right. They're landing.

K: They're landing and they have orders not to fire at the Greeks if the Greeks don't fire. So we're going to pass that message and we're also going to tell the Greeks that we think the best solution now is to have a negotiation as rapidly as possible looking for the return to constitutional government. And that we recommend the Clerides solution under these conditions. That's -- that means they have gotten rid of Makarios and they'll have to give up Sampson. And we'll send Sisco back from Ankara. Now we don't think this will really fly but at least its a slender threat.

S: My feeling is that the Turks at this stage are not going to settle for anything less than a piece of the island.

K: No, the Turks have said that they are willing to stabilize their forces and that they are willing to keep the existing structure and they will accept any president other than Sampson.

S: That's very generous of them. That's good. OK.....

K: If the turks want a piece of the island then in my view we have to work for double enesis and give the Greeks the other part of the island so my view is there are now two possible outcomes. Either double enesis or Clerides.

S: Completely. Henry. I had a call from Ingersoll a bit ago who wanted to move the Americans down to the British base.

K: I tell you. My bloody outfit. When they got a crisis the first thing they can think up is something trivial. What do you think. I'm not against it I just wish they'd do first things first.



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S: Well, my feeling on that is we can afford to wait and see what circumstances develop.

K: That is my feeling.

(uncompleted conversation)

TELCON

Friday, July 19, 1974

8:15 p.m.

Secretary Schlesinger - Secretary Kissinger

K: That is my feeling.

S: And it shows a certain nervousness on the part of the US government.

K: Agree completely.

S: If there is a discreet withdrawal by car but the hint --the statement that I got-- was we ought to move in helicopters and start removing Americans.

K: Well, to tell you the splendid reporting system I have they told me that you had offered helicopters. And I was under the impression that you were the energizing party.

S: Oh hell, I heard about this about 15 minutes ago.

K: OK, I'll take care of this. Of -- if they convince me that we need it, I assume we can appeal to you.

S: You bet, you bet.

K: But I agree with you that we should play that part cool.

S: We can move by car.

K: That is my strong feeling too. If we go in with helicopters no one will ever know what they are in there for.

S: That's right. And miserable as the circumstances are, we still want to keep a low profile.

K: So we will work either for double enosis or for Clerities, whichever works out.

S: OK, bye.

K: Bye.

TELCON

Friday, July 19, 1974

8:20 p.m.

Amb. McCloskey - Secretary Kissinger

K: Hello,

M: Hi, Mr. Secretary. I still have Joe on the phone and he is insisting that it is not wise to go to Athens.

K: On what grounds?

M: Well, we were only half way through our conversation when I found out you were trying to reach me.

K: I'm returning your call. Didn't you call me 10 minutes ago?

M: I was on the phone with you 10 minutes ago--along with the others.

K: But then I got a message that you had tried to reach me while I was talking to Secy. Schlesinger.

M: Well, I don't know. There must have been a garble somewhere. In any case, Sisco is on the line. I've talked to him. He is resisting or questioning that he should go to Athens. He says that the Clerities proposal has already been rejected by the Turks--

K: I thought he said he would accept any President.

M: This is the word I was getting from him when I got off the phone to take your call. He says it makes ~~no~~ no sense for him to go to Athens now.

K: Well, look, I've got Callaghan calling. Tell him that I read his cable about their saying they don't care who the president is under these conditions.

M: He asks then why we think the Turks, er the Greeks would accept this.

K: I don't know. That's what he's going there for!

M: All right.

K: But tell him to wait until I can get back to him. It would be a pleasure to talk to somebody who takes orders.

Let me talk to Callaghan.

M: OK.

TELCON
SAN CLEMENTE
7/19/74 - 8:22 p.m.
Callaghan/HAK



K: Hello.

C: Hello Henry.

K: Jim, how are you?

C: Not so good with the news.

K: That's it and I just wanted to check with you about where you think we should go now.

C: Yes. Can you speak a little louder Henry. I can't hear very well.

K: Good. I can hear you very well.

C: Good. So can I now. Well, what do we do now? Joe Sisco arrives here -- it is now half past four in the morning with us -- he'll arrive here in about an hour I think.

K: No, he hasn't left Ankara yet.

C: Oh, he's still there is he?
to send him

K: I was wondering whether/from Ankara to Athens? To see whether we could get our compromise solution floated there now.

C: If you would send him to Athens.

K: Yes.

C: Well, that's a prospect.

K: What do you think?

C: I think that's an idea -- what would he put to Athens Henry?

K: Our pet idea. I don't want to say it on an open line. You know what I mean. Because I don't think your idea.

C: I don't think I'm in the picture on that.

- K: You know the one I've mentioned the compromise I mentioned to Clerides -- or I mean to.....
- C: Yes. Well I think there is alot to be said for that. But it wouldn't be sufficient now would it. Would it be sufficient now to stop anything?
- K: The Turks have told us they would accept anybody.
- C: Have they. I see. And pull out.
- K: No. But that would have to be the next phase.
- C: I see.
- K: Joe is eager to go to London but I don't see what he can do in London.
- C: No. There is nothing he could do here. Very much at the moment. I was wondering whether we ought to invite them both there.
- K: I think that you should do.
- C: The alternative -- I wondered about this Henry -- is whether I would go to the sovereign base area and invite them both there.
- K: That's another possibility.
- C: I'd be closer to him there too. I'll think about that one.
- K: Let me call Sisco and I think there is nothing he can do in London. Unless he has a friend there.
- C: That's right. The Greeks have told us they will come here you know. You knew that did you?
- K: I knew that and I thought that was good progresss.
- C: So did I. But I think probably.....
- K: I think the Turks have decided to go it before they went to London. Don't you?
- C: Well I think they were divid^d myself and they assured me that they hadn't you know. They assured me hand on heart that if I were to give them helpful answers to their questions that they would use them for peaceful purposes and not as an excuse for going in.

- K: Yes, but _____ strike me as having been helpful.
- C: Well, that's what I thought but I still think they were divided and that when they got back. However this is all history.
- K: What more could you have done.
- C: What's that.
- K: You couldn't have offered them anymore than you did.
- C: Well. There you are. I'm just trying to turn the the thing over in my mind now. I was just thinking about where Sisco ought to be. Certainly not here. There is no point in that and there is nothing more he can do. I don't know anything about his mission to Turkey-- whether they told him anything or.
- K: I will get all the cables we have to Ramsbotham within the next half hour and I will now in any case make sure you get Sisco's reporting cables.
- C: I will get those then if you will authorize them and I can see what the story is. Then perhaps we could have another word.
- K: Let's do that. I will get you all his reporting cables from Turkey and also from Greece. Then I will send him back to
- C: My first reaction is subject to seeing that he should go to Greece. He's got to put alot of pressure on there and to do one of two things and you'll need that to make strong representations in Ankara before he leaves
- K: To what effect?
- C: I think we have to do that--we've got to put that on the record, anyway.
- K: That's right.
- C: And we'll do the same and I think I'd like about an hour to consider whether we should call them to London or not, or whether I ought to go to Cyprus itself--perhaps you could think about that, could you?
- K: I shall, and will you call me.
- C: Yeh, I'll call you in about an hour then when I've had a chance to read ~~it~~ his cables. Do you think it would be better for me to invite them both to London or whether I should go out there and I'll think about it too and then as then stands at the moment Henry, I think I sooner he was in Athens than anywhere else.
- K: That's my view, --it is everybody's view except Sisco's.



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C: Ah of course, well poor Sisco!

K But he is going to come to Athens, believe me.

C: I think so, now what about the UN--have to think about that

K: Let's put that off for a couple of hours.

C: Soviet Union, what do we do there.

K: Was going to get in touch with them as soon as you and I had agreed--in other words, after the next hour and tell them what is going to happen and where we --

C: I think we ought to notify the SU too, but I'd like first to make up my mind roughly what I'm going to do.

K: We won't get in touch with them until I've talked to you again.

C: In about an hours time then?

K: Yes.

C: That's very good
All right Henry--as the Chinese say, may you live in interesting times.

K: We've achieved that anyway.

C: What is the time with you?

K: Oh I m in good shape , it is 8:30 in evening on the West Coast.

C: Well, it is 4:30 in the morning here. I feel in good shape now, but I shall feel ~~light-headed~~ like hell in a few hours time. Okay.

K: Nice to talk to you.

C: Good bye old man.

K: Bye.

TELCON

Friday, July 19, 1974
Secretary Kissinger - Amb. McCloskey
8:45 p.m.

M: Hello.

K: Hello, OK. Sisco is to go to Athens. Callaghan agrees.

M: OK.

K: Before he goes to Athens he is supposed back into the Turks and he is to tell them first of all that we object strongly to their actions, that it has strong consequences for everybody, we now believe that the Clerivites solution is the only one and that he has been instructed to Athens to propose it, and that we expect the Turks to go along with us. And we are interpreting that phrase "go along with it". Now is there anything else on his tortured mind? Has he told you our whole plan on the telephone?

M: No.

K: What is his objection? Callaghan does not want him in London.

M: OK, that is doesn't know and no one could tell him that before now.

K: Well, what was he going to do in London? Will you tell me?

M: Mr. Secretary, I'm sorry. I don't know what he was going to do in London. I had to be interrupted twice while I was speaking with him.

K: What is his reason for not wanting to go to Athens?

M: He says there is no way the Greeks will accept the Clarities proposal that has already been rejected by the Turks furthermore.

M:

K: Then he has been writing out the cables. / But that is what he is saying to me over our rough connection.

K: As to who will be president under those circumstances, Ecevit said government is Turkey does not care. Now, what in the hell does that mean?

M: OK. I think I still have an open line to him. I'll go back to him and tell him he must go, he will have detailed instructions for him there and...



2

K: Yeah, but before he goes we want him to go back into the Turks. By now what else have the Russians not picked up? What is there left to say? OK, we've said so much on the open line we might as well go ahead. But Sisco is going to Athens and he is going to stay there. Now has anyone talked to Tasca?

M: We have been trying to get a call into him also. Bob Ingersoll is trying to get that call through.

K: Yeah, but not before we have had an evacuation. OK, let's get to Tasca, but let's not do everything on an open line.

M: OK,

K: Fine . bye.

TELCON

Secretary Kissinger

Amb. McCloskey

7/19/74 8:45 p.m.

.....missed first part.

K: believe now that the step has been taken--we will support a constitutional solution and a return to a level of forces prior to the signing. Our view of the constitutional solution is the Clerides solution. No other solution can possibly have a chance of being accepted by the Greek Government under the present condition. Sisco is going to Athens to put this to the Greek government and we are assuming that when Ecevit said they did not care who the President is that we have carte blanche to do this. Period. There is to be no debate--he is to inform them--there is to be no more lip from Sisco -- he is going back into Ankara, he's going back to the airport and he is going to Athens.....

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TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Mr. Stabler/Sec. Ingersoll
7/19/74 8:50 p.m.

S: Larry

K: Yeh

S: This telegram to Tasca is ready --I've written it--its ready to go,

K: Joe Sisco is going to Athens or I'm going to clean out the whole stinking department.

S: We know he is going to Athens, Mr. Secretary, that has been done, but you asked me to send a telegram to Tasca aswell which I have now written.

K: Okay, the first thing I want is to make sure that Sisco goes back in to the Turks and tells them what he is going to do. When he tells McCloskey that the Turks have already rejected the Clerities solution, I can only assume either that he misreported in this last cable or that his mind is still enthralled with the first conversation. In the first conversation they rejected the Clerities solution as a means of keeping them quiet. Now that they are in, they apparently have said they'll accept any government.

S: That's right.

K: That being the case, why does he say they have already rejected it?

S: I'm afraid I haven't talked to Bob since he has talked to Sisco, so I'm afraid I'm being on that.

K: Now could we also try to do this thing professionally and not discuss everything on an open phone to Turkey

I: Bob has been talking to Joe just to get him to go to Athens.

K: But in the process he has been told that the Clerities ideas has already been rejected by the Turks and therefore it is senseless for him to go to athens--therefore, everybody from Yugoslavia over knows what our plan is. I just haven't seen anything like this. I mean the Russians now know what our scheme is--everybody knows what we are going to try to do.

I: Bob is over in the Operations Center, I don't know what he said--

K: What he said was the Joe opposes going to Athens because the Turks have already rejected Clerities. From this I would have to assume that he discussed our plan with him--how else could he have gotten that intelligence.

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I: I didn't know he got it.

K: That is what Bob told me. Now can you please get some discipline in this bunch.

I: ~~Kx~~ Sure. Get on em right away.

K: He eh--it's already done.
I'm just trying to tell you if you tip everything to the Russians, we might just as well call Gromyko on an open line and tell him.

I: Right.

S: Should we still tell Tasca to go ahead--

K: Well, has somebody called Tasca?

I: We've been trying to get him--he hasn't been available.

K: What does that mean?

S: We've not been able to get through on the wire--meanwhile I've got the telegram --

K: Okay, you will send the telegram--

S: May I read it to you?

K: Yeh
has

S: Sisco/~~ix~~ just reported that GOT has taken final decision to land forces on Cyprus--now information is ~~ix~~ that landing may be underway within the hour. He should immediately get in touch with PM Ioaniddes, and pass their message from Turkish government Turkish troops should not open fireyou should urge Greek government to recognize direct confrontation between Greek and Turkish forces would hand to the Soviets the advantage they have been seeking in the ME, which would be disastrous for western interests, not for just, but over the years ahead. USG is prepared to support immediate negotiations with the parties concerned for the restoration of the constitutional situation in Cyprus, and we have in mind the possible succession of Clerities--we would support the return to the level of forces existing prior to the coup. Sisco will shortly arrive in Athens and if GOG agrees to proceed along the above lines, Sisco would return at once to Ankara to put these ideas to the Turks. You should tell GOG that we have tried our utmost to avoid Turkish intervention in the wake of the coup. Now that it has occurred GOG must join

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with us in seeking a negotiated settlement which will preserve the legitimate rights of all concerned. We call upon the Greeks to exercise that degree of restraint in statesmanship without which the

K:

25x(6)

M

I: Henry, may I interrupt a minute--Bob has Sisco on the phone, do you want him to go back into Ankara and talk to the Turks or do you want to give a message to the Turks?

K: I want Sisco to go back into Ankara , talk to the Turks, he is then to go back to the airport and go immediately to Athens and he will get instructions there.

I: And have you told Bob what you want Joe to tell the T_urks

K: I've have told bob what I want him to tell the Turks, but I repeat it again: I want Bob --I want Sisco to tell the Turks that we take an extremely grave view that I believe they are jeopardizingend conversation

TELCON

Hal Sonnenfeldt

Sec. Kissinger

8:50 p.m. 7/19/74

K: Hello? Where are you?

K: Get yourself brought up to date and see what message we can send to the Soviets--I've told Ingersoll to bring you up to date and at least you are one professional--myis fighting right now whether Sisico should go to--

S: I know, I know it.

K: I don't mean what they are complaini g about Makarios--that's down the drain.

S: Any way do you want to do something with them after this thing happens or before?

K It has happened so we might as well send them a mesaage-- Give them some idea what we are working towards--tell them we are going to work for what I discussed with Dobrynin--namely a Clerities type solution.

S: Okay why don't I get something on the wire to you or read something to you.

K: Yeh, read something to me.

Thank you.

*

TELCON - 8:51 pm 7/19/74
Conference Call
Secretary Kissinger
Secretary Ingersoll
Amb. McCloskey
Mr. Stabler

K: Bob--

I: Yes.

K: Are you on alone?

M Noooo, I'm on. Do you want me off.

K: No, no. I just wanted to know wh~~i~~e else--was on whether Stabler was on--

M: No, no

K: Because I ah--wanted to get another cable done of more detailed instructions to Sisco--

M: Do you want Stabler on--

S: Yes, sir. I'm on.

K: Okay. You will do some detailed--now does Sisco understand what he is supposed to do?

M Mr. Secretary, I have to say that Sisco is in the air--they had to leave the airport and I am afraid I could not understand completely the reasons he was attempting to give me over a very bad connection--

K: And where is he going?

M: Athens.

I We will get the message you suggested for him to give the Turks to Macomber.

K: Okay, now Bob--you are going to take over this goddamn department till I come back.

I: Right.

K And nobody is going to move without your authority. And anybody who ~~w~~ doesn't like it should hand in his resignation. I've just had it.

I: Probably some military problems--

K: I don't give a damn all right. Send a message to Macomber. Of the same substance that Sisco was supposed to deliver. That message is that we take a grave view of the situation, it could have the most serious consequences. That we are asking the Turks to keep in mind that it is easy to start these things--it is more difficult to end them. Our belief is that these must be restored as quickly as possible--our belief is that the only way now to restore constitutional government with any chance of success is the Clerities solution which Sisco outlined. Sisco is on his way to Athens to present that and we are assuming that the Turkish government will agree to that, secondly, we are going to ask Britain to call for immediate negotiations of the ~~Xxxix~~ powers, probably in London, but conceivably on a British base in Cyprus. But we think London is better and we hope that the Turkish government will accept that.

And you get Macomber in to see Ecevit with this message fastest. Read it to me before you send it out. Second we send detailed instructions to Sisco who may be a little tired after his exertions and explain to him what we have done in Turkey, why I believe the Clerities solution has not been rejected by Turkey if his reporting was correct, that they rejected it at first because they thought it was a way of keeping them from invading--now that they have invaded-----ah (long pause)

Now the only other thing we have to keep in mind is to leave open the door to double enosis--but I think we better not start pushing that yet.

Okay can you get those two cables out--Point out that I interpret his reporting to mean that the Turks rejected the Clerities idea when they ~~thex~~ thought it was a way of keeping them out.

That I interpret what they said that they will accept any President as a means of settling it. Now what is the judgment of the people about whether we should float the double enosis idea now?

I: Some people think that is probably the practical thing with the Turks in place.

K: I think we should go to that after trying the Clerities. It is too dangerous to come up with it now Because it will run into massive Soviet opposition. OKAY_let's get them drafted.

I: One to Macomber, one to Sisco--

K: The one to Macomber first.

S: The one to Tasca would be on its way--the one I read to you.

K: Then to Macomber, and then longer instruction to Sisco in Athens--quickly.

TELCON
Secretary Schlesinger/
Secretary Kissinger
9:10 p.m. 7/19/74

K: Jim, how are you

S: Okay. We have at the present time, reports of bombs falling in Kyrenia and Nicosia

K: Bombs falling ?

S: Yeh. There is no confirmation of Turkish landing as yet, but if they have not occurred as yet, they are expected momentarily. Now the Forrestal--

K: You consider that confirmed?

S: Yeh. We are getting that from the British I believe, but I can check on that.

Now the Forrestal Task Force is west of Crete at the present time and it might be desirable for us to start moving it down towards Cyprus.

K: I agree.

S: The amphibious forces moving towards Cyprus is steamed for about four hours and it is still about six hours away -- the British have an evacuation plan for themselves with a Caravan going toward the base and we would hook into it if the need arises, but nobody has indicated as yet the need is arising.

K: When bombs start falling, they may change their mind. Who do you think is doing it?

S: Turks--Turks took several F 100's off about 3 hours ago from one of their bases ~~and~~ in Turkey--they were loaded up.

K: You think they are getting the airfield?

S: My own guess is that they have a notion that before you land on a beach you are supposed to drop bombs and they are doing that.

K: Nicosia is not on a beach is it?

S: There is nothing in the manual of war that says you have to drop the bombs on the beaches.

K: The only reason I keep asking is because I have a message here from

Page 2

Ecevit--have you seen that?

S: Yws.

K: It says to pass to Schlesinger--Ecevit said so long as Greeks don't fire we won't.

S: I'm not sure he has control over everything--my own guess is that Sancherra and the military have their own ideas about what to do when the baloon goes up. We shall try to check thru the reports that the bombs have impacted.

K: Good.

S:Q But the purpose of the call at the moment is that we probably ought to start moving that Task Force out from west of Crete.

K: I agree with you completely

S: Okay. You've got my number here at the NMCC--
Believe me I am at the NMCC

K: Good, make sure the WH board knows where you are at all times.

Thank you Jim.

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TELCON
Senator Humphrey
Secretary Kissinger
9:20 p.m. 7/19/74

...K: Hubert!
I called you earlier -- it is a little bit overtaken by events to tell you
we had no intention of recognizing sampson--you wrote me a letter
--
H: Yes, that is right. I understand.
K: But in the meantime the Turks have landed in Cyprus so it
H I heard that on the radio-- tonight.
K: So its no longer-our problem now is to find the way out of this.
Before it all blows up.
H: Yes. It's a very nervous thing right now.
to
K: That's right. But I want you/know we have no intention of recognizing
Sampson or never did.
H: Well, I read what you had in the -- and I haven't said anything particularly
about it.
K: What was in the Times was totally wrong.
H: I gathered they might be
K: And there was nothing in the State Department people who said this I don't
know what level they are certainly none of the people which I work hold
that view.
H: Well, as you know, in the committee the other day we kind of held back
on anything there so there wouldn't be any comment coming out of the
Committee.
K: I have -- Fulbright is fully briefed on every detail.
H: I understand that.
K:

25x(6)

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H: I guess that's right. I hope to God that they keep that thing under control.

K: Well, we're trying to bring about now what we've always tried to do -- a constitutional solution. And maybe find a compromise by which the next line in -- to Makarios takes over.

H: Yes, that seemed to me the most sensible thing if that is possible.

K: That is frankly what we tried to do all along.

H: Yes, I gather that--

K: But we couldn't tip our hand too early until we had lined up one of the parties.

H: Yes.

K: And once we had the T^urks lined up for that, we were going to bring pressure on the Greeks.

H: Ah ha.

K: But we have Sisco going to Athens now to insist on that Clerities solution.

H: What can you do about these landings if anything?

K: We are telling them to stop but they haven't take advice before, so I can guarantee they'll take it now

H: The news reports to the effect that the Soviets are kind of giving them a little shove--

K: The Soviets have been rather reckless--they urged them on earlier in the week--

H: Thank you Henry much--I felt that in the Committee, as you know, there was an effort made to be very very critical of the Greek government the other day, and we sort of side-tracked it for a while--I was just worried about that there might be some effort being made in some echelons of the department to recognize this group that came in--and that I thought would be premature and unnecessary

K: I agree and it was never our attention. Claiborne Pell can confirm that I told him it was never our intention before the invasion--

H: All right friend.

K: Hubert when you write it is always taken seriously, as when you call.

H: Thank you sir, my best to you.

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TELCON

Amb. McCloskey

Secretary Ingersoll

Secretary Kissinger

9:25 p.m. 7/19/74

I: Bob McCloskey is on also.

K: That is okay. I would like to speak ill of him, but I can't when he is on the line--

I We did reach Joe on the plane--he of course things have changed now with the bomb drop in Nicosia and artillery Kyrenia

K: Yeh

I: So to tell the Greeks not to fire, we don't think we can do much about that.

K No but could we avoid conducting all our business on the open phone.

I: Sure

K What did you discuss with him now on the plane--

M: He called to ask whether he could have instructions that would assure the PM or FonMin would meet him at the airport

K: He must be out of his mind (god-damn bloody) Why?

M: He feels the sooner he can leave Athens the better it will be--he fears there may be some internal difficulty as he put it develop while he is on route and on the ground. And he thought if he could make his point--

K: Oh don't let's be absurd

M He ask for authority to go straight away from Athens to Rome or some place nearby--his first preference would be to return directly to Washington

K: Oh no, he is going to stay out there--he is going to go to Athens like a good boy, he is going into the town of Athens and we are not sending instructions to have the PM and FonMin meet him at the airport, there have other people who have taken risks and Sisco is going to take a few risks.

M Okay, I told him I'd raise these questions with you.

TELECON

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K: It is out of the question. However if his nerves aren't up to it, let him come home and I'll go out there.
How can we ask our Ambassador to stay in Athens while our UNSec is afraid to leave the goddamn airport.

I Do you want to send the same message except the first part about the-- flying back

K: Yep. You tell Sisco to stop -- I don't want anyone to have any further substantive discussions on the telephone--the next time Sisco calls, he is to be told that he communicates by cable. Second he is to go into Athens, he is to carry out his mission, he is to stay there until he is told to leave.

I Okay.

K: And he will not be told to leave until we have a report so we can assess it. If he can't take it, let him go on and ~~W~~ Ellsworth stays.

M: Okay, we'll take care of that. Say, Mr. Secretary, do you want to consider our issuing any kind of public statement at this time.

K: Yes, we should

end conversation.

TELCON

Director Colby/Kissinger

9:35 p.m. - 7/19/74

K: Hello.

C: Hello, Henry.

K: Bill, how are you? Sorry to have kept you on the line.

C: That's OK.

K: I just wanted to check in with you and to make sure you would of course be keeping a close watch on this thing. Can you get us out here - I'm in San Clemente -- your estimate of how this thing is going to evolve.

C: All right. Fine.

K: And also what the Turkish capability is to put troops ashore. What is it, do you know?

C: It's very good. They've got about I'd say about a regiment or so on the ships. They've got about 20 odd ships.

K: A regiment is what, 2000?

C: It's 2 or 3 thousand, yes.

K: And then how many can they send?

C: And they've got some airborne also. They have an airborne brigade.

K: How many is that?

C: They apparently are going for Kyrenia on the north coast. That's the first step.

K: But what do you think they're after? They're not after the whole island are they?

C: No, no. What they would be after would be Phamagusta and Kyrenia and kind of a line between the two.

K: That kind of a quadrangle in the northeast.

C: Yeh. Well, call it almost the (inaudible) from roughly Baranaka on up and then just asser themselves and give themselves a position to bargain with.

K: What do you think the Greeks are going to do?

C: Well, the local Greeks will fight and there are some reports that there is some bombing at Kyrenia already. And the National Guard particularly will fight. This is the one with the Greek officers in them.

K: They will fight.

C: You will have a very unpleasant thing in Cyprus itself. The Greeks themselves are a bit far away, quite frankly. They are about the range of their aircraft and they can't do very much from there.

K: Even from Rhodes?

C: Pardon.

K: Even from Rhodes?

C: Well, but there basic airfield is back in Greece and Athens and that area.

K: What is the relative strength of those two armies?

C: The Turks are about 300,000 and the Greeks about 100,000. But most of the Greek forces are up in the north, up in Thrace. And if you had kind of a mixup, that's where it would take place. Up in the northern area there, around Sowanaka.

K: Do you have any good ideas what we should do?

C: Well, I think the biggest thing is to get the Greeks not to fight. To say all right ~~next~~ let's negotiate and discuss what ought to be done.

K: OK.

C: There basic position has been that this is an internal affair in Cyprus. You know, so they have a face saving basis for saying, "Well, that was just a local affair. It's not Greece."

K: Yeh, OK. Thank you.

C: So in a sense they could say "Well, that was a great mistake down there in the island, but we're above that." I think the most important thing is to limit it to Cyprus and not let it go out beyond that.

K: OK, thank you. C: We'll pass on anything else we get, Henry.

K: Thank you. Bye.

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TELCON
 Secretary Kissinger
 Secretary Schlesinger
 9:45 p.m. 7/19/74

K: Jim, I just wanted to touch base with you on this Greek/Turkish situation.

S: Right.

K: I'm assuming that Clements and Brown represent your views exactly.

S: Well, I don't know that because I don't know exactly what they have been saying, but I think generally you are going in the right direction.

K: Q Good, that is what I wanted to check. Let must just sum up my thinking so that we can be sure that Defense and State are on the same line.

S

K:

S:

K:

S:

K

S: I think you are handling it very well, Henry.

K: And this is why we are moving so slowly. Now the one thing I fear also is this:

25x(6)

S: Right. Precisely.

State

Page 2

K: And therefore I am instructing Sisco to give a very tough warning to the Turks against intervention tonight.

S:

25x(6)

K:

S: Hmmm. Hmmm.

K: The Turks right now are very happy with us because we came out so strongly against Ioannides.

S:

25x(6)

K:

S: Precisely. When I say edgeaway, we had a letter of offer out to them on May 7th and my feeling on that is let's not finalize the contract until we know what the hell is going on.

K: I agree completely. And yesterday also

S: It cools things just a trace, but do it in a very slow--

K: I agree with, but we can wait a week or two on that can't we?

S:

25x(6)

K:

S:

K: That I favor.

S: Okay, how do you like George Brown.

K: Outstanding.

S: Did you know him before?

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K: Never met him. A brilliant appointment. I am really pleased with him.

S: He is a good man.

K: He is the most thoughtful chief that I've seen.

S:

K: Y^u know Tom was a nice guy and alright for a combat situation.
But George Brown is really outstanding.

S: Yeh, outstanding. Okay

K: So Jim I can assume you and I are together on this one.

S: You bet. Where ar you?

K: I'm in San Clemente. I am going to see the President in a few minutes.

S: Right, Henry.

K: I'll tell him we talked.

:S: Right. Bye.

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TELCON (San Clemente)
Ingersoll/Kissinger/McCloskey/Stabler
9:55 p.m. - 7/19/74

K: Bob.

I: Yes.

K: I was going to go back to my quarters and I was going to be out of touch for half an hour. I wanted to check how things are going.

I: We have these two wires. .

K: I got a call from a Mr. Sampson in your office.

I: Samuels?

K: Sampson is what they -- they want to know what I discussed with Callaghan. I told Callaghan, which I had already told you, to call the Greeks and Turks hopefully to London.

I: Right.

K: OK, what are the two cables?

I: The ones to Macomber and to Sisco. Do you want those read?

K: Yup.

I: Do you want them over the open phone or secure phone?

K: Well, this open phone isn't as bad as the other one. This will take them a while to analyze. Are they long?

I: They're about 2 pages.

K: I think we better do it by phone, don't you?

I: Here's the one to Sisco and that's the one we need the quickest.

"The Secretary desires that Sisco make immediate plans to go on to Athens.

K: Could it be a little louder?

I: "He should not request to have the meeting at the airport. From the message we have just sent to Ankara you will see what we have done and told Macomber to tell Ecevit. We have done this because we feel we must keep him playing as long as possible with the notion of a constitutional solution to the Cyprus problem. Ecevit in all probability rejected the Clerites proposal at the outset because he saw it as a possible bar to Turkish military intervention. Now, however, that the Turks have intervened, he has told you that he has no special concerns about who may be President of Cyprus. Under these circumstances we believe that there is still a chance, even though it may be an outside one, to try once again the Clerites solution.

"You will also have seen the instructions passed to Tasca to weigh in with Iohdides to exercise restraint in the face of Turkish landings and to float Clerites' proposal.

"Secretary wishes you to reenforce the views which have been expressed by Tasca and to tell the Greeks that they must bear a share of the responsibility for what has happened.

K: A heavy share of the responsibility.

I: "We look to them to recognize that unless they are prepared to accept a change of territorial integrity in the structure of Cyprus they must join with us, with the British and the Turks in finding a constitutional solution to the Cyprus problem. As we see it, only if Clerites offers an acceptable alternative, we are prepared to support the proposal with the Turks.

"You are prepared to return at once to Ankara and pursue the matter further with the Turks if the Greek Government agrees with the Clerites' proposal.

"In the meantime we have asked the UK to call for immediate negotiations of the guarantor powers in London. And we hope, and assume, that the Greek Government will agree to attend such a negotiation." That's the one to Athens. The one to Ankara follows:

"Ask to see Ecevit at once. Give him the following message: I take extremely grave view of the Turkish military intervention on Cyprus which will have the most serious consequences, (chief of which is the position it will place) on free world security. We are deeply dissappointed the Turkish government did not heed our pleas to exercise restraint.

"Now that the step has been taken, however, the most urgent means must be found to restore peace and stability in the area.

"While a conflict is easy to start it is difficult to stop. Statesmanship of the highest order is required of all concerned.

"The United States for its part, is prepared to support a constitutional solution and a level of forces which existed before the coup. The only way in our view to restore constitutional government is through the legitimate succession of Clerides. No other solution is possible or acceptable to the Greeks.

"The Turkish has indicated that it has no special concerns as to who the Head of State should be and, therefore,

K: Don't say "The Turkish Government, say President Ecevit."

I: Pardon.

K: Or Prime Minister Ecevit.

I: Yes. "Prime Minister Ecevit has indicated that he has no special concern as to who the Head of State should be and therefore Sisco is on his way to Athens to propose to the Greeks the Clerides solution. We assume that in light of what the Prime Minister told Sisco in their last meeting the GOT will agree.

"We are proposing urgently to the UK that it call for immediate negotiations with the guarantor powers in London to seek the constitutional solution which will open the way for the restoration of stability in Cyprus and in the area.

"We urgently appeal to the Turkish Government to weigh most carefully the proposals we are making, for we are convinced that to do otherwise would be self-defeating in terms of Turkey's own interests."

K: OK. Good. Fine.

I: Do you want to talk about a public statement?

K: Have you got one? Hello? Hello? I have trouble hearing you.

I: Bob has something he wants to show you.

K: OK.

(Bob McCloskey comes on the line.)

M: Hello.

K: Yup.

M: "The United States deplores in the most strongest terms the military intervention by Turkish military forces in Cyprus. We particularly regret that Turkey took this action at a time an active diplomatic effort in which the United States was participating was underway.

"We are appealing to Turkey to order its forces in Cyprus to cease-fire and we are at the same time urging Greece to avoid aggravating the situation by any further military action."

K: Why do we have to make a statement?

M: We don't have to now.

K: What? Are we getting a lot of calls?

M: Not many, I'm surprised.

K: Well, I think what we should say is we regret the action. We also deplore the previous Greek actions that helped precipitate this crisis. Tell them that I've been in frequent touch -- I mean don't put that out as a statement, just have it said -- I'm in frequent touch with the President, I've been in touch with Callaghan and Sisco is in Athens and we are in touch with all of the interested governments.

M: What was Callaghan's reaction?

K: Callaghan agrees with our line and he is also thinking of calling a meeting. Make sure they don't take Callaghan off the line there. Somebody on that other flickering line. Here they come. Who is it? (Talks to someone who has come in the room.)

M: Callaghan is going to let you know about going?

K: He's going to let me know whether he wants to hold the talks in London or Cyprus, but I'm going to recommend London.

M: He's agreeable to coming to London?

K: Yeh. But let him announce that. Now Irwin ought to go and see Savannah.

M: A message is being done to him.



K: OK, why don't I check with you in about a half hour when I get to my residence.

M: All right.

(Stabler comes into the conversation.)

S: Henry, you've got a message to the Soviets out there.

K: To the what?

S: To the Soviets.

K: I know and I will let you know about that as soon as I've read it.

S: OK, you've got it. All right.

K: OK. Good. Anything else?

I: NO.

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TELCON (San Clemente)
President/Kissinger
10:06 p.m. - 7/19/74

K: Hello.

P: Hello, Henry.

K: Mr. President.

P: Apparently the battle is started, huh?

K: Yeh. They are apparently bombing Nicosia and firing on another town and we haven't had a Greek reaction yet. I've got Sisco going to Athens under protest because he thinks it might be a little dangerous for him there.

P: Oh.

K: But I figure if Tasca can stand it, he must be able to stand it.

P: Dangerous in the sense of anti-Americanism?

K: Yeh. That's all right, Mr. President, that's what they pay under-secretaries for.

P: God almighty, that's what they pay us all for.

K: That's right.

P: And with Tasca there I should think he could have some - if anybody could have any influence with the people. Thank God he's there; he's a tough guy.

K: He's a good fellow.

P: What does he report?

K: We haven't had anything from Athens yet - not one word.

P: You think this is the kind of a thing that requires - that they feel my presence in Washington -- that I have to get the hell back there for this thing?

K: Not yet, but if the Greeks attack the Turks, Mr. President, then I think you should go back to Washington. If it leads to a major war.

P: Yeh, and then what do we do there?

K: Not much but I think. . .

P: I have to be there.

- N: That is all that matters is that you know we can do everything--
I can do everything here that I could do in Washington.
- K: You remember we had the same problem when the Mid East war started
--you were in Key Biscayne and we advised strongly not to move.
- N: In the Mid East we had basically interests that were -- well --
- K: We didn't want to exacerbate the situation and there wasn't anything
you could do in Washington that you couldn't do in Key Biscayne--
But let's see how the Greeks react, Mr. President. There is still
a 10% chance that this thing will be settled by Monday.
- N: How?
- K: Well, if the Greeks accept Clerities as a solution and if they --and if
the Greeks and Turks then meet in London, I think we could get a ceasefire
- N: And you don't want to go to the UN because that'll get the Russians in it.
- K: Well we can go to the UN in a few hours--its the middle night.
- N: Oh, I know, I know.
- K: But it won't contribute much--we can do it tomorrow morning.
- N: Well as you know Henry, there is always a damn symbolism in the UN
--you and I both know what a mine field it is, but I don't know.
- K: The UN is going to meet again tomorrow morning, Mr President. They
met on Cyprus today.
- N: Yep. Security Council
- K: Yeh. I think to call them in the middle of the night when neither of the
parties involved--
- N: No, no, no. That's the point, I just -- it is --
- K: I would wait until tomorrow morning on the UN
- N: Just so we can avoid the appearance that we are not completely on top of it
and I think we certainly are--now you are planning to go back tomorrow
afternoon, w

K

DECLASSIFIED

K: That is right, Mr. President. That's night at there and that gives me a chance to get on top of it.

N Hell, you are on top of it here too.

K: What I mean is I'll be travelling while people are sleeping out there--in the Middle East

N True, true.

Thank God it isn't Syria and Israel or something like that--that'd be worse wouldn't it?

K: Well before your term is over Mr. President, we'll have that privilege too.

N: I hope not.

K: I hope not, but I wouldn't lay odds on it.

N: That depends on our Israeli friends to a great extent--we are going to keep a very strong line there--anybody who gets arms from the US by golly to use it--this of course is the Cyprus thing--an

K:

N:

25x(6)

K:

N

K:

N:

K

N

25x(6)

UNCLASSIFIED

K: The Greeks have only about 9,000 men on the island and the Turks and the Turks have probablyover about 3,000 or 4,000, 2,000 seaborne and about 2,000 airborne, but the Turks are much better equipped and they can reinforce much faster.

N: They can, huh.

K: Yeh.

N: So what would the Greeks do--I'm just trying to--

K Well, the Greeks will either negotiate or they will attack the Turks in Thrace.

N: Gosh.

K: I don't exclude that they'll negotiate Mr. President. If Sisco hasn't lost his nerve completely, I think they can be gotten to negotiate.

N: God Sisco may lose his nerve, but Tasca won't. Don't underestimate what he can do. He will put the arm on him now,

K: No, ,no, I have already gotten instruction to him, Mr. President. And he has -- he is already working.

N: And they know too the penalty of failing to negotiate is a--they just rupture their situation with us--they break it right, don't they?

K: That is right. First.

N: That of course isn't much of an option for us---... consider what it does to NATO

K:

N:

SANITIZED

K:

N:

K:

N:

TELCON

Secretary Kissinger

Secretary Callahan (GB)

10:15 p.m. 7/19/72

K: Jim, how are you?

C: Henry, good morning, if that is not a contradiction in terms. How are you again, all right?

K: I'm doing fine.

C: Well, now look, as far as Sisco is concerned, have you told him to go to Athens?

K: I've told him to go to Athens and under great protest he is on his way there.

G: What is his objection to going, Henry?

K: His objection to going is that he thinks London is a more pleasant place and that Washington is even more pleasant.

C: Well, ^Yeh, I think that is right. What is he going to do when he gets there.

K: Then when he gets there he is going to urge the Greeks to negotiate that solution I discussed with you and to go accept any proposal you may make for Greek Turkish talks.

C: Very good. I think that he -- I think we can talk a little more frankly now because I think ~~w~~ we are on a secure line. Aren't we?

K: Not that I can tell--

C: As far as I'm concerned I accept that assessment that ^{you} were good enough to send me from your Ambassador about conversation with Clerides. It seems to me that Clerides is a very sensible man.

K: That is what it looks like to me.

C: I think he has the thing summed up and as far as I'm concerned I wouldn't be putting it in shorthand, I'd be willing to follow exactly that line and the line that had been following before hand.

K: That was my impression and that's why when I got your letter, I had drafted a long reply which has now been overtaken by events--

C: I don't mind--I'll put it in the scrapbook.



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K: Do you want me to send it?

C: Yeh, sure why not.

K: I'll send it on, saying it is overtaken but for your scrapbook.

But I substantially agreed with it--

C: I wanted to put my thoughts on paper to you, but they are not so different from the way Clerides apparently is looking at things.

K: No, I thought we were all coming together in the same direction.

C: That's right. I think if Joe Sisco can persuade them to get rid of Sampson and to constitutionally get Clerides installed, then we've got the makings of a package to deal with the Turks, haven't we?

K: That is exactly my view.

C: Right. And I've got the Turkish ambassador waiting outside to see me now--I thought I would send a strong note through him to the Turkish government, calling on them to bring about the earliest possible ceasefire to get the Greeks and Turks here

K: I agree with that completely--I was going to make that strong suggestion to you--you'll have too messy a situation on the island--much too messy

C: Yes, all right. Then I'll try to get them to come here and Joe Sisco can pressurize the Greeks to come here

K: Those ~~are~~ are Joe Sisco's instructions.

C: Very good --

K: So may I tell Joe that you are fully backing him--

C: That we are on the same line

K: I will tell Joe this and I will tell him that you are--your people are going to talk in the same sense.

C: Very good. Very good.

K: And you should know that we have--



Page 3

C: What about the Soviet Union, Henry

K: Should we tell them that we understand that you are going to task for talks--that we strongly support it and that we hope they encourage it

C: That's a good line.

K: Well, we will do that within the next hour

C: How much detail--you've had more dealings with them than I've had. How much detail should I go into?

K: I wouldn't go into endless details, but I would tell him that we are

C: I missed you then-- say it again

K: To whom to the Soviets?

C: Yeh

K: I wouldn't go into all the details--I would tell them that--I would go into detail about the negotiating process, not about the solution.

C: Very good.

K: Otherwise they will hang behind another fellow and just thwart it.

C: This line is very bad--you keep disappearing completely

K: I would give them the solution--I would give them the process

C: Right, okay

K: And we will do the same

C: Very good

K: And I also wanted you to know that I have told the Turks ~~if~~ substantially what you are going to tell them--that we object to what they are doing and they must get into talks immediately

C: Yes, very good then-- I should think after Sisco's persuaded them to go to come to Lond, he'd better come on to London too, hadn't he

K: Ah--ahha--I think London he will want to go to. London, I won't have trouble persuading- Athens he is a little shaky about.

C: Okay, Henry, we'll keep in touch--what time is with you/

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K: I'm all right, it is 10:30,

C: I don't want to wake you up during the night, do I, unless I've got to.

K: Well you should get even with me, since I woke you up at 4:30

C: [laughs] All right, Henry, I'll ring you if necessary

K: Jim, you call me anytime.

C: I'll call you anytime. Very good then, Thank you.

K: Bye.

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TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
DSec Ingersol
7/19/74 10:30 p.m.

K: Bob, I've just talked to Callahan--they completely support our program now and they will make representations in that sense.

I: Very good.

K: I mean they support Clerides and they will urge negotiations. Tell that to Sisco--tell Sisco his major job is to get the Greeks and Turks to London.

I: Fine.

K: And calm down--and you do you calm down Sisco, I don't know, but that is your job. I mean can we send him a cable-- I sent him an encouraging cable--did that ever go to him?

I: No, that is the one we didn't send because we had already sent another one.

K: What do you mean?

I: Remember this afternoon--we decided that we wouldn't send that one because we already sent one--

K: I sent him a cable telling him he had done a good job--could that have gone?

I: No, it was the first paragraph of your cable--

K: I sent him a three line telegram, saying he had done a good job--that wasn't sent?

I: I didn't see it--I don't know

K: Ah--he --it went through a WH channel
Now, can somebody send him a cable and tell him we need his special skills and tired as he is, we want him to make one more effort and it is to get the Greeks and Turks to London--the British are fully aboard now, fully following the line we worked out? --they no longer want Makarios, they are going along with the Clerides thing and he has the support of Callahan too. And to be steady and firm and we are sending Dr. Nidel out with pills.

I: All right, get it off right away--

K: Right Okay and you might tell Macomber where we stand with Callahan and tell him to keep the heat on the Turks to accept an offer to go -- to talk

Page 2

K: We've got to think of UN action tomorrow--okay?

I: Fine

K: Thank you.

I: Right.

TELCON

Director Colby
Secretary Kissinger
7/19/74 10:35 p.m.

K:divisions!
Are they walking across water?

C: No, they've got about a division afloat and the rest will come in tomorrow

K: But have they got enough equipment for a division?

C: Oh yeh, they are landing on the north coast, they've landed at Nicosia by airborne and there is a force moving down towards Famagusta that we haven't heard from

K: Of course--Colby, may I tell you something?

C: Yeh

K: I don't know where the hell Samagusta is--and may I tell you something else?

C: What

K: I could not care less--will somebody bring me a map--just because you drop names on me doesn't mean you are a bright guy--

C: [laughs]

K: You probably got a map right in front of you--is it Famagusta?

C: Yeh it is on the east--

K: I've got it right in front of me. You mean it is moving overland?
Are they going to take the whole island?

C: No, they are going to land probably--they have landed at Kyrenia on the north coast and they have landed some paratroops at Nicosia.

K: Why?

C: Because it is the capitol and because there is nothing but Turkish population between them and Kyrenia up to the north, so they can link up easily.

PAge 2

K: Do you think they'll take [^]_nNcosia?

C: Yeh, well there will be some fighting there. But you see what they can do is land there and land at the airport -- link up with the people coming in from the sea from the north and then they fight alot of National Guard in that area--a serious fight will probably develop there. Then they also have a separate landing over Famagusta on the east coast and perhaps one down at Lynica down on the southeast coast. The object would be then to try to establish themselves in 3 or 4 places and perhaps even link up but that is a little less sure and then have a basis for negotiation. The problem is the Greeks can only defend in that area-- they can't really get much force over there from the mainland because most of the Greek forces are up in the north around Salanica and Thrace.

K: You mean they can only defend with what they've got on the island?

C: With the National Guard on the island--that is about 30,000 troops, which is a lot of troops.

K: They've got 30,000 NG--I thought only 9,000

C: No excuse me--9,000 plus the mobilizationof about 30,000

K: But they won't be able to mobilize them

C: That's not so sure. They've got a pretty active mobilization idea there. But then you've got the Makarios problem going and the West wing and there is already a development of some forces going in to the mountains with the idea of carrying on a resistance in favor of Makarios.

K: You mean before this?

C: That was earlier today

K: That was ---- to fight Sampson?

C: That was to fight Sampson, but at this point they would probably stay out of the fight because these are Turks who are coming in.

K: I'm assuming Sampson is a dead duck.

C: He'll fight hard and the NG will probably fight with him because these are the extreme Greeks. These guys will fight pretty hard against the Turks.

K: Could ~~he~~ it wind up with double enosis?

C: It can wind up with the Turks pretty well ensconced on the isle with some forces and establishing themselves and--on the --on part of the island. So that they cannot be dislodged but not owning the whole island and therefore the basis for a discussion and some diplomacy as to whether it ends up with double enosis or not. I think that --

K: Is there any sense in pushing for the Clerides solution

C: The Turks now think--that they want double enosis.

K: So we shouldn't push for -- what we told Sisco was to try out the Clerides solution in Athens just to get them to get rid of Sampson

C: Well, that is still a possibility--
But the other possibility is -- for you to take Makarios back there

K: How will I take him back there-l

C: By plane

K: You mean me going with him?

C: Yeh.

K: Colby I ^K now you didn't like me--why should you be the only member of the National Security Council not having a feud with me

C: No my point being that -the only problem in my particular plan is who would be the Greek you would pick up with you because you'd need a Greek

K: Like who?

C: That I don't know

K: How about Ioaniddes?

C: Pardon?

K: Unides--Uniedes?

C: No, you would need some other Greek from the mainland.
If Makarios goes back then Ioaniddes is discredited but you cannot humiliate the Greeks and therefore some Greeks have to have a part of this and it has to be a Greek solution which is one acceptable to the Turks which -- all they really don't want is enosis on the Greek side.

K: Okay, we have until Monday to think about that one--

C: Yeh, that one ybu can think about a while--meanwhile I think the Turks will establish themselves and have a position from which they will want to bargain

Page 4

K: For what?

C: The main problem is to keep the Greeks from ~~was~~ starting a fight any where else.

K: YEh. Okay. Many thanks.

C: no movement on the ^soviet side at all that we have detected.

K: Right

C: No fleets or anything else particularly although we are a little behind the time curve on that

K: I think they've been too busy monitoring Joe Sisco phone calls.

C: [Laughs] Well they do have an intelligence ship down there and I'm sure they are listening very hard.

K: Okay, Bill. Many thanks. Don't float that idea of my going out there too actively , will you.

K:

C: I won't say that to anybody but you,/ because my wife might come after you.

C: I just think the idea is to give you ideas and then you'll come out with better ones--

K: Okay--Thank you.

C: Bye.